In article , Ed Rasimus
wrote:

On Sat, 21 Aug 2004 17:14:50 GMT, Andrew Chaplin
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

Doolittle raid

Tactical mission, but politically strategic.

Was there not a change in the deployment of Japan's air forces as a
result? If so, would it not fall into the strategic realm?

BTSOM. We're quickly descending into the realm of semantics here. The
distinction that is usually applied to tactical-v-strategic is one of
goals rather than outcomes.

The goal of the Doolittle raid was certainly not to bring Japanese
industrial might to its knees nor to destroy critical military assets
but rather to demonstrate to both the American people and the enemy
that the war could be brought to the enemy's homeland.

The targets were minimal and the impact even less except for the
demonstration of resolve.


Agreed that was the planners' intent. The Japanese reaction is what we
didn't predict. It caused considerable loss of face especially to the
Army, but also to the Navy in not guarding the homeland.

There is considerable postwar data that the fundamentally unwise
decision, in terms of strategic overreach, to attack Midway was a direct
consequence of the Doolittle raid. Capturing Midway would have extended
the outer security perimeter and thus have prevented further raids, or
so the staff thought.

Again, the "turning points" are different from different perspectives.
From the US position, the Japanese defeat at Midway turned the tide. For
any appreciable faction within the Japanese Naval staff, it was the
capture of Saipan that triggered the formation of a peace faction.
Japan put more value on Saipan as a key part of the inner perimeter than
the US had realized.