On Sep 23, 3:14*am, " wrote:
On Sep 23, 12:13*am, "Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com wrote:





"romeomike" wrote in message

...

Mike wrote:

Not all of the things you mentioned changes the DOI, and the person in
question has no ratings beyond PP-SEL. *So it seems a bit strange that
this person has "30 years" of experience as he claims, and nothing
farther than PP-SEL. *Certainly lots of things are possible, but one
thing is for sure, he has not demonstrated any competencies beyond
PP-SEL, and the two deceased pilots he chooses to belittle have
demonstrated far more competency than he has.

Well, they gave me a new DOI when I added ratings, got my SS# taken off,
changed address several times, corrected a misspelling, got the new
plastic one, and was declared "English Proficient."

One doesn't need ratings to demonstrate competence. I know many very
competent pilots who have no rating above the PPL. Some are very good
aerobatic pilots or fly high performance planes. They just don't need to
impress anyone with ratings they don't use. Ratings won't help you if you
have poor judgment. I don't know "benford", but IMO he's demonstrated
competence and judgment by staying alive during 30 years of flying.

You're assuming he has 30 years of flying, as we only have his word on that.
You are correct in that ratings aren't the only thing required to
demonstrate competence, but what exactly has he done to demonstrate
competence other than keep himself alive for his 50 or unfathomable or
whatever hours he actually does have? *One thing I do know is that Lt.. Col
James Henderson managed to keep himself alive flying for more years that he
did. *He demonstrated his competence when he completed his instrument
rating. *He demonstrated his competence when he achieved his commercial
rating. *He demonstrated his competence by flying thousands of hours of
pipeline patrol. *He demonstrated his competence when he completed his
biannual CAP mountain qualification. *He demonstrated his competence by
becoming a CAP check pilot. *He demonstrated his competence by maintaining
his BFR on a yearly basis, and he demonstrated his competence on a monthly
basis in order to be qualified to fly the type of mission he was flying..

James Henderson gave his life trying to save the life of a kid who was lost
in the mountains. *He gave his live as a part of a volunteer organization
that helps thousands of people each year, saves dozens of lives, and teaches
tens of thousands of kids respect, community involvement, and aviation. *As
a part of that organization, James Henderson donated a considerable amount
of time , his money, and his skills. *This is an organization that Mr.. Haas
proved he has too much ego to be a part. *Now he wants to try and belittle
James Henderson and that organization as he tries to pretend he is a more
competent and experienced pilot who never does anything stupid. *So draw
your own conclusions. *The one I have is that Mr. Haas is nothing more than
a blowhard piece of human filth who needs to cast disparity on those who are
better than he is in order to inflate his already enormous ego. *YMMV..-

- Show quoted text -

Ya just can't let go. *A true CAP member..

Fact,,, After all the glowing things you have said about James
Henderson and all his aviation skills, he is DEAD,,, from his poor
flying skills, And he killed two other human being during his act of
stupidity. Somehow you forgot to praise those poor souls..

I can't wait to see your glowing report on Mr Anderson and his fine
aviating skills.

As you might know going through the ranks of the CAP require you to
progress from observer, which is rear seat , to scanner, which is
right front seat to mission pilot. That would be the one Mr James
Henderson was in. During my first and only SAREX it became quite clear
that poor ol me, in the rear seat to get "blessed"and move up front, I
was at the mercy of the piloting skills of "experienced and competent"
CAP pilots. Ya see, from the rear seat I can't take control of the
aircraft when said "competent and experienced" *pilots do something
that might kill me. What I saw *during the first and only SAREX
conviced me to not continue to put myself at risk and as any good
pilot would,mitigate those issues which would take my life. I survived
to fly another day. Guess what Mike, if that really is your name. I
fly almost every day. Mr James Henderson is not flying anymore.

As with most government organizations the tactic is to kill the
messenger when they point out flaws in the system. I was and still
will do what I can to warn other good and safe pilots to think twice
before getting into a situation that might take their life. *CAP has a
poor record of safety. Lets look at the Wyoming wing. There were four
planes, two were destroyed in fatal crashes. That is a 50% loss rate.
To you CAP guys it must be acceptable, It is definately not acceptable
to me.

In closing I want to say there are great pilots in the CAP, Bill, the
local guy is outstanding in his flying skills, the real problem is
during a training mission or an actual event one gets paired up with
other flight crews. I will be damned if I am going to be taken out by
a "competent and experienced" CAP pilot. I am kinda amazed the CAP
headquarters has not told you to "tone down" and quit scaring away
future CAP members. You don't see it but your posts are quite clearly
a detriment to the Air Force and its CAP side show.

