"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message ...
"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message
om...
E. Barry Bruyea wrote in message
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On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:


Indeed, the Western powers were concerned to keep the Baltic States
out of Soviet hands. However, in the Anglo-German negotiations of the
summer of 1939, the British offered to recognize Eastern Europe as a
German sphere of influence. Last time I checked, the Baltic States
are in Eastern Europe. So the Western powers were indeed resolved to
keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands, in order to preserve them
for the Nazi variety.


What Anglo German negotiations ?

The ones described in Ambassador von Dirksen's cable from London to
Berlin of 24 July 1939:

"General ideas as to how a peaceful adjustment with Germany could be
undertaken seem to have crystallized... On the basis of political
appeasement, which in to ensure the principle of non-aggression and to
achieve a delimitation of political spheres of interest by means of a
comprehensive formula, a broad economic program is being worked out...
About these plans entertained by leading circles, State Advisor
Wohlthat, who, on British initiative, had long talks about them during
his stay in London last week, will be able to give more detailed
information. The problem that is puuzzling the sponsors of these
plans most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so
inflamed, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to
bedcome public they would immediately be torpoedoed by Churchill and
others with the cry 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to appeasement!'

The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation
therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
shrouded in the utmost secrecy. Only when Germany's willingness to
negotiate has been ascertained, and at leaset unanimity regarding the
program, perhaps regarding certain general principles, has been
attained, will the British government feel strong enough to inform the
public of its intentions and of the steps it has already taken. If it
could in this way hold out the prospect of an Anglo-German adjustment,
it is convinced that the public would greet the news with the greatest
joy, and the obstructionists would be reduced to silence. So much is
expected from the realization of this plan that it is even considered
a most effective election cry, one which would assure the government
parties a victory in the autumn elections, and with it the retention
of power for another five years.

....In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."

Zachary Shore "What Hitler Knew" Oxford University Press, 2003, pgs
117-118, citing Dirksen's report of 24 July 1939.

Unfortunately for these Anglo-German discussions, on 11 August this
cable was circulated to the German Embassy in Moscow, whose
communications were not secure...

From March onwards (when Germany seized the remains of
Czechoslovakia) there was a deterioration of relations which made everbody
understand the inevitability of war

Sure, once the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put paid to the idea of
Anglo-German agreement:

"For all the other acts of brutality at home and aggression
without, Herr Hitler had been able to offer an excuse, inadequate
indeed,
but not fantastic. The need for order and discipline in Europe,
for strength at the centre to withstand the incessant infiltration of
false and revolutionary ideas - this is certainly no more than the
conventional excuse offered by every military dictator who has ever
suppressed the liberties of his own people or advanced the conquest
of his neighbors. Nevertheless, so long as the excuse was offered
with sincerity, and in Hitler's case the appearance of sincerity were
not lacking over a period of years, the world's judgement of the man
remained more favorable than its judgement of his actions. The faint
possibility of an ultimate settlement with Herr Hitler still, in these
circumstances, remained, however abominable his methods, however
deceitful his diplomacy, however intolerant he might show himself of
the rights of other European peoples, he still claimed to stand
ultimately for something which was a common European interest, and
which therefore could conceivably provide some day a basis for
understanding with other nations equally determined not to sacrifice
their traditional institutions and habits on the bloodstained altars
of the World Revolution.

The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact removed even this faint
possibility of an honorable peace."

Lord Lloyd of Dolobran "The British Case" Eyre & Spottiswoode Limited.
London, 1939, pgs 54-5, with a preface by Lord Halifax, the Foreign
Secretary.

And Lord Lloyd was no isolated right-wing crank. Within months of his
book being published, he was a member of Churchill's Cabinet, the
Secretary of State for Colonies.

In April Germany denounced the Anglo German Naval Agreement

The Germans alsocomplained about the negotiations
Britain was pursuing with the USSR complaining that
Britain and the Soviet Union were trying to encircle
Germany.

And the British offered to end those talks.

They need not have feared since it was the Soviets who scuppered
any chance of an alliance to oppose Germany when Molotov
first sharply criticized the British suggestions of a defensive alliance
against Germany and Italy and then rejected a series of drafts in
negotiations

Actually, it was the Soviet draft of 17 April 1939 that formed the
basis of the discussions, and as late as 19 August 1939, a mere week
before the planned start date for the German invasion of Poland, the
British delegation at the Moscow military staff talks had no authority
to commit to anything.

with the British and French governments and demanded guarantees for the
Baltic states,

Yes.

insurance against internal revolution,

Not quite. A change in a country's policy in favor of Nazi Germany,
such as that successfully engineered by HMG in the case of
Czechoslovakia. This was clearly a legitimate Soviet concern, since
it had clear, recent precedents.

and the right to send
Red Army troops into Poland in the event of a German invasion.

And this was considered nothing more than the minimum requirement of
the military situation, at least according to the (British) Deputy
Chiefs of Staff:

"We feel that this is no time for half measures and that every effort
should be made to persuade Poland and Roumania to agree to the use of
their territory by Russian forces. In our opinion it is only logical
that the Russians should be given every facility for rendering
assistance and putting their maximum weight into the scale on the
side of the anti-aggression powers. We consider it so important to
meet the Russians in this matter that, if necessary, the strongest
pressure should be exerted on Poland and Roumania to persuade them to
adopt a helpful attitude.

It is perfectly clear that without early and effective Russian
assistance, the Poles cannot hope to stand up to a German attack for
more than a limited time... The supply of arms and war material is
not enough. If the Russians are to collaborate in resisting German
aggression against Poland or Roumania they can only do so effectively
on Polish or Roumanian soil; and...if permission for this were
withheld till war breaks out, it would then be too late. The most the
Allies could then hope for would be to avenge Poland and Roumania and
perhaps restore their independence as a result of the defeat of
Germanyin a long war.

Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer that war
would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland or
Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in anything
like their present form.

We suggest that it is now necessary to present this unpalatable truth
with absolute frankness to both the Poles and to the Roumanians. To
the Poles especially it ought to be pointed out that they have
obligations to us as well as we to them; and that it is unreasonable
for them to expect us blindly to implement our guarantee to them if,
at the same time, they will not co-operate in measures designed for a
common purpose.

The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best
way of preventing a war. ... At the worst if the negotiations with
Russia break down, a Russo-German rapproachment may take place of
which the probable consequence will be that Russia and Germany
decide to share the spoils and concert in a new partition of the
Eastern European States."

Committee on Imperial Defense, Deputy Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee
meeting of August 16, 1939. Quoted in Sidney Aster "1939 The Making
of the Second World War" and Michael Carley "1939 - The Alliance that
Never Was and the Coming of World War II"

To summarize, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff considered that the OTL
policy of Neville Chamberlain and the Polish government on this point
would lead to a disasterous Soviet-German agreement, and a war, and
that "Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer
that war would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland
or Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in
anything like their present form.".

The Deputy Chiefs of Staff were very clear that the position was
grave, that the Soviets were vital for resisting German aggression,
and that there was no time to be wasted in coming to agreement with
them. Unfortunately, Chamberlain preferred to pursue Anglo-German
agreement.

These demands were clearly impossible to accept and were almost
certainly intended to end all such talks as the USSR was already
secretly negotiating with Germany.

No, these Soviet proposals were nothing more than the minimum of what
was militarily necessary for successful resistance to Nazi Germany.
No wonder Chamberlain had no interest in them.

It was of course Stalin who offered Germany a free hand in Western
Europe while the USSR would have a free hand in the east and
split Poland between them.

Much better than letting Nazi Germany get it all.

Stuart Wilkes