"Robert Barker" wrote:

"Edward A. Falk" wrote:

Robert Barker wrote:

Airbus thinking seems to be that the computer is always right so
don't argue with it. There's a LOT more that makes Airbus less than
a treat to fly.

There's a saying that on an Airbus, the autopilot outranks the
captain.

And to protect Airbus, they'll call it "pilot error". Impartial
analysis will probably show the pilots had their hands full trying to
turn off all the automation so they could actually fly the stupid
thing.

No, the system switched to alternate law all by itself when the speed
signals went screwy, and there was no need to shut off the automation. In
this mode, it is like flying any direct fly aircraft, but without stall
protection. It still maintains some protecton against overstressing the
airframe. Automation didn't initiate the climb, which is what doomed the
flight, it was the pilot input that did that, resulting in the upset.

On the surface, the pilot lost control of a perfectly flyable airplane,
which was in stable flight before he took control. However, part of the
investigation certainly has to be why the pilot flying didn't put the
nose down as a reaction to repeated stall warnings. This is something
any pilot learns when first starting to fly, and should be a natural
reaction when hearing the alarm. Was he overwhelmed by all the alarms and
missed the stall warning? Did he think he was correcting for wind shear
or some other problem?

The pilot of the Colgan Air flight approaching Buffalo did the same
thing, and some studies suggest that when surprised, the majority of
pilots will try to pull the nose up when they hear a stall warning, which
is exactly the wrong thing to do. Is it just human nature to pull back
on the controls, thinking you want to stay away from the ground, rather
than point the aircraft at the ground to recover?

Further, why did he never figure out that he was in a stall and take
appropriate action? Beyond the alarms, the lack of wind noise past the
cockpit should have been an obvious clue, yet only once did he try
putting the nose down, and only then for a short time.

That said, there have been a number of other times on both Boeing and
Airbus aircraft where the pitots froze up in similar conditions, and the
pilots were easily able to maintain control without the need for
aggressive control inputs. Why was it different this time?