"Bill Phillips"  wrote in message 
... 
     The impact the CBO had 
    prior to 1944 was to draw manpower to defend Germany from the front. 
  Every 
   guy 
    manning a AAA piece or fueling a fighter would have been carrying a 
   Mauser-98 
    on either the eastern or western front if it wasn't for the CBO. 
    
   Just like all the effort being put into bombing as not available to 
help 
  the 
   allied armies. 
  
  Nor could it have been, at least not effectively (see below). At least 
 they 
  kept the Luftwaffe largely in check while also makiong the POL and 
  transportation situations within Germany a nightmare (all three of which 
  were very good things for the "allied armies"). 
  
  Also the flack units could and did turn their guns on ground 
   targets in the later stages of the war. 
  
  Great. Imagine how much MORE succesful they would have been had they not 
 had 
  to concentrate all of those resources on defending the homeland and 
 instead 
  had been putting them on more mobile armored platforms. 
  
   
   How long would a Kar-98 carrying soldier last if the allies put all 
that 
   effort into the battlefield?' 
  
  And pray tell just HOW would you put all of that effort "onto the 
  battlefield"? We know that level bombing was of mixed, at best, tactical 
  value when applied "to the battlefield" (witness COBRA). The allied 
ground 
  forces in France in late 1944 were about as big as you could manage 
given 
  logistics constraints (and no, having all of the bombers play transport 
  would not have appreciably changed that picture), so you would not have 
 been 
  reorienting the bombing resources into the ground fight very easily. 
 Sounds 
  like your plan is not very workable. OTOH, having the CBO ongoing 
 prevented 
  what was left of the Luftwaffe in late 44 from being able to effectively 
  focus on supporting their own ground forces opposing the oncoming allied 
  ground juggernaut. It did indeed make the POL situation a critical one 
for 
  German forces, including those on the ground facing Ike's troops. I just 
  can't see how we could have substantially improved upon the situation by 
  reorienting the resources applied to the CBO--as Buffdrvr points out, we 
  could have better *focused* them to be more effective, given the benefit 
 of 
  hindsight, but in the end the combined weight of *all* of the resources 
  brought to bear, from the CBO to the ground soldiers and TACAIR, working 
  simultaneously to apply pressure to the Germans from all directions and 
  forcing them to try to defend *everywhere* versus concentrating solely 
 upon 
  the ground equation, was the optimal solution to be had. 
  
 It depends on when you divert the resources. 
 
 Once you have built bombers you are restricted in what you can do with 
them. 
 
 However change early enough and you can build almost anything instead, 
such 
 as a tank that could take on Tigers and Panthers 1 to 1. Note: resources 
are 
 a quality issue as well as a quantity one, better equipment could have 
 actually reduced the logistic burden by achieving a given effect with less 
 equipment. 
 
Then you would have had to scrap the entire US military production strategy, 
which was based upon getting a LOT of "good enough" stuff produced as 
opposed to the German approach of building a few really good items--we know 
which side lost, so I would side with the winning strategy. 
 
 
 Even if it was put into air power then it could have won the battle of the 
 Atlantic earlier 
 
That is not assured. merely tossing a few hundred more aircraft over the 
ocean was not going to stop the German subs; it took a combination of 
aircraft and emerging technology (i.e., small radars capable of seeing the 
surfaced little buggers). Then you would have had to factor in that the 
germans, not being subjected to any kind of CBO, would have produced even *m 
ore* boats ata faster pace, and trained them more effectively since there 
was not the additional effect on their POL supplies, not to mention the fact 
that all of those flak crews and resources would have been reprogrammed to 
face your other threats, and their Luftwaffe would have been better able to 
support operations on *both* fronts, etc, ad nauseum. 
 
and some more CAS and air transport would have been useful 
 for the advance across Europe.  For example a little more air power would 
 have turned Operation Market Garden into a victory. 
 
No freakin' way. The weather shut out air support almost altogether during a 
critical window of that operation, and a few more C-47's would NOT have 
affected the outcome at Arnhem. 
 
Brooks 
 
 
 Much the same is true of the German efforts. 
 
 
 
 
 
		
	
		
		
		
		
		
	
		 
			
 
			
			
			
				 
            
			
			
            
            
                
			
			
		 
		
	
	
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