https://nationalinterest.org/blog/bu...-trouble-45997
In the case of the Su-57, UAC’s crucial failure was the early decision to close
its Combat Aircraft Division to foreign investors. The first director of the
consortium, former deputy minister of defense and later prime minister Sergey
Ivanov, insisted back in 2006 that Russia “plans to develop this sector on its
own.”
Westerns analysts have concluded that Russia’s fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57
stealth fighter is unlikely to enter operational service before 2027.
Postponements, cost-overruns and research and development-related problems mar
the project.
This should come as no surprise. The Su-57 program was never really viable.
Back in early 2006, Russian president Vladimir Putin integrated all of Russia’s
aviation companies into a single, state-owned holding — the United
Aircraft-building Corporation.
Over the time, UAC absorbed more than 20 aviation companies, and re-organized
these into four aircraft-manufacturing divisions. One for combat aircraft, one
for military transport aircraft, one for civilian aircraft and one for aircraft
components.
In the course of the streamlining, most of the state-owned enterprises became
joint-stock companies. However, the government owns at least 90 percent of
shares.
Despite the resulting centralized and vertical structure, most of enterprises
integrated within UAC have retained some level of autonomy. MiG and Sukhoi both
have their own board of directors.
However, with few exceptions, these directors have no say. On the contrary, the
entire UAC conglomerate is subject to a board of 14 directors, most of them
well-known associates of Putin. Few are skilled industrial managers.
Despite bombastic reports in the Russian media, UAC turned out to be a lame
duck. The conglomerate proved capable of re-launching production of types
designed back in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Otherwise, UAC is incapable of
innovation and adaptation.
The main reason is that most of UAC’s directors are hand-picked yes-sayers —
people more than happy to discuss planning, strategies and new projects, but
lacking the ability to make hard decisions. Unsurprisingly, over the last 10
years UAC has made promises it cannot fulfill,
In the case of the Su-57, UAC’s crucial failure was the early decision to close
its Combat Aircraft Division to foreign investors. The first director of the
consortium, former deputy minister of defense and later prime minister Sergey
Ivanov, insisted back in 2006 that Russia “plans to develop this sector on its
own.”
Combined with the dramatic collapse of the Russian economy in the wake of
Western economic sanctions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the
inflexibility of UAC made the Su-57 impossible to realize.
No matter how large or populated, a country with GDP comparable to that of
Australia cannot afford to play at being a superpower, fight a protracted war in
Syria and develop its own stealth fighter.
The last hope for the project was the serious Indian interest in financing the
conversion of the Su-57 into a stealth strike fighter in the class of the
Su-30MKI. But the management structures Putin imposed undermined that
collaboration.
Of course, the Kremlin’s core interest in the Su-57 is scoring big propaganda
points by creating a supposed match for Lockheed’s F-22 Raptor. This is
something the business-minded Indian air force is not keen to finance .
And that means the Su-57 is going nowhere fast.
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