John Freck wrote in message ...
"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message ...


"John Freck" wrote in message
om...


Why do you think Britain
didn't develop fighter bombers early like Germany?

Because Britain went with the light bomber idea pre war
and was on the defensive in 1940, which meant the RAF
fighter bombers appeared in 1941 versus 1940 for the
Luftwaffe.

Compare just
2-engined bombers with long ranged fighter bombers, and tell me which
would have been better for Britain to have during the BoB.

Easy the twin engined bombers like a Wellington could haul
4,000 pounds of bombs to the invasion ports, a Hurricane
fighter bomber 500 pounds when it came into service in
1941, even the Battles could do twice this.

Are you
willing to argue that; in a reasonable war-game, that if Britain swaps
all of her 2-engined bombers for fighter-bombers, that Britain will do
worse? Never mind alternative history POD (POint of departure)
"soundness", we are just subbing fighter bombers for bombers in a
game. Which is more important? Which can sub for what?

Easily, the damage being done to the invasion fleet was a
factor in the decision not to go and why it had to be dispersed.

No sir you cant, retooling a factory and re-training its workforce
takes considerable time during which you produce nothing at all.

What retooling? Both use the same job description workers to a tee.
Both use riveters, welders, assemblers, fitters, cutters, pressers,
ect.
Both use the forklifts, ceiling cranes, metal cutters, grinders,
torches,
drills, ect.
Both use large open space-warehouses-with strong ceilings.
Both use the same basic raw materials in nearly identical
configurations, and many parts are only different like 28" waist pants
are different than 60" pants.

A long amount of reading into the concept of machine tools
is clearly in order here. If it was so simple then hours after
the changeover to a new model, day a Spitfire V to IX
then the entire air force should have had the new model.

Effort in man hours, Spitfire production, mark / design / jigging
and tooling

I / 339,400 / 800,000
II / 9,267 / unknown
III / 91,120 / 75,000
V / 90,000 / 105,000
VI 14,340 / 50,000
IX 43,830 / 30,000
XII / 27,210 / 16,000
VII / 86,150 / 150,000
VIII / 24,970 / 250,000
XIV / 26,120 / 17,000
21 / 168,500 / unknown
PR XI / 12,415 / unknown
Seafire I / 10,130 / 18,000
Seafire II / 3,685 / 40,000
Seafire III / 8,938 / 9,000
Seafire XV / 9,150 / unknown
Spitfire on floats 22,260 / 35,000

Figures as of September 1943 for Supermarine works in
Southampton.

Even what looks like trivial design changes imposed
delays and loss of production.

Why didn't you use the Corsair as an example?

First flew 29 May 1940, ordered 30 June 1941 first
deliveries 3 October 1942.

HOw did all aircraft production jump by tens or thousands per year
then?
All major types of aircraft, that is all fighters, bombers, fighter
bombers, and transports all taken together all were jumping up rapidly
for all sides monthly. How was this done, and how is it then that
there can be no flexibility to increase fighter bombers over bombers
from July 1st, 1940 to October 1st, 1940. Early on air bases
themselves were producing large numbers of planes in mini factories:

So if we want the 1910 model aircraft we can do this method.

Every piece of a warplane could be made in the field. I have heard on
the USA's History Channel that nearly 50% of USAAF warplanes were not
made in factories at all but on or near air bases.

This is so wrong it is really funny.

The mini factories
had stuff like, mini-mills, diamond grinders, drills, metal scissors,
tool and die makers, ect. All of those can be made in a snap, are
common, and on the shelf.

Ah yes, machine tools that take months to build are a snap,
and of course they are all waiting on the shelf for the declaration
of war.

I consider it a fact that Britain set up
these mini-mills very quickly and this is a prime reason Britain had
such a high production rate.

So please detail where all those mini mills are, since no
historian has found one.

When Germany started with this method
too, its production went up to.

So again, show the locations.

