Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

snip

From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far inland
with
large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least
dual-point,
but
they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
preferred,
before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point boom
tanker is
about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or
F-18E/Fs
exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of
their
strikes
when they do so.

Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting the
USN,
with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767 won't
have
that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a critical
situation for the USN.

But it may be critical for bed-down and other operational issues, and it's
definitely inefficient. Besides,who says we're only supporting the USN?
In
various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets, plus
the
RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_
multi-point
tankers on occasion.

And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply that we
have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point refueling
right *now*.

I never said they _all_ had to be optimized right _now_, but I can see no reason
not to buy new tankers set up that way from the start, as our need for drogue
tanking is clearly inceasing (cf. the proposed USAF F-35B buy).

Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767 isn't
planned
to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.

Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in regards
to
the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to
upgrade
them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they
have to
get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly.

The justification for that has always been somewhat questionable. Only a
few
years ago they were projecting the 135E's fatigue life out 30 or 40 years,
although the engines were probably going to need replacement. Let's face
it,
the 767 deal has more than a little to do with keeping Boeing's 767 line
open
and people employed. Would it be a good thing to get some newer tankers?
Sure. Do we need them right now, because the 135Es are falling apart?
That's
arguable.

Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge tanker
support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
(operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher than they
were pre-9/11).

Yes, an increase from an average utilization of 300 hours/yr. to 435 hrs/year.
Even at the latter rate the KC-135Es have a fatigue lifespan of 82 years (36,000
hrs., vs. 39,000hrs for the KC-135Rs), and they're just a bit over halfway
through that.

Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment (witness
the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's, C-5's,
etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have also not
undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have to do
the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into R
models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.

We don't know that's the case, as we haven't done the assessment. Indeed, the
Defense Science Board just came out (see

http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.p...25-2904714.php

with a report that apparently says that upgrading some Es into Pacer Crag Rs may
well be the most cost effective solution, while we take a couple of years to do
a proper tanker requirements study. We apparently never finished the one we
started in 2001, and we're now talking about doing one that will run from 2004 -
2006. What the DSB has said is that there is no need to imminently replace the
Es - we've got time to look at our options. If you google on news and search

defense science board tanker

you'll come up with several sources that provides sniuppets of detail. The
actual report isn't available yet on the DSB website, apparently because it
hasn't yet been briefed to Congress.

It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it comes to
MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models, based upon
GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to the R
standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75% and I'd
think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion maintenace is
another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as we try
to stretch out the E model's lifespan.

The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above. From
what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was averaging $4.6
million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs

Oddly, even the GAO noted that they
recommended that the USAF start paying serious attention to replacing the
KC-135 fleet as early as 1996 (of course, in typical GAO style, they have
managed to cover their bases in all eventualities, so they can always say,
"Told ya so!" regardless of how we proceed...).


That last part (quickly)
seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into service
ASAP
with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's in
service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about bringing
them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so
critical.

I see it as entirely budget-driven, with the huge bow-wave they've already
got
going restricting them. Indeed, that was the primary reason for the
KC-767
lease rather than buy in the first place.

The lease came about because it (a) allowed the USAF to recapitalize the
oldest portion of the tanker fleet in the most rapid fashion, and (b)
because it was also beneficial to Boeing in terms of keeping the 767 line
open. Don't act as if the latter is a "bad" thing--we have paced procurement
programs to keep assembly operations going for decades, be it the C-130 or
the M-1 tank. Consider how much MORE it would cost to *buy* the 767's if we
drag this out through the usual (overly long) procurement cycle, and the
line has in the meanwhile shut down; restarting a line is not going to be
cheap. Some folks cry that this is a "help out Boeing" deal--I don't agree,
at least completely, as it also helps out the USAF in getting timely
replacements for the aging KC-135 fleet; and to be honest, even if it *were*
more of a "help out Boeing" deal it would not concern me greatly, as I see a
necessity in our keeping alive the kind of combined commercial/military
transport production capability that we NEED to have, unless you are willing
to be 100% reliant upon a foreign provider for our future tanking and heavy
transport needs (I for one would hate to see the French government in a
position to slow down or stop delivery of such a critical asset merely
because they would want to show us they could do it).

