more at
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone...solidate-force

The U.S. Air Force is reassessing the distribution and structure of its F-22
Raptor units, as well as their assigned missions and deployment schedules,
following a highly critical review of how it is utilizing the aircraft from a
top Congressional watchdog. At present, the stealth fighters suffer from low
availability rates and their crews have limited time to train for their primary
air superiority mission, especially due to having to fly alert missions in
defense of the United States, which could lead to a shortage in capability from
the already small fleet during any potential high-end conflict.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released the report publicly online
on July 19, 2018. It acknowledges that the short-sighted decision to truncate
the total purchase of F-22s has exacerbated many of the issues it uncovered and
may make certain problems unavoidable to some degree, but makes clear that the
Air Force is still not making the most of the Raptors it does have in inventory.

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As of the 2016 Fiscal Year, on average, at any given time less than half of the
Air Force's 186 F-22s are mission capable, according to GAO. Only around 125 of
those are assigned to combat units in the first place.

GAO's findings into how this has come to be the case fall into two broad
categories. The first is that the composition and number of F-22 squadrons
create impositions that inherently limit aircraft availability, while the second
is that Air Force's deployment of the Raptors on homeland defense and overseas
missions, as well as the demands of various training exercises, take aircraft
away from their core mission of air superiority in high-risk environments and
degrades pilot proficiency in that regard.


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The F-22's F119 engines, which are also no longer in production, have become an
especially problematic maintenance issue, according to the report. The issues go
far beyond that, though, and GAO said personnel at one operational location
explained it took a 30-week lead time just to obtain a wiring harness for the
aircraft. As such, units routinely cannibalize parts from already non-mission
capable aircraft to keep others flying.

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But while these issues may be, at least in part, out of the Air Force's hands,
decisions that it has made itself have only exacerbated the problems. With small
squadrons at numerous different bases, the service has to replicate the complex
and costly support infrastructure required for the F-22 at each location. For
instance, this means that every base has to have climate controlled hangars,
facilities to maintain the jet's stealthy coatings, and stocks of replacement
parts on hand.

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GAO acknowledged that pilot and other personnel shortages, among other issues,
meant that units across the Air Force were having trouble meeting training
requirements regardless of aircraft type, but said that these issues were
especially pronounced among F-22 squadrons. "One squadron identified training
shortfalls in its primary missions for four consecutive years in its annual
training reports," the review said.

The loss of training time can quickly have a cascading impact. The longer a
pilot goes without taking the appropriate amount of time to train, the longer it
can take to get them back to the necessary skill level. By the service's own
appraisal, it can reportedly take between seven and eight years for pilots to
fully master the F-22.


much more at
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone...solidate-force




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