"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message
news
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message
ink.net...
Granted
they may not have done as badly as press reports suggest, but these
wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by
helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable
option.

That is one hell of a leap based upon the results encountered during a
single mission where the SEAD support was intentionally withheld. A
lot of green suiters (outside the aviation community) thought that
the emphasis on the deep attack mission was bit overdone, but to
condemn the entire concept as "not viable" based upon one mission?
That's a bit much.

As I've said in another post, it's not just one mission. Afghanistan
(especially Op ANACONDA) certainly cast some doubt on current attack helo
doctrine.

How did Anaconda do that? There they used the attack helos as CAS platforms
in a rather demanding environment (helos don't like really high altitude
operations that much). They performed their mission and took ground fire;
one helo was lost after it had to set down during the transit back home
(another Apache took an RPG round and stayed in the fight). So what
universal conclusion can you reach based upon Anaconda results? Or for that
matter based upon any other attack helo usage in Afghanistan?


But I did sort of misdirect my comments here. I really should have said
that these ops suggested that Comanche wasn't going to offer enough
improvement in Army aviation's capability to perform these missions. As a
fairly large helo (smaller than Apache, but not that much smaller),
Comanche
wasn't going to be dramatically less vulnerable to the sort of threats
that
were actually being encountered. But it was going to be a lot more
expensive. Its main improvement for the performance of these missions
seems
to have been in sensors, which surely can be retrofitted to Apache for
less
money.

I'd agree with the conclusion that Commanche did not offer enough gain to be
worth its increasingly ridiculous cost. As to retrofitting sensors on
Apache, another poster has already addressed the concerns that will have to
be overcome if that route is followed. That would be sort of a reverse move
for the Army, though-- IIRC they just finished pulling the AH-64's from the
Cav units a few years ago in favor of the AH-58D.



It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's
only slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting
for,

You think the cavalry scout helos are there only to operate in
support of the attack helos? Nope. Cavalry units can be tasked to
independently screen and guard at the division level;

Granted. But why do they need a unique helo for this? Can't a cavalry
aviation formation have attack helos the same way a cavalry ground
formation
has tanks?

The AH-58D became the standard Cav scout/light attack aircraft for the DIV
Cav squadrons years ago, and the Apaches reside in the attack battalions at
both DIV and Corps level, except for the airborne and light divisions, which
have AH-58D's in their *attack* units (the 101st AASLT DIV retained the
Apache). You are somewhat mixing your unit definitions a bit, too--cavalry
units, be they corps or division level, are combined arms teams that already
include *both* ground and air components (at DIV level the mix is three
ground troops and two air troops, while at the corps level the regiment is
made up of three ground squadrons and an air squadron). Yes, you can
*augment* the cavalry unit's firepower by attaching some number of Apaches
to it (if, for example, you wanted your DIV Cav unit to conduct a cover
mission, which is normally beyond its capabilities). The current "unique
helo", the AH-58D, is quite capable of performing the normal range of
cavalry duties, and can perfrm adequately in the light attack role--why
would you want to pull Apaches away from their normal attack duties and try
and turn them into cavalry platforms?


or why
you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent
surveillance radars like Longbow.

So the attack helos can concentrate on their mission (killing bad
guys), while the cavalry scouts perform their mission (screen, guard,
reconnoiter, etc.).

In which case, the scouts don't need heavy armament.

Uhmmm...look up what is involved with both screen and guard missions. Both
involve the potential of direct combat (guard moreso than screening). Then
there is that pesky fact that we have *only* AH-58D's assigned to the light
and airborne divisions...

If you were going to
have a heavily armed scout, it seems like the Apache could have done that
job, too with the main differences being in crew training and doctrine
rather than the airframe.

Again, you are going to be pulling them away from their primary role of
being killing platforms. The 58D is a little smaller (a good thing for the
sneak and peek role) and is easier to get into theater via airlift. It
apparently performs quite well in the scout role, so why remove attack
assets from the force structure to replace them?

Given the shortcomings of the Kiowa Warrior, I
get the impression that Apache units have been pretty much self-scouting
in
many cases anyway.

Not sure what "shortcomings" you would be referring to in the case of the D
model. And you have sort of made a point that goes against your earlier
claim that the scouts are there "only" to support the attack helos. In
actuality they support the entire force; they *can* and often *do* support
the Apaches, but not always, and not exclusively.

Brooks


--
Tom Schoene