On 16 Feb, 12:45, nimbusgb wrote:
On 15 Feb, 21:08, Papa3 wrote:

On Feb 15, 9:09 am, nimbusgb

[Jim wrote: and can provide just as secure a record for badge

flights]

[Ian wrote: Not even nearly]

Okay Ian - prove it. Prove that a COTS unit governed under the
manual OO procedures I've laid out in the referenced link doesn't
provide an equivalent level of security. Come on, I dare ya :-)

http://home.netcom.com/~pappa3/files...rity_draft.pdf

A cots GPS is still not as secure as an IGC logger.

Your presentation appears to have merit and I'd support using it for
badges.

Ian

Ho boy!

It is VERY simple to split the casing on COTS units and substitute
some internal microprocessor controlled gubbins or even reprogram the
software so that it appears to perform like the real thing but given a
few 'special' keystrokes could do just about anything, including
dumping some prerecorded track or trace. I have a Garmin 12 that I put
a NiMh pack into with a charger circuit INSIDE the casing.

Without the manufacurers PKI key it would be extremely difficult to
acheive this sot of thing with an IGC logger and still avoid detection
using the VALI programs.

That's why a COTS unit is not as secure. There is no way for anyone to
check the validity of what's being produced from the unit or whether
the unit is still a 'standard' cots unit.

Now if you want to talk about how #probable# it is that someone is
going to spend time, money and effort in replacing the internals of a
cots unit just toe get a diamond height, thats another argument. Its
MUCH quicker and simpler to just go find some wave somewhere.

This was all argued out more than 10 years ago!

Ian