Very nice, sharp one. I've already noticed your attack on amazon.com.

Now that you're here and so willing to "inform" the people about me, I hope you'll be kind to answer me the following questions:

- Would you be so kind to mention all these sources which we plagiarized so much - regardles in which of Farzad's and my publications?

- Which of published sources used for "Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988" was not mentioned in footnotes?

- Which "massive portions" of "Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988" were "drawn word by word" from Paul Gillchrist's "Tomcat!"?

- Where am I known as a plagiarizer?

- Better yet: "Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988" was written by two authors. How do you know that it's me who should be a plagiarizer of us two?


- Then, I'd like you to be so kind and explain me the following:

Can you cite the source of such stories like this (excerpt from "Iranian F-4 Phantom Units in Combat"):

'Thanks to 'Combat Tree' and the TISEO, we knew for sure that two Iraqi MiG-23s were ahead of us, so we went after them with our radars off. The flight leader ordered me to keep my eyes open for the MiG-21s that we knew were nearby. As we closed on the two MiG-23s from behind, it appeared they had not seen us, and were focused on something else. The leader had just begun to get a missile tone from his Sidewinder when his WSO (Weapons System Officer) warned him that an F-4E from the other pair had cut in between us and the Iraqi MiGs. As the other Phantom II passed by, I reported ³Close² to my leader to let him know he was covered by me. He responded, ³Stay as close as possible², while trying to turn hard to starboard to stay behind the

MiG-23s.



'As I followed his turn, a single MiG-21 suddenly rolled out 100 metres away from my leader, who had, meanwhile, initiated a left turn, tracking the two MiG-23s ahead of him. With a clear target in front of me, I quickly fired a single Sidewinder. The Iraqi had no time to manoeuvre. The missile hit, and a red and white fireball covered its tail area. The jet crashed nose-down into the ground below. 'The leader then reacquired the MiG-23s with the help of the TISEO, and after some very hard manoeuvring, shot one of the Iraqi jets down using Sidewinders. There were now more MiGs in the area, but we decided to disengage, clearing our 'six' and turning back east. A bombed Iraqi airfield and two MiGs were enough for one day * the war was still far from over...



Can you cite any source where one can read the following (excerpt from "Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat"):

By 1300hrs on 24 September 1980, six F-14As of the 81st TFS were armed and ready for take-off at Khatami AB. IRIAF High Command ordered four of these to join a Boeing 707 tanker and patrol over northern Iran, to prevent any IrAF bombers from hitting Mehrabad again. I was to fly one of the remaining two Tomcats, sent to patrol along the border in the south. None of our aircraft were armed with AIM-54s, as we had none ready to load that day, plus - in all honesty - only two or three of available crews were qualified on the system. Only later in the day were two F-14s to fly a mission armed with Phoenix, and they shot down one MiG-21, and then frightened the life out of four Iraqi MiG-23-pilots.

As we took off, there were many "panic-reports" about Iraqi planes crossing into Iran on the radio, but we detected none: only F-5s from TFB.4's 41st, 42nd, and 43rd TFS' and F-4s from 31st, 32nd, and 33rd Squadrons, which were bombing Iraqis with loads of napalm. I ordered radio reports to be ignored as we were burning up to much fuel trying to chase Iraqi "phantoms" down, and from that point on into the mission we would rely only on the information from our AWG-9s. Some 40 minutes after we reached our CAP-station - some 18km west of Vahdati - my wingman called out,

'Multiple bogeys detected! 23km to southeast and closing!' Using our AWG-9s and Combat Tree we determined there were four Su-22s and four MiG-21s - well within our range. We descended down to 20,000ft, closed to 12km and locked-up: each of us fired one AIM-7E. My Sparrow hit an Iraqi MiG-21 head-on. There was no evasive action: apparently, the pilot was not aware of the attack. My wingman's missile failed to track, so I ordered him to stay close as we dropped to engage the rest of the Iraqi formation which was turning West at high speed. My RIO took great pleasure informing me that the Iraqis were running away, and I concluded: "Our reputation must have preceded us!"