PS, Those words in your last rant about me are grounds for a
defamation suit, and since you work for Microsoft and are probably
bringing in 6 figures+ a year I would say your assets look pretty
inviting to a hungry lawyer, and you used Mircosoft's server to post
it. That, my friend is called "gravy"

Cheers, tailwinds and safe flying guys.

Ben.- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

For those not familier with the Henderson crash,, here it is. I am
sure Mike will be able to explain the shortfalls of said flight.


DEN07FA140
HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 20, 2007, approximately 1630 mountain daylight time, a
Cessna 182R, N6109N, operated by the Civil Air Patrol as CAPS flight
4940, was destroyed when it impacted terrain 20 miles west of Dayton,
Wyoming. A post impact fire ensued. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed. The search and rescue flight was being operated under the
provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 without a
flight plan. The commercial pilot, a pilot rated passenger (scanner
trainee) and one observer were fatally injured. The flight departed
Sheridan County Airport (SHR), Sheridan, Wyoming, approximately 1530.

According to the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and the Sheridan County
Sheriff's office, the accident airplane departed Cowley, Wyoming, at
an undetermined time, in order to pick up two observers in Sheridan,
for a missing hiker search and rescue mission in the Big Horn
Mountains. One of the observers on the accident flight contacted the
United States Forest Service approximately 1430 with regards to the
temporary flight restriction (TFR 7/3431 Bone Creek Incident) over the
Big Horn Mountains. The intended search area for the Civil Air Patrol
mission included the perimeter of the TFR. It was determined that CAPS
flight 4940 would not be a factor for the TFR. Communication
frequencies and procedures were established with the US Forest Service
prior to departure from SHR.

According to a US Forest Service pilot, communication with the
accident airplane was established approximately 1550. The CAP airplane
reported that they were "maneuvering above their search area" and they
were at a higher altitude "familiarizing themselves with the terrain."
The incident commander for the Garland Gulch fire (part of the Bone
Creek Incident) reported observing an airplane, consistent in
appearance with the accident airplane, fly "slowly" over his location
in a north, northwest direction, towards the Lake and Lick Creek
drainages. The witness stated that the airplane was approximately "400
to 600 [feet] above the ground. There was no apparent indication of
trouble in performance of the aircraft, nor did it dip its wings or
anything else remarkable." He stated that the airplane did not return
to his area.

At 1756, the search and rescue teams on the ground located the missing
hiker. Approximately the same time, an aerial team working on the Bone
Creek Incident discovered another fire three miles north of where the
hiker was located, along the Lick Creek Canyon. Several water drops
were made on the fire and the wreckage of the accident airplane was
discovered approximately .75 miles from the ridge of Lick Creek
Canyon, on the east wall of the canyon.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 49, held a commercial pilot certificate with an
airplane single engine land/sea, multi-engine land/sea, and instrument
ratings. He was issued a second class airman medical certificate on
January 9, 2007. The certificate contained the limitation "must wear
corrective lenses." At the time of application, the pilot reported
1,749 hours total time; 105 hours of which were logged within the
previous 6 months. The pilot's personal logbook was not recovered.

According to the CAP, the pilot joined the CAP in April of 2001. His
Mountain Flying Certification with the CAP was successfully completed
on August 10, 2007. According to the CAP Pilot Data Summary sheet
dated May 12, 2007, the pilot reported he had logged 1,803 hours total
time, 1,541 of which were in single engine airplanes. The pilot
reported that his last flight review was conducted on February 27,
2007. His last annual checkride and Mission Check Pilot checkride with
the CAP were both conducted on May 12, 2007.

The pilot rated passenger, age 53, held a commercial pilot certificate
with an airplane single engine land, rotorcraft helicopter, and
instrument helicopter ratings. He was issued a second class airman
medical certificate in August of 2006. The certificate contained no
limitations. According to the CAP, he completed his entry level
training on April 20, 2007, and was a scanner trainee.

The observer had joined the CAP in November of 2003. According to the
CAP, she was trained as a mission observer, mission scanner, and
skills evaluator.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane, a Cessna 182R (serial number 18267787), was
manufactured in 1981. It was registered with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) on a standard airworthiness certificate for
normal operations. The airplane was powered by a Teledyne Continental
Motors O-470 U engine rated at 230 horsepower at 2,400 rpm. The engine
was equipped with a two-blade, McCauley propeller.

