On Thursday, June 28, 2018 at 10:40:57 PM UTC-4, Charlie Quebec wrote:
My deepest condolences to the pilot and his friends.
I do have a question, does the video show a normal US preflight procedure? It seemed very casual to me.

I agree we should respect the OP's intent. That said, sometimes there are things we can learn in these digressions. I'm hoping the above post reflects confusion about terminology rather than the criticism that's implied. One can infer very little from what we refer to as a preflight procedure from the video. As someone pointed out, there has not been even a suggestion that a glider malfunction caused this tragic death. In the video, the pilot is already in the cockpit with the towline connected. Yes, there are some final checks to be done (e.g., canopy secured) or repeated (e.g., altimeter set), but the bulk of what we refer to as a "preflight" (i.e., daily inspection) would have been performed by the pilot prior to getting in the takeoff queue, much less getting into the cockpit.

For example, I have four different written checklists that I manually mark off before I even get in the cockpit (Assembly, Launch Grid, Task--contests only, and Pre-Takeoff), plus the in-cockpit final checklist. I don't have a daily inspection book, per se. I do, however, check off each item on the checklist with a pen or pencil for two reasons: to make certain I don't forget anything, especially if I have to skip an item and then come back later and clear it. And the second, fairly minor reason is so that if something bad does happen, there will be a written record of what I inspected, not just the items that didn't meet standards but everything I looked at. Just my way of making it easier for the NTSB! Years ago I just let my thumb slide down the list as I walked around. As I've gotten older and the number of things I check has increased (it's up to about 85 items, now), I nearly always record the results. But that's just a personal practice; it's not mandatory.

In this country, it is the pilot's responsibility to do a preflight inspection to his/her satisfaction. What is appropriate for a metal glider that is kept assembled in a locked hangar might be somewhat different than for a composite glider that is rigged from the trailer every day, though it would still be quite comprehensive.

We do have one preflight inspection enforcement mechanism for SSA-sanctioned contests in the form of the "critical assembly check"--i.e., a subset of items from the checklist that are critical for flight (including the main pins, control hookups, etc.). The line crew will not launch a glider unless there are initials on the left wing root tape indicating that a critical assembly check was performed.

I was on the SSA board for the debate over whether to mandate this, with opinions strong on both sides. IIRC, the primary issue was, unfortunately, one of legal liability. Specifically, by mandating this check, were we opening the SSA or the organizers up to liability if it turned out that something on the critical list went wrong (in other words, did we become responsible for verifying the validity of the checks?--it's a strange legal world we live in). Also, and perhaps more important, would the person who assisted the pilot to do the check and signed the tape be liable in a similar situation? We resolved this with some legal disclaimers and also by agreeing that we would not seek to validate who actually did the critical assembly check or signed the tape. That means many pilots do enlist others to assist them and sign the tape. Others seek assistance but then sign the tape themselves. And still others do the check and sign the tape themselves.

Many commercial and club operations will not tow a glider unless the pilot confirms he/she has done a positive control check, which is part of the critical assembly check anyway.

Regulations and practices vary by country. Here in the U.S., we like to think we have the flexibility to survey what others are doing and then adopt their best practices, modifying and enhancing them as makes sense for our operating environment. As with most things in life, there is often not a single perfect or right way of doing things. What works for us would not necessarily work in other countries, but we have the satisfaction, I suppose, of knowing that certain things developed or popularized here have been adopted elsewhe e.g., some of the original turnpoint photography processes, start gates, tasking concepts, daily safety briefings at contests, etc. We're always seeking ways to make soaring safer while recognizing that preserving the freedom to fly the way we want is also important and must be balanced against that.

Chip Bearden