I don't think that it is hard to
boost fighter production from July 1st, 1940 since it was boosted on
an emergency basis. By no means is fighter production structurally
limited like you indicate. Adding more assembly lines to an already
developed plane already in production is easy and quick.
The mini-mills can larger factory lines can be added fast until basic
raw material availability has been tapped. Sorry. Try harder, maybe.

It is really hard to punch through such iron clad ignorance
when you cannot see the screen because you are
laughing too much.

Consider further the second Spitfire production plant at Castle Bromwich
in the West Midlands. On April 12,1938 a contract was placed for 1,000
Spitfires to be built at this new factory, aircraft first came off the
production line in September 1940.

And now provide further data on how fast additional production was
added.

Since you are so sure it was easy to ramp it up perhaps
you can provide production figures.

I don't happen to have Hurricane and Spitfire monthly production
counts from July, August, September, and October 1940: but I suppose
you do.

Ah I see no information but absolute certainty about what the
facts are.

Now how do you account for the increasing counts? From you
examples, I could infer that back in 1938 Britain had pre planned the
build-up and it just so happen the BoB rolled right in just then as
things were picking up steam.

This sort of proves how random chance can make you
right occasionally. The explanation is completely correct
the increases in RAF fighter production in 1940 was due
to decisions taken in 1938 and 1939.

British Fighter output June to October 1940 by type, planned
and actual

Month // Beaufighter P/A // Defiant P/A // Hurricane P/A // Spitfire
P/A // Whirlwind P/A

June // 8/2 // 30/30 // 300/309 // 135/103 // 8/2
July // 14/5 // 50/56 // 220/272 // 140/160 // 4/3
August // 21/25 // 65/38 // 270/251 // 155/163 // 6/1
September // 24/15 // 65/41 // 280/252 // 175/156 // 8/3
October // 40/21 // 50/48 // 300/250 // 231/149 // 10/1

Total British aircraft production in 1940 January 802, February
719, March 860, April 1,081, May 1,279, June 1,591, July 1,665,
August 1,601, September 1,341, October 1,419, November
1,461, December 1,230.

There are two reasons for the summer peak, more good weather
for acceptance flights and people putting in large amounts of
overtime to produce as much as possible, with the inevitable
result of declining production as the workers tired. It took until
March 1941 to beat the peak monthly figure in 1940.

No they cant, there was no shortage of fuel, the bombers mostly used
different engines and the rest of the stuff is just silly. Once more
there was no shortage of aircraft, the RAF had seveal hundred
complete spares in stock and production was running at 300 a
month by September.

If there was no shortage why were they so concerned to increase
production further?

Presumably this means fuel and the answer is the air force was
going to become larger in future years. Air forces are energy
intensive, fuelling 1,000 Lancasters is the same amount of energy
needed for 2,000 armoured division miles, say 50 miles for 40
armoured divisions.

And I never stated there is a shortage of planes, anyway. I stated
that fighters were more important than bombers in the BoB, and Britain
should have favored fighters even more over bombers than they did. AS
far a a fuel shortage?

This is the usual hindsight ruling, and ignores the fact while
the RAF fighter situation became tight the pilot situation
was worse.

I have heard in many interviews that the RAF
was very tight on fuel. Just the other day on the Dorothy Reeem show
that what was husbanding fighters to fight "Sea Lion" was not having
fuel to head over ot the fight.

Which sort of fiction does this show push? The RAF did not
have a fuel problem in 1940.

The RAF, RN, and Army were all very worried about fuel conservation.
In addition, I have read that Britain was very interested in
projecting confidence and prowess.

Given the problems in shipping fuel to England the British
did take conservation measures, that is all.

You really are totally clueless about production engineering. An
aircraft is an incredibly complex product, even in WW2
it took around 2 years to go from prototype to production.

There is no point discussing things with a stale noodle either.

In that case why not go away?

The time from first proto-type test flights to first combat plane
mass production date is irrelevant. It would be more relevant for
you to explain how production of a plane in mass production has
production boosted.

It is called laying down additional produciton lines, and training
the work force, which takes around as much time as the original
lines, thanks to the need for things like machine tools and
buildings.

