On 15 Apr 2004 23:31:32 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

SAC remained a specified command and not chopped to PACAF or
7th AF for employment. This very issue is the core of Michel's book,
"Eleven Days of Christmas."

Yeah, Michel pretty much blames SAC for everything that went wrong in the world
after 1966, but that doesn't change the fact he was correct about their
involvement in what went wrong during LB II.

I think that is painting with too broad a brush. What Marshal says is
that the isolation of SAC dating back to the LeMay involvement at the
beginning led to an unresponsive command structure. SAC was certainly
pivotal in maintaining deterrence throughout the Cold War, but they
weren't a contributor to air power in an effective way for lesser
wars.

And, Marsh points out, the unresponsiveness of the SAC leadership to
the requests of the local commanders cost a lot of B-52 crews their
lives or freedom on day 1 through 6 of LB II.

Linebacker I was significantly more effective than Rolling Thunder.

Agree.

But,
the damage inflicted by LB II was the decisive factor.

I'll have to disagree with you there Ed. I did a lot of research for a 40 page
masters thesis and nearly every target struck during LB II had either already
been struck during LB I or was struck repeatedly during LB II basically turning
over rubble. Ed, B-52s alone dropped over 4,000 M-117 on the Kinh No
railyard...which had already been 60% disabled in November. BUFFs dropped over
3,000 M-117 on the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant....also struck repeatedly in
November. I mean, come on Ed, they sent 36 B-52 sorties after the damn Hanoi
Radio site, dropped over 3,000 bombs, lost 4 B-52s and never even took the damn
thing out. On day #9 a pair of F-4Es hit it with a few LGBs and knocked it off
the air for months. No Ed, I'm going to have to disagree, we were mainly
turning over rubble and making a political statement during those days and
nights.

We had been bombing NVN on and off for eight years. There are only a
limited number of targets in an area the size of RP VI. It is almost
inevitable that you will be re-striking previously struck targets.
But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
area. Additionally we added targets such as all of the MiG bases and
(as you note) radio Hanoi. We took out all of the major RR bridges in
town, got confirmed kills on 43 SAM sites, restruck Thai Nguyen steel
and the power plant, hit Viet Tri and Phu Tho's power plants, etc.
etc.

They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their
significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even
hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't
be done.

Academic
interpretation of the events will not prevail as long as there are a
bunch of us participants still around to speak the truth.

I'm sorry Ed, but I've researched every target hit by B-52s during LB II and
even the ones struck for the first time (and there were only 3 or 4) were hit
again and again. I used an accuracy of 1000 feet and plugged the numbers into
todays targeteering software and the .pd inflicted on nearly every BUFF target
was .8 or better after being struck the second time. Problem is most targets
were hit 3, 4 or even 5 times. I know you've seen me say this to Kramer before
Ed, but just because you were a participant doesn't mean you've got an accurate
view of events.

I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.

On a similar subject, I'll be attending Army General Command & Staff College
next year at Ft. Leavenworth and I just received my "book report" reading list
for the Air Force prep course preceeding the Army course (basic Air Force 101 I
guess ??). #21 on a list of 26 was "When Thunder Rolled". I guess I'll have to
pick it up Ed. Looking forward to reading it.

You mean you haven't read it yet? You might want to continue waiting
until Sept 28th when it will be released in paperback by Random
House/Presidio Press for $6.99. The new book, tentatively titled
"Phantom Flights/Bangkok Nights" will be out from Smithsonian this
fall as well. It contains a few stories about Linebacker I and II seen
out the front window rather than from the back of the library.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8