One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis, that the
767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't), or that it's the most
cost-effective solution (we don't know). Another thing that worries me about
rushing into a 767 buy is that we'll be buying an a/c that is essentially out of
production except for the USAF. The KC-135s were bought at the opposite
extreme. These a/c are going to last us at least 50 years, so spares are going
to be a real problem down the road, as the commercial operators are already
starting to look for replacements. Italy and Japan won't have a problem,
because they're each only going to buy airframes in the single-digits so they'll
be able to buy adequate spares from cannibalised airframes, but the USAF is
talking about buying at least 100, possibly with more to come.

When the 767 deal was first mooted, it was really the only in-production (US)
a/c in the size class available in the proper time frame. That is no longer the
case, as the 7E7 will be entering service in 2008 (this is a commercial a/c, and
unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees cost the
company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at the
_start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of theirs. Which
is better suited for the role? Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?
Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion issues
down the road? How about the 20% better fuel efficiency? Respective runway and
ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.

snip

Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add.
Correct
me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to
replace,
the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability, either, do
they?

No, they don't, and the 767's will at least be able to refuel both types
of
refueling systems on the same sortie, and they'll have a proper drogue
rather
than that ******* afterthought on the end of the boom. OTOH, we're also
buying
fewer of them than the 135Es they're supposed to replace (differing MC
rates
obviously play a part). But in big strikes, it's the number of refueling
drogues/booms in the air that determine the service rate, and it's silly
to have
to use (and bed-down) double the number of a/c if we don't need to.

That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given case, you
send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other aircraft
(i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge su[pport
operations into the theater.

I think KC-10s are too important as deployment tankers early on in a conflict to
use them in the tactical role. After all, that's what we bought them for,
precisely so we could get to the Middle East from the US non-stop, if we were
refused landing/overflight rights. Let's face it - being on good terms with
Portugal (Lajes) and Spain (Moron) has become more important to us than ever.
Besides, KC-10s take up a lot of space, and need stronger runways than 135s or
767s (don't know how the 7E7 stacks up), which may limit its deployment options.

So what you really seem to be saying is that
the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an improvement
to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?

Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded Es and
later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers need to
do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for tankers and the
type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be properly
studied.

snip

So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even further
than
it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force (the
USN
strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of
support...that
they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining in
service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither does
the
USAF, apparently).

I'm saying that it makes far more sense now to buy the capability up front
that
we know we'll be adding down the road, especially since the R&D work is
largely
being paid for by Italy and Japan, than to add it years from now when we
know
it's going to be more expensive to do so.

Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by virtue of
those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away because we
dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D effort is
still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow the
delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.

I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the materiel costs,
which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's just buy
it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated prices later.

If that means we buy a/c at a slower
rate (and more refueling pods), good.

Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.

The DSB doesn't, and Rumsfeld said that he was waiting on a couple of reports,
including theirs, before making a decision.

We plan to be operating from more austere
bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we can
do
that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's arguments
against
the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no more
refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat
greater
offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were concerned
with
the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
footprint. If
that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point capability
is
even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See
below.

In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even further
than it already has been slowed?

According to the DSB, we have the time.

snip

Another
thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so keenly
worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think about
including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class of
aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not,
because
that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?

I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against any
such
proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered buying
their
own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect
said
"over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around
that;
after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.

I imagine AMC would act similarly proprietarily today, but the point (to
me, at
least) isn't which service provides the capability, but that it be
provided.

But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to augment
their current tanker fleet.

Of course not, because a KC-130 (any flavor) clearly isn't a replacement for a
jet tanker. It meets USMC needs for a STOL tanker/transport that can also
refuel helos (AFSOC too), and for countries that also operate C-130s it's a
relatively cheap, easy way to get some A/A tanking capability; it's certainly
better than nothing, as Argentina can attest. But it's a relatively inefficient
tanker for fast jets, lacking range, speed, cruise altitude, and offload
capability.

Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary refueling
capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely silent over
the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming capability.

There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a tanker mod for
their C-40s, with all their other needs.

snip area of general agreement

Clearly you can
get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of
tankers
PLUS a
force of fighters and all their support.

Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially since
getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do you
some
good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily available,
at
that operating location.