The airplane was registered to and operated by the Civil Air Patrol,
and was maintained under an annual inspection program. The maintenance
records were in the airplane at the time of the accident and were
destroyed. According to the Civil Air Patrol records, the last
recorded maintenance performed was an oil change and filter inspection
on April 13, 2007, at an aircraft total time of 3,537.9 hours. The
last 100-hour/annual inspection was completed on September 14, 2006,
at an aircraft total time of 3,492.6 hours.

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

Aviation area forecasts were issued for Wyoming by the Aviation
Weather Center, the day of the accident. The area forecast for
northwestern Wyoming was as follows: sky condition, scattered at
15,000 feet; winds out of the west, gusting to 25 knots. The area
forecast for northeastern Wyoming was as follows: sky condition,
clear; occasional visibility 3 to 5 statute miles in smoke. The
terminal forecast for Sheridan for the time period closest to the
accident flight was as follows: winds 340 at 4 knots; visibility, 4
statute miles, smoke; sky condition, few clouds at 10,000 feet,
scattered at 20,000 feet.

The winds aloft forecasts were issued for the accident airplanes route
of flight for Billings (BIL), Montana, (75 miles north, northwest of
the accident site) and Crazy Woman (CZI), Wyoming (85 miles southeast
of the accident site.) The forecast from 1100 to 1500 was as follows:
BIL - 9,000 feet, 280 degrees at 29 knots, 12,000 feet, 280 degrees at
35 knots; CZI - 9,000 feet, 270 degrees at 17 knots, 12,000 feet, 280
degrees at 38 knots. The forecast from 1500 to 2400 was as follows:
BIL - 9,000 feet, 280 degrees at 22 knots, 12,000 feet, 250 degrees at
22 knots; CZI - 9,000 feet, 260 degrees at 14 knots, 12,000 feet, 260
degrees at 23 knots.

Airman's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) for turbulence (TANGO)
was issued for areas in Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, including the
accident airplane's route of flight. AIRMET TANGO covered an area from
50 nautical miles (nm) north, northwest of Williston, North Dakota, to
50 nm west, southwest of Rapid City, South Dakota, to 50 nm east,
northeast of Salt Lake City, Utah, to Jackson, Wyoming, to 40 nm south
of Cranbrook, Canada. The AIRMET stated to expect moderate turbulence
below 14,000 feet. There were no AIRMETS for icing, instrument flight
rules, or mountain obscuration for the accident airplane's route of
flight.

The spot forecast for the Garland Gulch Fire, issued by the National
Weather Service in Billings, Montana, forecasted winds west, to
northwest at 10 to 15 mph, with gusts to 25 mph for the slopes and
valleys. Ridgetop winds were forecast to be out of the west at 25 to
40 miles per hour.

The closest official aviation weather observation station was Sheridan
County Airport (SHR), Sheridan, Wyoming, located 35 nm east of the
accident site. The elevation of the weather observation station was
4,021 feet mean sea level (msl). The routine aviation weather report
(METAR) for SHR, issued at 1553, reported, winds, calm; visibility, 3
statute miles, haze; temperature 23 degrees Celsius (C); dewpoint, 03
degrees C; altimeter, 29.94 inches.

Two fire weather observation stations were located within 10 miles of
the accident site. The Boyd Ridge (BYDW4) station was located 5 miles
northwest of the accident site, at an elevation of 7,740 feet msl. The
observation for BYDW4, recorded at 1655, reported winds from the
north, northwest at 9 miles per hour (mph) with gusts to 21 mph. The
Burgess (BUJW4) station was located 8 nautical miles southeast of the
accident site at an elevation of 7,743 feet msl. The observation for
BUJW4, recorded at 1649, reported winds from the west, southwest at 12
mph with gusts to 25 mph. Visibility was not reported at either
station.

The pilot of the aircraft that located the initial fire noted that
there were "high winds and surface friction causing turbulence." There
was no record of the pilot obtaining a weather briefing from the FAA
Flight Service Station or the Direct User Access Terminal System
(DUATS).

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC)
arrived on scene approximately 1000 on August 23, 2007. The accident
site was located on the east side of a vegetated canyon wall. A global
positioning system receiver reported the coordinates of the main
wreckage as 44 degrees 51 minutes 37.2 seconds north latitude, and 107
degrees 40 minutes 17.6 seconds west longitude. The accident site was
at an elevation of 7,650 feet msl and the airplane impacted on a
magnetic heading of 010 degrees.

