Tarver Engineering wrote:

No Curt, the sequence began when the validation rule: "remove all doubles"
was written for the FMS design. In fact, Columbia uses ROZO twice as a
waypoint indetifyer for navigating to the runway in question. Something
both operators should have known.


It wasn't Rozo that was doubled- it was the identifier "R" for
that navaid. The crew called up the identifier, resulting in selection
of the navaid "Rome," an NDB serving Bogota, per the accident report.
The crew apparently failed to confirm that they had the correct
navaid, which, combined with a hurried approach, led to lack of
awareness as to the position of the aircraft relative to the airport,
the approach, and the high terrain.

http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publ...i/calirep.html


Mike