From: smartace11@

I am wondering, from a hypothetical standpoint, if
there were possibly other tactics that could have been more effective that
weren't used.

In Italy, while full group attacks by B-25s against targets were practiced, it
was also common for targets to be attacked by a squadron or even fewer planes.
Also, the B-25 groups in Italy evolved the tactic of having a box or half-box
of anti-flak planes fly ahead of and lower than the main attack force. These
were loaded with WP and attacked the flak positions, the timing such that the
flak crews would be dodging that nasty stuff as the main force arrived. The
anti-flak ships sometimes also dropped chaff, other times a dedicated chaff
plane would fly with them. Usually the gun batteries used radar tracking for
range and optical tracking for direction. The chaff helped mess up the radar
but did nothing against the optical part of the equation. Planes would jink to
mess up the optical aiming before settling down for the bomb run, which, of
course, had to be straight and level, but as soon as bombs away, the B-25s
would peel off and dive away--terrain permitting (lot of targets were in the
Alps). In mountainous terrain, approach to the target would be planned to take
advantage of it so as to come booming over a mountain ridge lined up on the
target, reducing exposure to flak. The Germans countered this by dragging
light flak guns up on the mountain ridges. Some B-25 groups in Italy also
fooled around with low-level attacks, but, aside from using that tactic against
shipping during Operation Stranglehold, except for specific tactical needs that
might develop, as against enemy units on the move in daylight, it was abandoned
as not providing any particular advantage in damaging the target or reducing
losses.
In the Pacific, some of the B-25 groups became specialists in low level
attacks, packing the nose with machineguns to suppress anti-aircraft fire (and
to destroy targets).
I've always been puzzled by the enthusiasm shown for this tactic. Aside from
its use against shipping, when skip-bombing tactics were a good choice, it
doesn't seem to have provided much of an advantage. Casualties were
substantially higher for medium bomber groups in the Pacific than in the MTO or
ETO, despite the fact that flak defenses were generally more formidable in
these theaters. Two problems with low-level attacks: First, every ape with a
weapon can potentially fire a golden BB. And second, if you are hit when you
are on the deck, you are in instant deep dog-do. That fact was made worse by
packing the B-25's nose with guns. The D model was a pretty good single engine
ship. But by the time the J-22 came out, with a solid nose filled with 8 .50s,
it was a different story. Putting that much weight forward made the airplane
pretty much uncontrollable if an engine were lost. Lose an engine at 50 feet
in a J-22 and five crewmen together couldn't finish the phrase "Oh, sh--"
before they ceased to exist. If enough ammunition had been expended before
engine loss, pilot and co-pilot together might keep the plane in control, but
being down on the deck just made everything much harder.
And why strafe an airfield and drop parafrags and parademos with a medium?
Such an airplane could do more damage dropping bombs in a tight pattern from
10,000 feet. Let the fighters go down and strafe. They're faster, nimbler,
present less of a target.
An example: 33 B-25s went in low level against a Japanese air base on Formosa
in March, 1945, straffing and dropping parafrags and parademos. Results of the
raid: two parked fighters destroyed, nine fighters and two bombers damaged,
two barracks damaged, two small buildings destroyed. Runways not damaged at
all, airfield still in operation. In exchange, 20 B-25s were damaged by AA, 4
seriously, with five crewmen wounded. And three B-25s were shot down and 10
crewmen killed. One ditched and the crew were rescued. During the whole month
of March, this group lost almost one-third of its aircraft and almost 60
aircrew killed. Bailout was impossible and when your plane was hit, unless it
could be nursed out to sea and ditched, you died.
In contrast, in Italy in the whole month of March, in repeated attacks on
targets defended by a total of some 500 flak guns, a B-25 group lost 14
aircraft shot down and 207 damaged. Total aircraft lost and damaged between the
two groups were not that different, but in the Italian situation, most of the
aircrew were able to bail out and those who were captured were interned, going
home at war's end. In many cases the damaged aircraft was able to make it back
to friendly territory before bailout was necessary. And in still other cases,
the aircraft, although a write-off, was able to make it to an emergency field
or even home, trading altitude for miles.




Chris Mark