On Friday, April 6, 2018 at 2:30:08 PM UTC-4, soarin wrote:
At 04:15 02 April 2018, danlj wroteOver the years I've found DrDans
articles in soaring magazine to be
informative and enlightening and I was in the process of
communicating with him when I saw his post on RAS.

This whole thread is a pretty good discussion of the relevant factors.
I've thought about reviving SoaringRx now that I've retired, and the
cognitive degradation during stress is petty complicated and interesting..

My initial article was an attempt at bringing to light a serious safety
issue
that to this day has not been addressed or included in flight training or
training manuals. The more knowledgeable I became on this subject
the more stunning it seemed that it is omitted from flight training
manuals. It is a medical fact that sympathetic nervous system arousal
is a normal subconscious response to incidents of high anxiety and
stress. The effects can include issues like loss of peripheral vision,
depth perception, audio exclusion and the slowing down or speeding
up of the perception of time. Lastly the overall effect can be a loss of
situational awareness to the extent that a pilot is incapable of
avoiding an accident because he literally can’t see that it’s
happening.

DrDan’s states that “the cognitive degradation associated with
stress is complicated, interesting and like most other causes of
inadvertent stupidity, the pilot never has the situation figured out
initially”.

For pilots who have been killed or maimed in accidents, where
sympathetic arousal was a factor. That statement is disingenuous
as those pilots were not just being inadvertently stupid.

The heart rate is seldom noticed, is not directly a cause, and is never
a clue to the resolution of the crisis.

I never stated or claimed that heart rate was the cause, my contention
has been that heart rate was an indicator and that current technology
now allows us to have real time awareness of our heart rate. If you
don’t know you have a crisis you can’t very well resolve it.

I agree that training for emergencies, both planned (and, after
competence with those) unplanned, will contribute greatly to safety.
In this regard, we simply do not fly often enough. If I ruled the
soaring world, everyone would do about a dozen ground launches
to a low pattern once a month or so, to get really used to the way
things look down there, get used to a low approach, and to
build sick-and-rudder skills. A dozen four-hour flights a year feel
good -- but that's only a dozen landings.
Time, cost, and availability of equipment and instructors are all
hindrances.
DrDan

It seems DrDan has closed the potential for further discussion
on this subject. For those pilots who believe this is all poppycock
and they are too good to be bothered by anything as simple
as anxiety or stress, that is your prerogative.

As a flight instructor I’ve always believed we have an obligation
to assure that students are as well informed as possible.
Consequently, if there is any other soaring doctor out there who
feels that this is a credible topic that should become an article in
soaring magazine. Feel free to contact me at
and I will collaborate on an article.

Martin Eiler

I, like Marty, have been waiting to see if anything useful came out of the thread. So far- not much.
I believe that the stress related narrowing of inputs(tunnel vision in particular)is real.
I also believe that training can reduce this.
How you say?
1- Introduce the pilot/student to the issue by causing a difficult/ stressful situation and observe if the pilot reacts incorrectly. The natural tendency is to "concentrate" on the problem which will result in a lot of attention one thing (I'm really low- or other)to the detriment of other inputs(too close, too high , too slow, too fast, skid, slip, etc) leading to a poor result due to abandoning the basics. Allow the resulting poor result to happen without letting it get to dangerous.
2- After it is over have a conversation about what happened and why. I teach that in a difficult situation "concentration" is exactly the wrong thing to do and that the pilot needs to recognize that it isn't so good and remember to stick with basics, open up and look around,and RELAX.
I learned many years ago(thanks Rolf)that in a strange landing situation, under stress, most of us will get in too close and tight and all jammed up leading to a poor result, especially in an off field landing. Beginners commonly do this in their first field landings. More of these are overshoots than undershoots.
I test that this information has been learned during the prep for PP practical tests by overloading(moderately) and distracting, while adding to test stress(I have to pass with Hank before I can take the flight test). Almost all who have been exposed to the stress simulation in training do just fine.. They also don't have much test stress during the real thing because they already have encountered it.
I hope this is responsive to Marty's inquiry.
FWIW
UH