Not a second later, two MiG-21s turned back into us: these Iraqi pilots were neither cowards nor runaways.

I switched on HEAT, and we rolled wide left in an effort to take a position behind and above the enemy. The Iraqis would have none of it, as they started climbing, rolling hard in order to keep us in sight and come out behind our position. But, they were too late to save themselves. Or so I thought...

Our two Tomcats were now at maximum power: I pulled our typical high-AOA manoeuvre and pointed the nose of my F-14A at the rear MiG-21, getting a good tone: we were now bellow 15,000ft and descending. Just as I fired a Sidewinder my wingman came over the radio screaming: 'Engine stall!'

The Sidewinder I fired hit the MiG but any joy I felt was now replaced by the urgent concern for my wingman. Yaw characteristics of the F-14 after the loss of one engine at low altitude and high AOA are not good. My wingman, himself short of launching a Sidewinder at the other MiG, was now using all the skill he possessed to keep his Tomcat from departing. To make matters worse, we lost the sight of the other MiG: there was little I could do without relocating him. Ages - actually few seconds - later, we detected him on our radar running away - most likely low on fuel.

As my wingman's right engine stalled he was just above 10,000 feet, at maximum dry power, speed of almost 520 knots, and about 45° AOA. The pilot knew he had only ten seconds to take actions that would save his aircraft, and maybe even his and the life of his RIO. He later said:

'I had increased my airspeed to close on the lead MiG just as you were firing a missile at the rear one, and I was getting tone from AIM-9 in my helmet headset. So I did not hear the engine stall audible warning, but I did see the warning light next to my HUD not a moment too soon. I stopped breathing then, immediately shut the stalling engine down while pulling the stick all the way back and then holding it there. My F-14 then pitched up to between 70 and 75° AOA, and developed a yaw-rate of 44-46° per second to the right side, with airspeed dropping off to 82 knots. I initiated recovery, the plane responded well, and ten seconds later we were flying level, on one engine, and with my heart at 10.000 beats per second. My RIO was scanning the skies as if nothing happened....'

During the post-flight inspection we found out that the mid-compression bypass values remained closed on one of the engines, shutting it down during the climb. Normally, this value opens at high AOA to improve engine stall margin, and then you lose 13-14% of engine thrust. However, this time it failed.

We had some luck on this mission, as both our F-14s and both crews survived and were to fly many more times and show the Iraqis they could not operate freely - nor without cost - over Iran.



Or this (from the same book):

Our Tomcats detected four suspected Iraqi interceptors only 70km south from our tankers, and flying into an area between our tankers and the Phantoms. Using the Combat Tree equipment and RWRs, the Tomcat-crews determined that these were four MiG-23s, most likely MiG-23MFs from Qayyarah West AB, where we knew the Iraqis stationed their first squadron equipped with this type, as well as 16 MiG-21s. They informed Col. Afshar about this development and he did a few fast calculations, determining that within the following 10-15 minutes the MiGs would run out of fuel and be forced to return back to their base: While they would be doing so, they would fly head-on into our Phantoms as these would try to return to the tankers - themselves also short of fuel. Under normal circumstances, our Phantom-pilots would have little problem to kill these MiGs. However, on this mission, the fuel was life, and the ability of the Phantoms to reach tankers undisturbed and without any detours was crucial for success, as these also carried no air-to-air missiles.

Col. Afshar acted swiftly: he ordered the F-14A 'Sultan 7', piloted by Capt. K. Sedgi, and "Sultan 8", his wingman, Capt. M. Taibbe, to intercept the MiG-23s and destroy them before these could cross the path of returning Phantoms.

There was no time to waste: without hesitation, the Tomcats joined a formation and turned south, climbing to 15.000ft. Checking their systems, Sedigh and Taibbe concluded the Iraqis had no clue about their presence, and therefore continued climbing to 20.000ft, from where they would have several attack options. It was obvious the Iraqi pilots were enjoying a boring CAP-mission: the two Iranian Tomcat-pilots had to ensure they would not be bored for much longer. There was no other way to clear the path for the Sultan F-4 Phantoms: the thought of the six crews running out of fuel and having to eject over Iraq was simply unacceptable.

