A declining Europe
George Will

April 11, 2003

WASHINGTON--The task of reconstructing Iraq--more its civil society
than its physical infrastructure--is entangled with the less urgent
task of reweaving the frayed relations between America and France and
Germany, and with the optional task of rehabilitating the United
Nations.

The U.N. has proved itself unsuitable as an instrument of collective
security. It is a stew of starkly conflicting political cultures, and
incompatible assessments of the world's dangers and what to do about
them. Hence it cannot function as a policy-making body. It can,
however, be invited to help with certain brief relief and civil
administration chores. This invitation should be extended for the same
reason France was made a permanent member of the Security Council in
1945--as psychotherapy for a crisis of self-esteem brought on by bad
behavior.

Note the verb ``invited.'' There is no entitlement for France,
Germany, Russia and the U.N. They did all in their power to keep
Saddam Hussein in power, which makes them accessories to tyranny and
war crimes. All Iraq's debts incurred to Russia, France, Germany--U.S.
officials at the U.N. say Germany was even more troublesome than
France ``in the corridors,'' meaning in the prewar politics outside
the Security Council--during Saddam's regime should be canceled.

Some European militaries, like Canada's, can barely be considered real
military--meaning war-fighting--forces. The New York Times reports
that more than half of Germany's defense budget of just $27 billion
goes to salaries and benefits for personnel--a third of them civilians
who, after 15 years, are guaranteed lifetime employment. Germany had
to lease Ukrainian aircraft to get its peacekeeping forces to
Afghanistan.

Still, such militaries can perhaps earn their keep by maintaining
order in an Iraq where tribalism is reasserting itself and civil war
might now fester. Besides, there is a danger that peacekeeping will
diminish the U.S. military services' aptitude for their real purpose,
which is war-fighting. Furthermore, the services are stretched
perilously thin, and were being exhausted by the tempo of operations
even before the war began.

The crisis with Iraq, which became an overdue crisis of U.S. relations
with the U.N. and portions of Old Europe, arrived as the U.N. was
publishing ``State of the World Population 2002.'' To the extent that
demography is destiny, Europe's collective destiny, for decades, will
be beyond the choice of its governments, and will be a continuing
decrescendo.

Today Europe's population is 725 million. The populations of 14
European nations are declining, and the declines are driven by
powerful social values and trends that would be difficult for
governments to reverse, were they inclined to try, which they do not
seem to be. The growth rates of the populations of the other European
nations are at or near zero. So the European population is projected
to be 600 million in 2050.

In developed countries, a birthrate of 2.1 children per woman is a
replacement rate, producing population stability. Only Albania has
that rate. Catholic Ireland's rate is 2.0, but the rates of the
Catholic nations of Southern Europe are among Europe's lowest--1.2.
The estimated European average is 1.34.

Stein Ringen, an Oxford sociologist, writes that ``without emigration
or immigration and with a stable birthrate of 1.5, a population would
be reduced to about half in 100 years, and with a birthrate of 1.2 to
about 25 percent.'' On those assumptions, Germany's population would
shrink from 82 million to fewer than 40 million by the end of the
century, and Italy's 57 million to fewer than 20 million.

Ringen acknowledges that population trends can change rapidly and
unpredictably. But with the exception of the post-1945 baby
boom--before working mothers became the norm--Europe's birthrates were
low for most of the last century, and higher rates are unlikely
because the ``modern conventions for family life are built around the
now firm idea, and economic necessity, of both parents working and
earning.''

Economic anemia and further military impotence are probable
consequences of Europe's population collapse. Which will trouble some
Americans with peculiar political sensibilities.

Americans who are apt to argue that U.S. foreign policy needs constant
infusions of legitimacy from the approbation of European governments
are also apt to deplore, in the domestic culture wars, Eurocentrism in
academic curricula. Such Americans resist the cultural products of
Europe's centuries of vitality, but defer to the politics of Europe in
its decadence.

Why? Perhaps because yesterday's European culture helped make America
what it is, and today's European politics expresses resentment and
distrust of what America is. Both sensibilities arise from the
distaste of some Americans for America.