The 1st TFW had an A/A role, IIRR deployed with a full loadout of missiles
on
thea/c and could fairly easily bring an adequate number of reloads with
them, or
fly them in later. A/G ordnance can be a very different matter, although
PGMs
help that aspect. I can't remember if it was the A-10s or F-15Es, but in
one of
Smallwood's books (I think), aircrews described just how limited their A/G
ordnance options were right after they deployed. Fuel, OTOH, is
relatively
available anywhere a commercial airliner is able to operate from. Maybe
you
need to haul in JP-5/8 for the tactical a/c, but the tankers themselves
should
be able to operate on Jet A/A-1.

As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability of the
JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we haul it in
ourselves.

JP-5 presumably, if they're refueling navy a/c that are operating from CVs. At
least, that's my understanding, but maybe some of the KC-135 people here can
comment.

Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
pieces of ordnance, right?

Sure, but getting fuel to an airfield is relatively easy (pipelines); moving
ordnance tends to require a lot more handling and surface transport.

If you are tied to getting basic resources into
the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And yes, the
use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of ordnance
that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that during OEF
we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did during ODS,
with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the earlier
conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even moreso the
SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel even
further.

PGMs certainly help, but the problem is the variety of A/G ordnance that may be
required. A/A, there's two types of missiles and gun ammo. A/G, even with PGMs
there's lots of different kinds, and the usage rates are far higher.

How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage capability
of
a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from
extended
range itself)?

If they've got sufficient time to get set up in advance, fine, but crises
often
don't provide that kind of time. We've been lucky that most of our wars
in the
past decade and a half (OAF somewhat excepted) have given us some lead
time to
get ready.

I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand (Guam, Diego
Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive this pretty
much anywhere in the world *now*.

In that case, let's dump the fighters altogether ;-)

Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that.

And provided you're willing to send them in without any SEAD at the start
of the
war, and multi-hour cycle times are no problem, great.

I was playing devils advocate a bit here, but if you areally want to get
down to details, yeah, they could still provide a reasonable option. Use of
ALCM's to target IADS nodes/assets during the initial phase, with the
pending "electric" B-52 providing standoff jamming support, B-2's doing
their thing, and then as we start taking down the defenses, we can move a
bit closer and start using the other standoff systems (i.e., JASSM). Given
the range we saw the F-16's operate at during OEF, it would not be beyond
the realm of possibility for the F-15C's and E's to get into the ballgame at
long range, either (if they had to). As I have said a couple of times, I do
see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have every
tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to support the
argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?

No one (or at least, not I) is claiming that they every USAF tanker has to be
available to support the USN, but clearly, an increase is required. IIRR, the
GAO report stated we used 150 KC-135s in OAF and OIF; given the large percentage
of USN/Marine plus allied sorties in both of those ops, having at best only 40
KC-135s with dual point drogues seems to be inadequate.However, if the tanker
requirements study says we don't need more, I'll accept it, but the study needs
to be _done_.

OEF
demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty
long
range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan and
back
again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring).

Sure did. Using those USAF tankers with booms to maximise the transfer
rate.
And it helped that we were already set up in the area flying Southern
Watch
sorties. But we're not there now, although we do still have some presence
in
the 'Stans, IIRC.

And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further east,
too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific we have
Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that is
truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in the -stans
you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in the past.

The $64 million question being whether those bases will be available to us when
we need them. Last I checked there'll all in muslim countries with regimes that
are more or less unstable. Given our current unpopularity in the muslim world,
I don't think we should count on such bases being available.

snip

Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to
operate
a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without
HAVING to
have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.

Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater,
fine, but
it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of
course,
if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no big
deal,
but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help
tank our
allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
multi-point
drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the ride.

That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker tracks
a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific version,
depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major contributor
without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is how long
we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in service
now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports some
fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns, and
obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to drop, which
is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come out
in pretty good shape.

Or it might make sense to upgrade them all to 135R/Pacer Crag; I read one quote
somewhere of the cost savings going that route compared to the 767 buy -- AIR
it was a couple of billion dollars over the life of the deal. But that all
needs to be studied so we know.

Do we have the time available to dally around with
optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take the
money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF has
tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the former.

As I've pointed out above, I think an even more fundamental question is should
we be buying the 767 at all, rather than some other option. The 767 lease is
looking more and more like roadkill, so it may be moot. However, even if we
decided to go the 767 route, there's no reason why we couldn't buy 35 of them
(or whatever the $ work out to) with wing drogues, rather than 40 without.

Guy