The two F-14s joined in a combat spread formation, which is a very flexible, mutual-support formation developed by the USN, and which worked much better than the formations usually used by our F-4-squadrons. It allowed much freedom of action during intercept and air-to-air combat. In this formation, whichever Tomcat gets the first radar- or visual-contact has tactical lead and can run the flight for the intercept, but lead can always be passed onto another F-14 - if necessary. Such tactics were never used in our F-4 and F-5 units: there the flight-leader was always the leader and gave all orders. Sultan 7 was armed with two AIM-54As, three AIM-7s, and two AIM-9s. Sultan 8 was loaded with six AIM-7s and two AIM-9s; the two Tomcats thus had longer-ranged weapons and better combat persistence than four MiGs. Yet, much of their success depended on not giving away their presence too early - especially not in order to cause the IrAF to scramble even more interceptors until Sultan Phantoms would be refuelled and the whole Iranian package safe out of the Iraqi airspace.

While they continued climbing to 22.000ft, Capt. Sedghi's RIO quickly ran down his checklist for all rear-cockpit equipment so to get ready for combat: all armament controls (except for Sidewinders and guns), sensor controls, keyboard panels, and all communication panels are on RIO's left console; electronic countermeasures and navigational display, as well as the panel for IFF-interrogator were on his right console. The RIO operated the AWG-9 in track-while-scan mode, keeping contact with all four MiGs all two seconds as the radar swept across the sky and stored the last known position of targets n the computer, and the computer then estimated where they will appear next, just like magic. The heading, speed, and altitude of Iraqi MiGs, as well as launch-zone priorities were all determined by Tomcat's weapons systems. There was only one draw-back in this situation: the TWS is useful only for deployment of AIM-54 missiles, of which only two were carried, and both by Sultan 7.

At about 56km from Iraqi fighters the computer of Sedghi's AWG-9 established a track file on the Iraqi fighters: these were flying in a split formation, made up of two pairs behind each other: the leading pair was to be the first target. Capt. Sedigh ordered the noise-jammers of the two F-14As to be turned on, but his ECM-system failed just seconds after it was activated, so the one on Capt. Taibbe's Tomcat had to cover both aircraft.

At 33km from the Iraqis, Capt. Sedghi cleared his RIO to "light off" the AIM-54s when ready: and he was very ready! The First AIM-54 fired and then began to climb towards the Iraqi MiGs, which were underway at 30.000ft. Some eight seconds later the second Phoenix followed.

The MiGs continued straight ahead as if on a routine, peace-time training flight: it was clear they still had no clue about the presence of their enemies nearby. We knew that the MiGs as supplied to Iraqis carried only a most rudimentary radar and RWRs. As the crews of two F-14s tracked the progress of the two AIM-54s, their radios became alive with a call from "Sultan 9", informing them about the Iraqi MiGs being informed about the attack against al-Gayyar AB, and had been ordered to turn west to attempt to intercept Iranian strikers. Iraqi MiGs were about to turn: not now!

To our luck, the Iraqis never had time to obey their orders: the first AIM-54 slammed into the lead MiG-23, blotting it out immediately. Sedghi's RIO simply exclaimed: "The Iraqi ******* is gone!" The second Phoenix, however, appeared to have missed, as the MiG for which it was intended continued on after it should have been hit. Apparently.

Seconds later the RIO noticed the MiG was actually diving towards the ground at a high speed and obviously out of control. Sultan 8 confirmed the kill, reporting the AIM-54 must have crippled the second MiG-23 by early or late proximity fuse detonation of the warhead. In either case, the large warhead did exactly what it was designed for: until today we have no doubts about what a remarkable weapon the F-14A and AIM-54A systems truly are.




