On 29 Oct 2003 10:39:24 -0800, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:


Correct. Unlike French government, it still had the territory,
manpower and industrial resources to continue the fight with. However,
just like French government, Soviet government tried to negotiate a
cease fire.

The Soviets discussed it, with the Bulgarian Ambassador in Moscow.
When and to whom was the offer actually made?

Since Bulgarian ambassador persuaded Soviet government not to pursue
this for a moment, nothing emerged from this initiative. Nevertheless,
Soviet government contemplated the similar move Petain's did.


You will be well advised to check the number of aircraft (+1500)
Germans lost in the Battle for France.

"The French fighter force had available to it during the battle more
than 2900 modern aircraft.

Actually, French air force possessed less than 1,000 modern combat
aircraft according to "The Oxford Companion to the Second World War".


One wonders at the possible result if they had fought with more
committment.

They fought with as much commitment as their organisation and
equipment allowed. Most of French air units were under double chain of
command, both from army and air force commanders.


"By 15 June, the French and German air forces were at approximate
parity with about 2400 aircraft each, but the French were operating
from their own turf, and they had the support of the RAF. Mastery of
the air was there for the seizing, but on 17 June the French air staff
began to order its units to fly to North Africa. The justification put
forth by the air staff was that the army was destroyed and could not
protect the airfields.

By June 15th, Paris was captured by Germans and the organised
resistance from army collapsed. Most of serviceable French aircraft
already had to abandon their original airfields due to German advance
in May and had little time to reorganise for the second phase of
German attack ("Fall Rot"). The numbers you have are misleading since
most of these aircraft lacked equipment (tyres, propellers, radios)
and pilots to fly them. The statement that "mastery of
the air was there for the seizing" is pure nonsense.

An examination of which units were ordered to North Africa and which
were left behind reveals much about the motivation behind the
evacuation. The units flown to North Africa were those regular air
force squadrons with the most modern and effective aircraft--all of
the squadrons equipped with the Curtiss 75A (10), Dewoitine 520 (10),
Amiot 354 (8), Bloch 174 (18), Farman 222 (4), Douglas DB-7 (8), and
Martin 167 (10), plus most of those with the Lioré et Olivier 451 (12
of 18). Those left behind included all of the air force reserve
units--47 observation squadrons and 12 fighter squadrons--and all of
the units closely connected with the army (the observation squadrons,
the 10 assault bomber squadrons, and 7 night fighter squadrons
converted to the ground assault role)."

Since the campaign for France was definitely lost by June 17th, there
was every sense to save the remainder of air force to serve the
interests of France, whether to continue the war on the Allied side
(like Polish air force whose pilots also escaped from Poland) or to
serve as bargaining point in negotiations (like French navy did).

Same link as above

The link does not serve as any reliable source of information about
the Battle for France. I rather read books.

A difference being that the French could import AvGas?

They could not since Germans were about to overrun the ports within a
fortnight.



Did the French leave large assets unemployed, only to surreneder them?

They did not. They fought for as long as they could, then they asked
for truce.


I never said that the Soviets didn't take appalling losses in 1941. I
said that they fought back better than the West did in the Battle of
France.

Your only argument is that total number of Germans killed in USSR from
June 22nd to August 4th was larger than the number of Germans killed
from May 10th to June 22nd. Let's talk the total number of forces
engaged, ratio of losses sustained during the fighting and the ammount
of territory lost.


And I never said that that 150km was decisive. I've said that Soviet
margins were thin in 1941, and that extra territory did impact the
1941 campaign in a way that reduced German success.

I'd say that these 150 kilometres were by the order of magnitude less
important than Stalin's incompetance in defensive preparations.

I see this as a Good Thing.

Only if you take Stalin's policy as a given.


Hey, few message ago you were writing about the defensive measures
Stalin adopted and were using that as a proof that he wasn't surprised
and that he expected German attack in 1941.

I wrote nothing so absurd.

OK, if you say so. I am not going to dig the Google for you. So, do
you maintain that Stalin was surprised by German attack?


Stalin believed there was a risk of German attack in 1941, that risk
growing to a near-certainty in 1942. While he believed Germany would
not attack while at war with Great Britain, he mobilized reserves in
case he was wrong.

In the light of what you wrote above, do you think that Stalin
believed Britain was going to be defeated by 1942 in order to allow
"near certain" attack on Soviet Union?


You wrote how Stalin had a directive for Barbarossa,

For preparations, yes.

So, he "knew" preparations have started.

we all know British were bombarding Stalin with reports about German preparations,

Including during a time that British intelligence believed that the
German preparations for Barbarossa were really intended to pressure
the Soviets into a closer relationship with Germany.

Even if true, this is irrelevant. Britain was trying to warn Stalin
about the impeding German attack. So we have warnings by Britain and
copy of Barbarossa directive in Stalin's hands.

the concentration of Wehrmach in Poland was impossible to hide,

Indeed. The GRU tracked the German buildup closely. What was unclear
was the political intention behind it.

Excuse me? "Mein Kampf", Barbarossa directive, British and Soviet
agents' warnings and finally the military intelligence data confirming
German build up on the Soviet borders? What else did Stalin need? A
written declaration of war in triplicate?

So, do you think Stalin had more reason to believe Hitler's word and
be "surprised" by attack than Chamberlain's declaration of war against
Germany or Churchill's warnings?


Was annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania justified when Soviet
Union already had military bases in the area?

Would 70k troops in a few bases have been enough in the event of a
German attack?

You can always pressure the respective governments to allow more
troops into their countries to match the German build-up. No need to
annex the countries and murder tens of thousands of citizens because
you _might_ be invaded.


Where "in the field" were the Western elements of the anti-German
coalition fighting the German Army in September 1939?

On French border. I can list you the armies involved of you like. It
still betters the Soviet elements fighting the German Army in
September 1939.

Why should the Soviets shoulder the committment of hostilities on two fronts with no
guarantee of the Western Allies hitting Germany with any vigor?

Because it is better to fight Germans in Poland alongside Polish army
than wait for Germany to deliver concentrated attack and then fight at
the gates of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostove. That's why.


Drax