"George Z. Bush" wrote:
Ed Rasimus wrote:
On Mon, 14 Jun 2004 11:07:19 -0400, "George Z. Bush"
wrote:

He's trying to make something out of the Russians pulling out under
fire and
he seems to be under the impression that while Kissinger was
negotiating
with the NVs in Paris in '73, none of our guys were shooting at any of
their
guys and vice versa. At any rate, agreement was reached in January '73
and
by the end of March, all US combat troops were out of there.

The negotiation in Paris ran from '68 to '72. You are right that
bombing the N. ended in January '73, but way off on "by the end of
March, all US combat troops were out of there."

I flew combat until the end of my one year tour in July of '73 with
missions in SVN, Laos and Cambodia. US Marines were still in ground
combat as well as US Army. Small numbers, yes. But definitely not "all
US combat troops." The sieges of An Loc, Hue and Khe Sanh were still
ongoing.

Your memory is little better than mine, apparently. I took the trouble to
read
up a little bit about the siege of An Loc and learned that the NV launched
an
all-out attack on An Loc in mid-April 1972. Take a look at this and please
try
to refrain from quibbling about what constitutes "all US combat troops":

"The North Vietnamese could not have picked a better time to attack in MR
III.
Since the drawdown of American troops began in 1969, the region had seen
U.S.
combat units dwindle to almost nothing. Between February and April 1972
alone,
58,000 troops and advisors returned to the U.S. This was the single
largest
troop reduction of the war and it came precisely when the NVA was building
up
for the Easter Offensive.

Those advisors that did remain in III Corps operated within the Third
Regional
Assistance Command (TRAC), headquartered at Long Binh outside of Saigon."

Further on, the narrative added:

"By 1972, the advisory system in MR III, and in the rest of South Vietnam,
was
primarily a skeleton team sprinkled throughout the top of the ARVN officer
corps. In combat units, advisors now interacted with their ARVN
counterparts
only at corps, division, and regimental levels. In elite units, such as
airborne, rangers, and marines, advisors were still used down to the
battalion
level."

From 'Strategy for Defeat', U.S.G. Sharp__"The Hanoi/Haiphong area was the
obvious focus of the bombing effort. In the fields of logistics,
communications, electric power and air bases, most of the lucrative targets
were centered within ten or fifteen miles of those two cities.
Transportation related targets and military supplies had high priority. A
brief assessment showed the following results:
a.. the entire railroad complex of North Vietnam was severely
crippled-to include damage to 383 rail cars, fourteen steam locomotives, 191
storage warehouse buildings, and two railroad bridges.
b.. the important railroad yard in downtown Hanoi was struck and badly
damaged by laser-guided bombs. (This yard had been used by the North
Vietnamese for years as a sanctuary, since they were able to bring railroad
cars into the "off limits" middle of Hanoi. USAF had only been allowed to
attack it once or twice during the whole war, and then it was quickly
repaired.) The railroad shops and the warehouse area were also hit with
laser-guided bombs, all of which went directly into the target area.
c.. the railroad yard at Gia Lam, two miles across the river from Hanoi
and jammed at the time with loaded rail cars, was hit hard and extensively
damaged.
d.. the Haiphong railroad siding was fairly well broken up and
interdicted almost completely.
e.. the Kinh No complex, where the railroad from Thai Nguyen, and the
northwest railroad come together to serve as the largest logistics grouping
in North Vietnam, was well cleaned out. It was being used to assemble and
redistribute cargo and contained many large warehouses packed with military
supplies.
f.. the Yen Vien military complex and the Kep railroad yard were also
hit heavily, and the Hanoi railroad highway bridge over the Rapides Canal
interdicted.
"In addition, nine major supply storage areas - seven in the Hanoi area
and two near Haiphong - were struck with excellent results. Vehicle repair
facilities (the North Vietnamese used trucks by the thousands) received
considerable damage, as did the nine port and waterway targets on the strike
list. Furthermore, the electric power grid of North Vietnam was sharply
compromised by the combined effect of the Hanoi power plant being hit by
smart bombs . . . the Hanoi transformer station being rendered inoperative,
and the Viet Tri thermal power plant and two other big power plants (one at
Uong Bi and one just northwest of Hanoi) all being successfully struck. The
main control buildings of the Hanoi radio communications center (where the
transmitters were located) were also damaged. Finally, ten airfields, mostly
around the Hanoi area, were struck in order to ensure that aircraft
operations from these fields would be interdicted, and a number of surface
to air missile sites were put out of commission. Most importantly, all of
this damage was done in eleven days of concentrated attacks. There was no
respite for the North Vietnamese the shock effect was tremendous. Aerial
bombardment had worked."__