Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 01:28:09 -0600, George Ruch
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

I'd think that maybe 11 days might be closer to a battle, but if you
want it to be called campaign, [...]

Looked pretty impressive from my seat.

No doubt, Ed.

I'd call the whole Linebacker II campaign a strategic success. As I
remember, the North Vietnamese had walked away from the Paris negotiations,
and had to be 'persuaded' to come back. Seems like taking the gloves off
worked.

I don't know how long we could have sustained that level of losses,
specially the BUFFs, but I'm reasonably sure the NV thought we'd go as long
as we had to. If only we'd done it earlier...

The loss level dropped abruptly after day six and although several
more BUFFs were lost in the remaining five days, the near total
destruction of the NVN air defense system means that the campaign
could have been sustained until the level of the 1964 LeMay
prescription--"back to the stone age."

I was at Takhli at the time - 474AMS pod shop (ALQ-87s). We didn't get
much detail at the time - some of the strike photos, but not much of the
big picture. We lost 6 airplanes - three of them during Linebacker.

On day six, I was part of a
Hunter/Killer flight supporting a day strike to Hanoi. We orbited
Bullseye (Hanoi geographic center) for more than 25 minutes at six
thousand feet over a solid undercast--a prescription for almost
certain disaster a week earlier.

Glad you got back in one piece. That could definitely have ruined your
day.

The question about how it might have turned out had we done it earlier
is certainly one for extended debate, but that was then and this is
now. The huge difference was that during the period in question, there
was a significant doubt about what would inadvertently trigger
intervention by the Soviets or the PRC and start the slippery slide to
nuclear exchange.

Even without that possibility, a heavy bombing campaign would have been a
very sharp dual edged sword. Military necessity vs. major portions of Hanoi
and Haiphong leveled by 'indiscriminate' bombing. The foreign press and
some of our own would have torn the Johnson and Nixon administrations
apart.

Bottom line for consideration, however, is that the restraint
exercised by the Nixon administration in terminating the campaign
after eleven days when an agreement was reached seems to put into
question the assertions of atrocities, war crimes, carpet-bombing, etc
instituted from the highest levels of command.

Good point.

| George Ruch
| "Is there life in Clovis after Clovis Man?"