On 21 Apr 2004 10:39:02 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

You're hedging. You indicated that personal observation was a poor
source of historical fact; that on-scene observers were unreliable and
only imperfectly viewed the metaphorical "lower right-hand corner of
the big picture."

Taken by itself, yes, personal observations are not adequate historical
sources. When backed up by other personal sources they get more credibility,
but when backed up by documents, they become factual. The munition, food and
POL shortages experienced by the NVA in the summer of '72 are well documented
by NV government records and by dozens of NV officers and enlisted who were
obsessive diary keepers. Ed, you're arguing against a very solid historic fact.

My challenge has never been that historical compilation is inaccurate.
I've been contending that as long as we have first person accounts
available, we can integrate the "official" record with the live
on-scene experiences to get a considerably more accurate account. In
many instances, availability of first-person recollections will result
in correction of the historic records.

The real issue here is that on the one hand you are eager to discount
first person US recollections on intensity of the fighting and
simultaneously accept the NVN statements. And, do you really mean to
say that the NVA operating from the tunnels and jungle caves deep into
SVN, short of "munition, food and POL" were devoting their time to
meticulous record keeping? This while the massive US bureaucracy of
MAC-V was simply doodling away on French cuisine and Eurasian whores?


As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable.

Not with 108 bombs its not! Come on Ed, I split the runways at Batajanica with
a B-52 two-ship with a grand total of 90 weapons. 2 more two-ships followed
until we quartered the runway making it useless for anything except a
Cessna-172. This was all done with unguided Mk-82s. Its not really that
difficult to cut runways, even with unguided weapons.

Gimme a break. I'll accept your well-earned pride in your system and
capabilities, but if you've really done that in-depth research of the
LB II BUFF strikes, you've seen the same B&W BDA photos I have from
the period. Long bomb trains walking up to and over discrete targets
with one, two or three bombs out of the string possibly hitting the
target---or in some instances ending before the target, starting after
the target or paralleling the target but missing cleanly.

And, I'm sure you've been briefed and maybe even personally observed
"rapid runway repair" teams in action. That technology has been around
for a lot of years. And, you can trust me, the NV were quite good at
it. Maybe Serbs hadn't finished the correspondence course yet.


I suspect that they were shooting at
shadows--no airplanes at all.

However, this whole issue gets at the heart of your argument. Here you have
reports from guys who were actually there and compared to studies done by guys
who weren't actually there (sitting in the back of a library as you put it) we
find the "library guys" more historically accurate. Why? Because the infameous
"fog and friction" tends to distort reality. There's no fog and little friction
from the back of a library. I'm not sure how familiar you are with the study
Checkmate did in the 80s of a supposed F-4 to F-4 blue on blue kill in Vietnam,
but several guys who were not old enough to drive when the incident occured,
accurately figured out that a supposed blue-on-blue kill in 1971 (I think?)
over NVN was, in fact, an enemy MiG-21 that shot down the F-4. As far as I'm
concerned personal eyewitness accounts are good historical sources, but like
all other sources, must be supported by other documentation.

Ahhh, Checkmate..."John Warden? I knew John Warden. John Warden was a
friend of mine. And, frankly, Senator, you're no John Warden...."
(Sorry, I digress.)

Read about Chuck Horner's dismissal of John Warden when setting up the
offensive team for Desert Storm in Clancy's collaboration, "Every Man
a Tiger."

"blue-on-blue kill in 1971"? Sounds like some of that great
history---no ops going in in MiG country in '71. LB didn't start until
May of '72, and the various "protective reaction" incursions were down
in the panhandle.

Recently, Howard Plunkett sent me an extract from the Pentagon study
(Red Baron) that gathered all the MiG engagement data of the SEA war.
It covered an encounter that I had with a MiG-17 that is detailed in
When Thunder Rolled in the chapter titled "MiGs and Moustaches". The
positions in the illustrations are wrong. The sequence of events is
wrong. The ranges between aircraft are wrong. Even the location
relative to the target and other flights is wrong. The only interview
conducted to establish the definitive historic account was done eight
months after the event with the flight lead in Wichita KS. No other
participants were interviewed and the flight lead was not in a
position to witness the entire engagement. Yet, that becomes the
historic record.

For several years after LB II, Carl Jeffcoat who I mentioned earlier
as being downed by a MiG 21 near Kep, believed that he was shot down
by a member of the Hunter/Killer flight rather than an enemy aircraft.
Talking to several participants who were airborne that day, we
confirmed that no H/K aircraft were carrying Sidewinders. No H/K
aircraft fired a Sparrow.

If you read the history of LB II, twenty years from now, you'll know
that two BUFF tail gunners killed MiG 21s. Today, while some of the
participants are still around, we'll tell you that while it is
remotely possible it is extremely unlikely.

YMMV.



A SAM site without SAMs or radar in residence isn't really a SAM site
is it?

LOL...nope, not at all. I was trying to point out that had there been an SA-2
site located in those areas (which there wasn't), they would have certainly
been destroyed, so the fact that no SAMs were attacked by B-52s is a matter of
good NVN luck.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8