"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Keith Willshaw wrote:

"Cub Driver" wrote in message
...

Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
beach,

In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were
not.
The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.


The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
fought in North Africa and Sicily

It was two RLTs from the 1st ID along with an RLT from the 29th ID
(plus
the Rangers) who landed in the first wave. Here's General Bradley's
comments on his choice of the 1st ID, from his book "A Soldier's
Story":

I don't think so, Guy; the spearhead was only *two* RCT's, the 16th from
the
1st ID and the 116th from the 29th ID.

That's what I thought, from remembering the details in Adrian Lewis'
"Omaha
Beach: A Flawed Victory" (well worth the read). I was sure on the 16th and
116th, but couldn't remember if the 18th (or 26th) came in at the same
time or
subsequently, and blanked completely on the follow-on for the 29th. But I
only
had Bradley handy, and he says it was two and one, although I may be
misunderstanding him. He (or more likely an aide) wrote:

"The assault force on Omaha was to make contact with the British on its
left
while at the same time establishing a link with Utah on its right. If one
division were to be given both missions, it would have been dispersed
across a
25-mile front. And as the follow-up divisions came in, it would have
become
necessary to reassemble the 1st Division in one corner of Omaha Beach. To
avoid
the traffic snarl that would otherwise have jammed up the beach, I shaped
the
Omaha attack force with two regiments from the 1st Division, the third
from the
29th. Thus while the 1st Division concentrated to the left of the
beachhead,
the 29th would advance to the right. the follow-up division would then
come
into the whole between them."

IIRC, Lewis says that the actual assault planning was Gerow's (and
Huebner's)
responsibility, so either Bradley is misremembering things, or his
definition of
'assault force'and 'attack force' is more expansive than 'first wave'.
But then
he leaves out any mention of a second regiment from the 29th in the second
wave,
so I don't know what he had in mind. Elsewhere, he mentions that there
were
three naval forces in the American sector -- one for each beach, and a
third
with the two follow-on divisions, the 2nd for Omaha and the 90th for Utah,
so
maybe that's where he draws the line. OTOH, I've just found (pg. 270)
where he
mentions the "two assault regiments on Omaha," so clearly there's some
confusion
by the author(s).

Ah well, that's what I get for not waiting to post until I could access a
source
more dedicated to the subject. In any case, we're agreed that units of
both the
1st and 29th participated in the landings, which was the main point in my
original reply to Keith.

The schedule had the next two RCT's
(18th from 1st ID and 115th from the 29th) following at about H+3. And
when
you read the accounts of what happened that morning on the beach, it is
quite apparent that there was not a danged bit of difference between the
performance of the previously unblooded 29th troops and those veterans
(what
there was of them--ISTR the Big Red One already had picked up its share
of
green replacements since its previous efforts).

Sure did. OTOH, they at least had a cadre of combat-experienced troops
and
small-unit commanders, which couldn't be said for the 29th. ISTR that the
29th
was very similar to my dad's division*, in that some of the senior
commanders
had combat experience, but probably not at the battalion level and below.

(*The 99th, which disembarked in Le Havre in October. He said that the
99th CG,
MG Lauer, had been in North Africa, but that the division was green.
Naturally,
he was in no position to know the background and experience of every
company and
field grade officer in the infantry regiments, so take his opinion for
what it's
worth.)

Furthermore, while it is
true that the these lead elements were all under the command of the 1st
ID
HQ, that entity had darned little to do with what happened that morning,
and
in fact it was IIRC the 29th ID's ADC, BG Norm Cota, who was
instrumental in
getting the stagnated effort moving off the beach proper and up the
Vierville Draw?

Cota seems to have played a part, although just how much of one depends on
which
history you read. Some say that it was the small unit leaders that got
things
moving, and that Robert Mitchum and the other senior commanders on the
beach
were essentially irrelevant. I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the
middle,
but take your pick as to which way you lean.

snip

"Had a less experienced division than the 1st Infantry stumbled into
this
crack resistance, it might easily have been thrown back into the
Channel.
Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1st to spearhead the invasion
probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing."
[ibid,
pg. 272]

As much as I respect and admire Bradley, the fact is that the above is
after-the-fact window dressing.

I'm not sure what his justification for that would be. Why would he care
which
unit performed well?

I don't necessarily think there was some sort of sinister intention
involved. But it is not uncommon for even the most self-effacing of famous
people (and I have always admired Bradley for his relative modesty) to "over
analyze" their own contributions a bit.

The gist of his remarks (much of which I've left out)
seems to be that he was sorry that he had to use the 1st given their
tiredness,
and the troops' felt that it was someone else's turn. He makes no bones
about
the fact that their assignment to the landing was bitterly resented by
many in
the division. It's kind of surprising to me that he devotes as much space
to
his reasons for selecting them as he did. His tone sounds almost
apologetic
about having used them, but it's almost as if he wants _them_ to know why
he
considered it essential that he did, instead of one of the new, green
divisions.

And there may be the reason for that analysis--it justified thrusting those
veteran troops once again "into the breach". I have little doubt that he had
at the time real concerns about assigning completely unblooded units to the
first wave, and this was undoubtedly his reasoning. But what i am pointing
out is a benefit of "Monday morning quarterbacking"--that in fact the 29'ers
did just as well as their 1st ID brethren that morning.




In fact the performance of the 29th ID

troops and their leaders on the beach and as they seized the beachhead
was
as much, if not more, responsible for the success gained at Omaha as was
the
efforts of their 1st ID counterparts. The proof is in the pudding, as
they
say, and the pudding demonstrated that the 29th was indeed just as
capable
as the 1st ID was on 6 June 1944.

I'm not sure I agree, although it's been awhile since I read detailed
accounts
so my memory may be playing me false. The slaughter of Company A/116th
Infantry
during the approach and landing (92% casualties on D-Day IIRR, quite
accurately
depicted in "Saving Private Ryan") as well as (IIRR) other units of the
regiment
stalling at the water line would seem to indicate otherwise.

No, what that indicates is that like the rest of the force, 16th RCT
included, they were the victims of confused close in navigation and
hellacious beachead resistance. You can do a Google on "Omaha Beach" and
come up with a site that indicates that until the 1st ID ADC came trundling
ashore his own 16th RCT troops were sitting tight to cover near Sur de
M---(can't recall the actual name of the draw). In the various articles and
books I have read regarding the assault, there was no apparent difference
between the performance of the two RCT's that morning other than the fate of
where they were landed (and they were often intermixed) and what kind of
opposition was facing that particular stretch of beach. The only reference
to differing performance I found was that later in the day the 29th sector
required additional mopping up due to having to reduce bypassed and cut-off
German defenders, but how much of that was due to inexperience and how much
was due to differing terrain or a different view of what was meant by moving
inland ASAP is unknown. IIRC it was not until after this phase that the 29th
ID assumed actual command of its two RCT's that were ashore (probably about
the same time its third RCT, the 175th, came ashore I'd imagine).

Brooks

But I'll have to
refresh my memory of who actually wound up where (as opposed to where they
were
supposed to land) and did what before arguing the point.

Guy