I appreciate all folks who post to promote discussions in
review of accident situations, and encourage other pilots to consider
how to avoid similar exposure or actions in their own flying, by
reviewing accident synopses. I have given a few presentations at
SSA conventions and regional or local soaring gatherings specifically
reviewing soaring accidents -- NOT to reach conclusions, but to
evaluate
the multitude of POSSIBILITIES that could have occurred.

I find many accident evaluations woefully inadequate, and have acted
to support NTSB in several situations both close and far, with
technical
resources and references.

It is emotionally simple to conclude, "the weather got him." Any him.

We weren't there; many sites are remote from "local" weather recording
systems; in the Western states, weather stations operate in separate
basins or localized systems. Mountain chains isolate weather into
discreet patterns in often channelized flow. Yet, Sierra or Owens
Valley
pilots readily report that winds at or above ridgeline are often
distinctly
different than below ridgelines.

I find it too simplistic to conclude that both Geoff and Steve
expereinced
"similar" weather simply because they impacted within 50 miles and
30 days of each other. I have seen days that offer great soaring
or scary thunderstorms on those mountains within five miles at
any given moment. Personal courseline selection determines safe
or scary flight conditions.

I find it difficult to believe that Steve would encounter "scary winds
and conditions" on a scenic solo flight which ended
at 9:30 A.M. A glider pilot who launched from and returned to Cal
City
on that day flew within ten miles of Steve's impact, at about 3:30
pm.
It was a 'normal' summer day, no extreme OD, no massive cu-nims,
no wave. Would Steve go looking at gorgeous terrain? Sure.
We all love those vistas. It's breathtaking scenery.

Would Geoff knowingly fly into 'extreme turbulence'? Not based on the
descriptions given by his flying friends. I don't have access to
Geoff's
flight trace to be able to say that he was flying "close to
terrain."
Maybe Jim or others did have access to a flight file. I was bemused
by his last reported altitude and location related to the impact
location.
It seemed a short way flown for a big altitude loss. But that was
all based on hear-say, not a trace.

I know there was no log file for Fossett. So we cannot say he was
"close to terrain". No one knows for sure. We only know he struck
terrain at high speed, based on the site and wreckage.

I agree with Jim and Martin -- we should encourage establishing and
heeding personal margins from terrain based on expereince, recency,
and conditions. Leave a little extra room, for friends and loved
ones.
Big weather and big terrain should encourage bigger margins of
terrain separation.

What else COULD have happened? Without the benefit of flight log
files? Pretty simply - my first bet would be pilot incapacitation.
That would not have been found (and continues to not be found),
in many soaring accidents. Where a coroner gets to make an
evaluation, they take the expedient and simple answer - blunt force
trauma was cause of death. To look for, or find, any prior medical
event evidence of stroke or an eschemic event is difficult and/or
beyond the scope of what the autopsy 'needs' to find.

NTSB doesn't get to 'tell' a county employee how to do their job.
Where a sole decedent involves no injury or damage to others,
why spend county dollars and work hard for a messier answer?
The bereaved usually only want a fast and simple answer.

So - what possibilities remain for the NTSB?
"Strange weather" can always be sold to the public.
No one stood there and watched, no system recorded
'local' weather, so the report writer gets off simply. No one can
prove them wrong. They have no conclusive information for
another option. They aren't allowed to speculate.

But - these were both healthy guys, you exhort. Yep.
So was Jim Fixx, before he dropped in his tracks. Hug the
ones you love, as we don't know when we'll leave.

I would prefer that if log files existed for accident flights,
they be published as part of the public record. Then we would
be free to evaluate the trace and come to our own conclusions.
Personally, in two fatal flight records I have seen,
one pilot made a mistake and turned toward terrain with
inadequate separation, and one trace showed apparent
incapacitation. Neither answer was easy for family.

I think if we all wish to help each other and ourselves in this
spring season, we should choose to review accident reports
and ask -- what could have happened?
Could I avoid being in that situation?
Am I evading looking at that accident as being pertinent to me,
due to --
"it's a different glider/different weather than home" (transference)
"I'm a better pilot, I'm more careful" (macho/ego)
"I won't fly in that kind of weather/terrain/racing" (rationalization)
"I'm too upset to think about my lost friend" (flight).

Think about flying with a CFI or friend and have them
review your skills before this season. Soaring Safety
Foundation calls this the First Flight program, and I now have
several private owner pilots come to us for a spring brush up.
They decided they'd rather pay a few hundred bucks to an FBO,
than a few thousand for a repair bill and a scare in the current
season.

Best wishes for safe flying in 2009 for all,

Cindy B



On Apr 6, 8:48*pm, Hellman wrote:
I got the following message from Jim Herd today
SNIP
On Apr 5, 2009, at 10:48 PM, Jim Herd wrote:

Pilots and Friends of Geoff,
SNIP

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?...3&ntsbno=SEA07....

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...07FA231&rpt=fi

Incidentally, the parallels between Geoff’s accident and Steve
Fossett’s are uncanny. They were just 3 weeks and 50 miles apart, at
the same altitude with similar winds and gnarly mountains. Both were
flying quite close to terrain, and both were hit by unexpected extreme
turbulence caused by a combination of wind, terrain, and thermal
activity.

SNIP
The message I have learned is to stay further away from
terrain, especially when downwind of terrain. We all need to increase
our safety margins.