Kevin Brooks wrote:

snip

This has been interesting, and informative; I hate to admit it ( :-) ), but
I have learned a few things in this thread--though nothing that convinces me
that either (a) we should not continue with procurement of the 767 tanker,
or (b) there is something critically wrong with procuring the first 40 767's
without multi-point capability up-front. And BTW--I don't find the assertion
that we could keep the E's flying "as is" very convincing--ISTR there are
real concerns over the availability of engines and related parts for the
existing powerplants, so if you wanna go the "keep the E's" route you are
realistically going to *have* to upgrade them.

Thanks for the info, and I appreciate the discourse.

Kevin, since were both tired of arguing the same points while lacking the data,
here's a Congressional Research Service report from last September which
presents both sides' arguments, as well as showing the costs and what
assumptions went in to them, plus the effect on costs if any of those
assumptions change. See:

www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32056.pdf

Of interest, my WAG that the engine struts (pylons) on the Es might be the main
(extra) corrosion driver compared to the Rs was correct. I get lucky once in a
while. Also, the report mentioned that the navy was already contracting out
training and coast-to-coast tanking services, which I was unaware of. I haven't
yet found out who they're contracting with or what kind of a/c they're using.

Guy