(Drazen Kramaric) wrote in message ...
On 29 Oct 2003 10:39:24 -0800, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:


Correct. Unlike French government, it still had the territory,
manpower and industrial resources to continue the fight with. However,
just like French government, Soviet government tried to negotiate a
cease fire.

The Soviets discussed it, with the Bulgarian Ambassador in Moscow.
When and to whom was the offer actually made?

Since Bulgarian ambassador persuaded Soviet government not to pursue
this for a moment, nothing emerged from this initiative. Nevertheless,
Soviet government contemplated the similar move Petain's did.

Then they really didn't "try to negotiate a cease fire", did they
Drax?

No they didn't.

You will be well advised to check the number of aircraft (+1500)
Germans lost in the Battle for France.

"The French fighter force had available to it during the battle more
than 2900 modern aircraft.

Actually, French air force possessed less than 1,000 modern combat
aircraft according to "The Oxford Companion to the Second World War".

And my source, a paper from the USAF School of Advanced Airpower
Studies, disagrees with your source.

One wonders at the possible result if they had fought with more
committment.

They fought with as much commitment as their organisation and
equipment allowed.

Committing less than a fifth of the available air force at any given
time, and that not exceeding one sortie a day.

snip

Same link as above

The link does not serve as any reliable source of information about
the Battle for France. I rather read books.

It's the USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies, at Maxwell Air
Force Base. I think they know a thing or six about air power.

snip

I never said that the Soviets didn't take appalling losses in 1941. I
said that they fought back better than the West did in the Battle of
France.

Your only argument is that total number of Germans killed in USSR from
June 22nd to August 4th was larger than the number of Germans killed
from May 10th to June 22nd. Let's talk the total number of forces
engaged, ratio of losses sustained during the fighting and the ammount
of territory lost.

Go ahead Drax, why don't you? If you've got a point to make, then do
it.

And I never said that that 150km was decisive. I've said that Soviet
margins were thin in 1941, and that extra territory did impact the
1941 campaign in a way that reduced German success.

I'd say that these 150 kilometres were by the order of magnitude less
important than Stalin's incompetance in defensive preparations.

What has one thing to do with the other?

Will not having the 150km magically make everything else better? And
who did defended against a German attack better at the time?

I see this as a Good Thing.

Only if you take Stalin's policy as a given.

Nothing about not having the 150km necessarily makes anything else
better.

Hey, few message ago you were writing about the defensive measures
Stalin adopted and were using that as a proof that he wasn't surprised
and that he expected German attack in 1941.

I wrote nothing so absurd.

OK, if you say so. I am not going to dig the Google for you. So, do
you maintain that Stalin was surprised by German attack?

He was indeed suprised that Germany would attack prior to making peace
with Great Britain.

Stalin believed there was a risk of German attack in 1941, that risk
growing to a near-certainty in 1942. While he believed Germany would
not attack while at war with Great Britain, he mobilized reserves in
case he was wrong.

In the light of what you wrote above, do you think that Stalin
believed Britain was going to be defeated by 1942 in order to allow
"near certain" attack on Soviet Union?

He seemed to have believed what His Majesty's Ambassador, Sir Stafford
Cripps, was telling him, that an Anglo-German peace was a possibility
not to be excluded.

You wrote how Stalin had a directive for Barbarossa,

For preparations, yes.

So, he "knew" preparations have started.

Absolutely.

we all know British were bombarding Stalin with reports about German
preparations,

Including during a time that British intelligence believed that the
German preparations for Barbarossa were really intended to pressure
the Soviets into a closer relationship with Germany.

Even if true, this is irrelevant. Britain was trying to warn Stalin
about the impeding German attack.

No Britain wasn't. At the time of the warning, what the British
feared was closer German-Soviet relations. At the time it was given,
the warning was intended to disrupt the German-Soviet discussions the
British feared were going on.

So we have warnings by Britain and
copy of Barbarossa directive in Stalin's hands.

the concentration of Wehrmach in Poland was impossible to hide,

Indeed. The GRU tracked the German buildup closely. What was unclear
was the political intention behind it.

Excuse me? "Mein Kampf", Barbarossa directive, British and Soviet
agents' warnings and finally the military intelligence data confirming
German build up on the Soviet borders? What else did Stalin need?

A written declaration of war in triplicate?

Information concerning the specifics of Hitler's decisions. The date
specified in the Barbarossa Directive had come and gone. A couple
other possible start dates the GRU and NKVD had ascertained had also
come and gone. Compared to these earlier dates, what reason is there
to believe, on say 20 June, that there's something special about 22
June 1941?

So, do you think Stalin had more reason to believe Hitler's word

You've not shown that he believed Hitler's word.

Was annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania justified when Soviet
Union already had military bases in the area?

Would 70k troops in a few bases have been enough in the event of a
German attack?

You can always pressure the respective governments to allow more
troops into their countries to match the German build-up.

And are they going to agree to let you set up a fortified line where
you think you need to? Will they let you dig their country up to that
degree? The degree of pressure that would be required for that
amounts more or less to annexation.

No need to
annex the countries and murder tens of thousands of citizens because
you _might_ be invaded.

Where "in the field" were the Western elements of the anti-German
coalition fighting the German Army in September 1939?

On French border. I can list you the armies involved of you like.

If you would please. And tell us how many casualties they inflicted
on the German Armed Forces in September 1939.

It still betters the Soviet elements fighting the German Army in
September 1939.

Never said it wasn't.

Why should the Soviets shoulder the committment of hostilities on two
fronts with no guarantee of the Western Allies hitting Germany with
any vigor?

Because it is better to fight Germans in Poland alongside Polish army

The Polish Army itself didn't think so. The Polish Army itself didn't
want anything of the sort.

than wait for Germany to deliver concentrated attack and then fight at
the gates of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostove. That's why.

Except that in September 1939 there's not any reason for anyone to
believe that France will go belly-up in six weeks in May-June 1940.

Stuart Wilkes