As I have noted many times for you, and you don't seem impressed.
The USAAF held in 1947 that 95% of strategic bombing missed, and only
5% was useful.

Given the basic point most of your claimed facts are fiction
there is no rason to believe what you say, provide the source
of the quote.

What was useful mostly at lower altitudes, which improves accuracy,
was against rail,
and was against energy. The energy raids were at a fairly low
altitude too as I recall.

Try again the oil targets had the heaviest flak defences, forcing
the bombers to fly at above average heights. The USAAF ETO
heavies dropped 126,191 short tons on oil targets.

Also the USAAF bomb tonnage from heavy bombers on transport
targets for the ETO comes to 226,167 short tons of bombs, this
compares with the total bomb tonnage for medium and fighter
bombers on all targets as 257,043 short tons.

Fighter bombers are an absolute requirement for ground support
but they wont demolish the oil plants which proved to be a
decisive move in WW2. Nor will they destroy the enemy's transport
infrastructure

I have seen WWII film footage from wing cameras showing Mustang
rockets killing a moving locomotive, and causing railcars filled with
munitions to explode. It is very obviously that fighter bombers can
attack bridges, trucks, rail, and ships.

This leaves marshalling yards, canals and the oil industry.


Irrelevant. address the issue please , how do you propose
to destroy the German oil industry with fighter bombers

Why not?

Try the fact it is out of fighter bomber range from England.

I know the precise opposite. Unsupported infantry gets
chopped up without anti-tank guns and air cover. Ask
the paras who got caught at Arnhem.

It is not so well known that Red Army infantrymen were brought west
just to teach Allied infantrymen their tactics for dealing with tanks,

Ah we are really into the fiction here.

And how do you propose to kill the enemy infantry ?
Wave a magic wand ?

Are you a drug abuser?

I gather this is the question John Freck is frequently asked.

I don't have all the references that might be nice for accurate
detailing.
I find my level of detailing fine for conceptual development.

Yes folks, live in a fact free zone so improve the elegance of
the proposed solutions.

The best British gun was the 17 pounder and the Americans
used their own 3" gun

I bet one
of those could be air delivered by glider, or parachute, or
airplane.

You'd lose, the 17 pounder weighed 2100 kg, was 4.2 m long
needed a truck to tow it and each round including packing weighed
around 50 pounds. The largest air portable AT gun
was the 6 pounder but damm few of them got into action.

The Douglas C-47 Dakota/Skytrain Weight empty 17,865lbs operational
31,000lbs length 19.44 meters.

So show us how a 17 pounder fitted in and how it could be
delivered by parachute or glider.

Medium bombers and fighter bombers made all of Normandy a major
success and not the heavies.

Actually it was the armies that won, assisted by the air forces,
including the heavies striking at important transport targets
as well as Germany in general, keeping the Luftwaffe busy
elsewhere.

Anything a medium bomber did during Normandy and the Normandy breakout
could have been done by fighter bombers. The prelude to the Normandy
invasion is just the sort of thing I'm taking about in terms of
tactics and weapons.

The medium bombers could travel further with larger bomb
loads, the USAAF bomb tonnage by delivery type 1944

Month / heavies / mediums / fighter bombers
March / 21,346 / 5,062 / 131
April / 27,576 / 9,475 / 1,489
May / 38,029 / 15,156 / 3,689
June / 59,625 / 15,701 / 10,322
July / 46,605 / 9,883 / 6,574
August / 49,305 / 10,716 / 7,745

Not a lot of fighter bomber sorties pre June 1944.

***** It brought the economy which
***** sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse, although the full
***** effects of this collapse had not reached the enemy's front lines when they
***** were overrun by Allied forces.


Reread, very carefully what is written above. It says that by May
1945 the effects of strategic bombing against the German economy were
not felt by frontline German troops.

Try "full effects", that is there were still tanks in the vehicle parks
ready for issue as produciton declined. Try the way the Luftwaffe
was crippled by lack of fuel and losses trying to stop the heavy
bombers. Try the way the German explosive situation was so
bad rock salt was being substituted for HE.


Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.