"Ed Rasimus"  wrote in message 
... 
 On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering" 
  wrote: 
 
  
  
 I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the 
 replacement for the A-10.  Some sort of game boy type interface to 
designate 
 targets would be all the human interface required.  In that manner the 
 tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated. 
 
 That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an 
 incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require 
 some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with 
 pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of 
 trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech, 
 mud-reliable sort of weapon. 
 
I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and 
operator support requirements.  UAVs are already flying in US airspace using 
existing comercially available sensors.  My vehicle in atonomous mode could 
come to the battle and then go home when exhasted.  Such UAVs are already 
envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a 
transportation link. 
 
 Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the 
 ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he 
 seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a 
 detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked 
 vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports 
 what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a 
 difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS. 
 
CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet.  The only 
thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having a 
flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA years 
ago. 
 
 You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace 
 coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of 
 aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or 
 flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver 
 ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem. 
 
Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the fighter 
mafia. 
 
 And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an 
 unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made 
 few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic. 
 
The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents 
is poor.  I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in 
this forum. 
 
 
 
		
	
		
		
		
		
		
	
		 
			
 
			
			
			
				 
            
			
			
            
            
                
			
			
		 
		
	
	
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