"Herbert Pocket" wrote in message ...


Agreed, it is hard to pick out any outstanding Allied failures at the
macroscopic level, though this is probably a consequence of knowing (with
20:20 hindsight) that the Allies were ultimately victorious.


Snip


In no particular order:


A) Earlier recognition of aerial bombing inaccuracies, and development of
improved assessment, equipment & training (with reference to the RAF's poor
performance in early bombing missions and the general misbelief that the job
was being well done).


Herbert Pocket,

Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The Allies
wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing. If
Britain, and the Allies, had cut out four engined bombers in order to
have a large increase in top fighters and a boost to strong, fast,and
long-ranged 2 engined bombers: Then Germany would have had a harder
time much sooner. Hopefully, I'm not reading to much into your
sugggestion, I have long put forward similar notion that most of the
strategic bombing was a waste, or it could have been done with much
less and even better. During the Summer of 1940 the Allies could have
had more fighters and more fuel, and have had the bombers on lower
level missions cutting up Germans energy and transport.

All strategic bombing could have, and should have, been done by long
ranged fighter-bombers, and fast 2-engined bombers, and 100% of the
effort shoud have been against German military targets, energy, and
transport. IN 1947 the USAAF stated that 95% of startegic bombing
reasouces were wasted, only 5% of the strategic bombing effort was
worthwhile. But Christ, that 5% was a knock-out! Viturally, all the
crippling damage done by strategic air attack was done by long-ranged
fighter bombers and 2-engined bombers attacking at low altitude, and
almost no serious damage was done by the wasteful other line.

One hundred Mustangs each with a single 1,000lbs bomb, flying in low
in order to lay down 50+ direct hits on railline is very troublesome
to the GErmans, and did I mention the destoyed and badly damaged
locomotives, loads, and other equipment, and the need for Germany then
to disperse AAA? The Allies can put down 500 fighter-bomb sorties
like that a day in the Rhur by 1943 and sleep in to boot.




John Freck