Can you cite any source where one can read the following (from article "Les tigres du Shah", published in Le Fana de l'Aviation magazine, volume 418 & 419 - September/October 2004, published in French):

- It was during December 1982 that I first heard talk of an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Aviation Squadron made up of 12 zealot pilots, all completely "loyal to Imam Khomeini," on Radio Tehran; "the voice of Islam." Radio Tehran reported as soon as theses zealot pilots were ready, their sacrifices would make their mark, and that all the peoples of Iran should be commending theses pilots and the "martyr-creating" land of Iran. I guess that speaker would not talk about martyrs so freely if he had seen some of the scenes we were frequently seeing in the front....

I had heard earlier some rumours about some kind of a "suicide" Guard unit being in formation, but had thought little about it, thinking it was only some sort of propaganda tool against the Iraqis. But, these rumours would not go away!

Then, on 21 October 1983, after flying an F-4E from TFB.4 to TFB.9 in Bandar Abbas - to reinforce their Phantom force - I learned that our High Command had ordered the 91st TFW at that base to be reinforced to 20 F-4Es and three F-4Ds. By our standards, this was a very powerful force, and the reason for this assignment was what our Headquarters had seen as a growing threat against Iran: the United States Navy operations in the Persian Gulf.

Well, there I was, waiting at TFB.9 for a ride back to Dezful, when I - to my considerable amazement - became aware of a number of F-5As and F-5Bs parked inside hardened aircraft shelters at the eastern end of the base. I knew the IRIAF still had F-5Bs on hand, and also a few RF-5As, but I thought the F-5A days were long over. So, I went out to ask about these planes.

To my even greater amazement I was to find out these fighters belonged to a Revolutionary Guards Suicide Squadron!

This unit was in training and they were to be used against the US Navy shipping. I was told this Guards Suicide Squadron had at first been given two F-4Es and a single F-4D to use for their mission, but the Guard pilots proved incapable of mastering the Phantom, and they were replaced by four F-5Bs, three F-5As and a single F-5E. I was also told that the IRIAF's High Command had raised hell over three irreplaceable F-4s being assigned to a suicide unit and had reclaimed them, instead giving the IRGC a larger number of fighters which would be easier to fly - and relatively more dispensable.

"Easier to fly," turned into a base joke. The F-5s given to the IRGC were in very bad condition and the IRIAF was slow to supply parts to this unit for repairs. So, this Pasdaran Suicide Squadron flew very little before being disbanded.

But, they flew and they were trained nevertheless, and that with full support from the IRIAF, and my feeling was that these "Kamikaze" fighters would have been a serious and potent threat to USN warships. We had at least one daily flight by Lockheed P-3F Orion reconnaissance aircraft over the USN warships in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman from TFB.9, and we knew where to hunt for Americans: they were not expecting any attacks, so that surprise was on our side. And, I saw two IRGC F-5Bs take off and practice suicide air attacks during my visit to TFB.9. They would fly low and fast, and then climb straight up to about 300 to 400 metres, then dive down at very high speed at their imaginary targets. After seeing this I knew under right conditions the very manoeuvrable F-5 with their low visual and radar cross-section could have been a very serious threat.

Many months later I learned that this Guards Suicide Squadron returned its F-5s to the IRIAF and its pilots were assigned to other duties. The rumour was that the IRIAF Commanders had sent a message to Khomeini himself, which - to the best of my knowledge - told Khomeini that his officials seemed openly hostile to the idea of a modern professional air force which was all that stood between the Iranian people and the full onslaught of the Iraqi AF and army. Another version suggests that our High Command sent a message to Khomeini, telling him that if the IRGC pilots attacked even a single USN warship, the probable catastrophic outcome would be that within 48 hours the Americans would attack Iranian air bases and obliterate the IRIAF, leaving the country at their and the Iraqi mercy.

Whatever was the case, the suicide squadron was no more.


Let me know should I post few examples mo I'm certainly looking forward for your answers...



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Tom Cooper
Freelance aviation journalist

Author:
- Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/titl...hp/title=S7875

- Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 Units in Combat
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/titl...hp/title=S6550

- Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/titl...hp/title=S6585

- African MiGs
http://www.acig.org/afmig/

- Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
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