The tops of several pine trees were broken in the direction of the
main wreckage. An airplane antenna and paint chips were located
directly below these trees. A debris field extended from the initial
impact point, north, approximately 50 feet, to the right wing and a
large burn area. The wing exhibited aft accordion crushing, torn
metal, and was charred, melted, and partially consumed by fire. The
right aileron and flap were consumed by fire. Aileron cable continuity
was confirmed from the aileron bell crank, inboard to the wing root.
The cable end failure was consistent with tension overload.

The debris field and burn area continued in a northeast direction, in
down-sloping terrain. The propeller assembly separated from the engine
and was located approximately 50 feet north of the right wing. The
propeller blades were arbitrarily labeled "A" and "B" for
identification purposes only. Blade "A" was bowed forward
approximately 60 degrees and exhibited leading edge scratches and
chord wise scratches. Blade "B" was bowed aft approximately 45 degrees
and exhibited leading edge knicks, and chord wise scratches. The
throttle control separated from the fuselage and was partially melted.
It was secured in a position 1.5 inches aft of a full forward
position.

The main wreckage, to include portions of the empennage, fuselage, and
left wing, came to rest inverted, approximately 140 feet from the
initial impact point. The wreckage exhibited extensive crushing and
torn metal due to impact damage. The wreckage was charred, melted, and
consumed by fire. The instrument panel was destroyed, and various
instruments scattered downhill from the main wreckage. The vertical
speed indicator (VSI) indicated a rate of descent of 1,900 feet per
minute. The bottom portion of the directional gyro gave an indication
of 190 degrees.

Rudder cable control continuity was established from the rudder pedals
aft, to the "tail cone" area. Control cable continuity for the left
aileron was established from the aileron bell crank, inboard, to the
wing root. Elevator control continuity was established from the
elevator bell cranks, forward, to the "tail cone" area. Signatures
consistent with tension overload were observed in all of the cables.
The trim tab actuator for the elevator was measured at 1 inch.
According to Cessna, this is consistent with 10 degrees tab down. The
flap jackscrew exposed 5.8 inches of threads. According to Cessna,
this is consistent with 40 degrees of flaps.

The engine separated from the airplane and came to rest approximately
100 feet downhill (east) of the main wreckage. It exhibited no
apparent fire damage. The vacuum pump, alternator, and left magneto
separated from the engine and were not located. The top bank of spark
plugs were removed and the engine was partially rotated by the
crankshaft propeller flange. Movement of all six pistons was noted.
The right magneto was removed and rotated by hand. Spark was observed
on all six leads. Due to impact damage, tactile compression could not
be confirmed.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The autopsy was performed by the office of Forensic Medicine and
Pathology, PLLC, Billings, Montana, on August 21, 2007, as authorized
by the Sheridan County Coroner's office. The autopsy revealed the
cause of death as "blunt traumatic injuries."

During the autopsy, specimens were collected for toxicological testing
to be performed by the FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (CAMI Reference #200700197001). Tests for
carbon monoxide, and cyanide were not performed. Tests for ethanol
were negative. Ibuprofen was detected in the urine.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

According to the CAP policies and procedures, the pilot will obtain a
weather briefing from an FAA weather briefer. They will share the
contents of the weather briefing with their crew. While operating the
aircraft in mountainous terrain, the pilot should adjust the search
altitude, based upon the winds aloft. For 10 knots of wind, the pilot
shall add 1,000 feet to the search altitude - 20 knots of wind results
in an addition of 2,000 feet added to the search altitude.

The CAP Mountain Furry - Mountain Search Pilot Course Guide states
that more "than 30 knots of wind at the operating altitude usually
denotes that the flight should be delayed or postponed until more
favorable conditions prevail." The text continues to state that
"mission search pilots may fly as close as 500 to 1,000 feet from
mountain ridges and terrain (providing the wind allows this
operation)."

According to the CAP Mission Flight Plan/Briefing Form, the mission
was going to use multiple search patterns at a search altitude of
1,000 feet above ground level and a search airspeed of 100 knots. They
were searching the northern half of grid 518 on the Billings Sectional
Chart. Hazards to this particular flight were noted as winds, smoke,
and firefighting.

Parties to the investigation included the Civil Air Patrol, Cessna
Aircraft Company, Teledyne Continental Motors, the United Stated Air
Force, and the FAA as represented through the Casper, Flight Standards
Field Office. The wreckage was released to a representative of the
Civil Air Patrol on December 7, 2007.




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