David Bromage wrote in message ...
Emmanuel Gustin wrote:
The logical approach seems to be to make Enola Gay the centrepiece
of an exhibition dealing with the end of the war in the Pacific.

That's what NASM wanted to do in 1995. The Smithsonian argued at the
time that it presented the context in which the decision to drop the
bomb was made and the historical significance of its use. Anyone who has
been to the Smithsonian will know it is a serious research institution
which presents facts rather than opinions.

Various groups accused them of revisionism. A lot of things were claimed
to be part of the exhibition. It was one of those stories that fed of
itself and the media reports didn't checks the story before repeating it.

If you want to see what the original exhibition focused upon, the
info is available at www.afa.org/media/enolagay/chrono.asp. From
reading the rather well documented chronology, and supporting memos
and meeting records, that the AFA includes in their site, it is
apparent that Harwit's (Museum director) claims that the concerns
raised "were not true" is itself an incorrect (at best) or downright
dishonest (at worst) assertion; maybe you are looking in the wrong
direction for these "claims" as to what was, and was not, to be part
of the exhibition. As the AFA notes (and proves with a copy of an
internal Museum memo), "In an internal memo, the Director of the Air &
Space Museum agrees with critics that the exhibit lacks balance, says
"much of the criticism that has been levied against us is
understandable." Publicly, museum officials disparage criticism as
unfair and inaccurate." So even NASM came to the belated conclusion
that their exhibit was not well balanced--they just could not bring
themselves to publicly admit it.

Ironically, NASM went to great lengths to obtain editorial review from
japanese officials in Hiroshima and Nagasaki for their "revised"
script (overnight mailing the drafts to them), but were reluctant to
provide the AFA with a copy. Is that *balance*? It is apparent from
the nature of the concerns raised by the AFA during their
communications with NASM that all they really wanted was a *balanced*
exhibit--mainly through the *addition* of material, not the deletion.
This was supposed to be an exhibit that used the Enola Gay as a
backdrop to explaining the end of the war; instead, it was hopelessly
skewed in favor of portraying the Japanese as mere victims, it
lowballed casualty estimates for the invasion and conquest of the home
islands, and it portrayed the bombing as an atrocity while largely
ignoring *real* Japanese atrocities. That the *entire* US Senate
expressed its dismay, without regard to party lines, should point out
the underlying truth that the exhibit was fatally flawed; rarely does
that body unanimously agree on much of *anything*.


The following is from a letter from the AFA to the Smithsonian after
reviewing their first few concept papers on the exhibit (this from
1993):

"The paper says the Smithsonian is non-partisan, taking no position on
the "difficult moral and political questions" but the full text does
not bear out that statement. Similarly, you assure me that the
exhibition will "honor the bravery of the veterans," but that theme is
virtually nonexistent in the proposal as drafted...Furthermore, the
concept paper treats Japan and United States in the war as if their
participation in the war were morally equivalent. If anything,
incredibly, it gives the benefit of opinion to Japan, which was the
aggressor. The revised concept plans for flashback segments, including
a major one on the firebombing of Japan – emphasizing the casualties –
but there is little mention of Pearl Harbor, except to characterize
the American response as "vengeance." Japanese aggression and
atrocities have no significant place in this account. Artifacts seem
to have been selected for emotional value (the schoolgirl's lunchbox,
for example) in hammering home a rather hard-line point of view. In
this presentation, the Japanese "felt compelled to make the ultimate
sacrifice to defend the Emperor and the nation," victims in the
defense of their islands. I wonder if the Japanese survivors and
spokesmen describing the horrors will give equal attention to the fact
that the reason Japan needed defending was that it had begun a war of
aggression a long way from home. How much emphasis will there be on
the refusal of the Japanese to surrender, even after the first atomic
bomb had been delivered?"

From the notes of a later meeting (November 93) between AFA leaders
and the Museum staff:

"We also said the concept goes out of its way to spotlight Japanese
suffering, with major focus on death and destruction as seen from the
ground. Harwit said the exhibit would show GIs suffering as well.
Correll asked if it would show GIs dead. Harwit seemed taken aback,
did not answer. We made an issue of the emotional impact of the school
child's lunch box and pointed out that there was nothing on the other
side for balance. Harwit asked what we had in mind. We mentioned
several possibilities of Japanese behavior. Harwit dismissed those
suggestions, saying the exhibit should not show Japanese atrocities
because that would make Enola Gay mission appear to be one of revenge
-- i.e., unfair to the Americans! (This was one of two instances when
the Air & Spacers rejected content that we would regard as balance on
the pretext that it was unfair to Americans.) Furthermore, Harwit
(supported by Neufeld) said the airplane itself was a dominating
"militaristic" and "macho" element in the exhibit...Neufeld
acknowledged that his low US casualty estimate (20-30,000) was for
invasion of the southern island only, and only for the first month at
that. He said higher casualty estimates -- such as the often-cited
500,000 -- could not be used because veterans groups use a figure of
1-2 million (??!!) and would not be satisfied with anything lower. The
solution, therefore, is not to use any casualty estimate --
conveniently eliminating a the impact of a key point in the decision
to drop the bomb. This, like Harwit's reluctance on Japanese
atrocities, just happens to tilt the balance toward the point we
believe they are really trying to make, and to which we object."




Not was there a political decision to cancel the exhibition, they
ordered that all the research notes and proofs of the accompanying book
be destoyed. So it's now effectively impossible to dispute the decision
or the claims that influenced it.

No, it is not. The concept papers are available, as are copies of the
"scripts" for the exhibit. Those were the items under *contention*,
for gosh sakes, and many of them are available for you to peruse on
the web via the cite I have provided to you.


I have no doubt that the debate over both 1945 and 1995 will continue
for a long time and various people will continue to make various claims
about what should and shouldn't be said. I have no doubt that somebody
will follow up this post with claims about what the exhibition was
supposed to have said, but it will be impossible to prove either way
because the evidence was ordered to be destroyed.

No, it wasn't. See above.


Benjamin Franklin once said something about a country learning from its
history and not ignoring the unpalatable bits. When a nation ignores
part of its history, no matter how unpalatable it is, it ceases to be
civilised. (If anybody has the exact quote, please let me know.)

What was "unpalatable" about that decision? It was total war, the
Japanese started it, they refused the unconditional surrender offered,
and we undoubtedly saved a lot of US and allied lives by bombing
versus invading (and likely saved as many or more Japanese lives).
Very palatable. What is unpalatable is putting up an exhibit about the
end of the war, and the things that led to that point, with sixteen
graphic photos of Japanese casualties for every one photo an American
casualty, with ten "aggressive" anti-Japanese US period quotes to one
aggressive anti-American Japanese period quote (odd, as they were the
folks who started the fracas), etc., and then trying to claim that it
is *really* quite fair and balanced. No wonder that so many japanese
have a problem accepting responsibility for their actions leading to
and during the war, when groups like NASM were so prepared to place
the lion's share of the responsibility on the US...

Brooks


Cheers
David