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Old February 25th 04, 11:03 PM
Howard Berkowitz
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In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...
In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that

I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those

blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.


Can we say "Key West Agreement"?


No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd. It's
past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope
and
provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the franchise
on
fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the
Air
Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast
movers
that can also be used for other missions" by planning on replacing the
A-10 with the F-35.



Please don't assume I'm defending the thing! But it probably is the
reason for the rotorcraft emphasis.

If we look at roles and missions, there are cases where operational and
routine control could very reasonably differ. For example, long-range
air defense assets like Patriot and SM-2 could go, operationally, to the
service component with the best battlespace management capability. Might
be Air Force, might be Navy.

But logistic and maintenance support for the Patriot vehicles, given
commonality with other platforms, belongs in the Army.