Chad Irby wrote:

Well, speaking as a former ECM tech on the F-4E, most pilots would seem
to prefer having a coffee cup holder than an ECM suite that they
actually have to know how to use...

Unfortunately, you're all too right. The date in your next paragraph
explains why.

...and you wouldn't *believe* how snippy some of those guys got when we
loaded ALQ-119 and -131 pods on the planes (early 1980s, well after most
plane drivers figured out that ECM is a Good Thing in a high-threat
environment).

In the early '80s we'd been non-combatant for about ten years. We
fired up the ECM and RWR for serious only for a Red Flag deployment
and the written Stan/Eval test questions for the annual TAC check were
all from a study guide. I had the same issue when flying the F-4 out
of Torrejon, post-Vietnam. I'd wait after take-off for the WSO to turn
on the RWR, usually in vain. I'd wait for the WSO to reach out with
the radar and search for traffic that had been called by departure,
usually in vain.

We carried the 101 or 119 the whole time I was at Torrejon, bolted in
the left forward missile well. Never allowed to turn it on in
peace-time---"you'll compromise the programs" or "you'll put RAPCON
off the air". Motivation to study without a threat or an opportunity
to practice will deteriorate.

You can believe that we knew exactly what the RWR was doing in the
Hunter/Killer mission. And, we didn't object too much to dragging the
ALQ-87 or 101 around, even though we never turned it on (it
interferred with the Weasel's stuff). The pod was a last ditch aid to
SAM evasion when face-to-face with a missile airborne.

Now, the guys know exactly what the value is and they have lots of
opportunity to practice.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038