"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message ...
"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message
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"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
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"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message
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E. Barry Bruyea wrote in message
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On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:


Indeed, the Western powers were concerned to keep the Baltic States
out of Soviet hands. However, in the Anglo-German negotiations of the
summer of 1939, the British offered to recognize Eastern Europe as a
German sphere of influence. Last time I checked, the Baltic States
are in Eastern Europe. So the Western powers were indeed resolved to
keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands, in order to preserve them
for the Nazi variety.


What Anglo German negotiations ?

The ones described in Ambassador von Dirksen's cable from London to
Berlin of 24 July 1939:

"General ideas as to how a peaceful adjustment with Germany could be
undertaken seem to have crystallized... On the basis of political
appeasement, which in to ensure the principle of non-aggression and to
achieve a delimitation of political spheres of interest by means of a
comprehensive formula, a broad economic program is being worked out...
About these plans entertained by leading circles, State Advisor
Wohlthat, who, on British initiative, had long talks about them during
his stay in London last week, will be able to give more detailed
information. The problem that is puuzzling the sponsors of these
plans most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so
inflamed, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to
bedcome public they would immediately be torpoedoed by Churchill and
others with the cry 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to appeasement!'


So we have a report of discussions within the German embassy

No. As I show below, they quite accurately report the content of the
discussions between Wohlthat and Sir Horace Wilson. The latter was
not, to my knowlege, assigned to the German embassy.

about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.

How does that explain the discussions State Advisor Wohlthat had in
London, on British initiative...

It dosen't of course.

The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation

A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred

Nonsense. The discussions Wohlthat held with Sir Horace Wilson are
mentioned specifically. Wohlthat and Wilson met on 6 June, 7 July, 19
July, 21 July, and 31 July.

Here's Zachary Shore "What Hitler Knew" Oxford University Press, 2003,
pg 89, on these negotiations:

"Sir Horace presented a detailed plan for Anglo-German accord that
began with a proposal of a nonaggression pact. ... There would be a
recognition of spheres of influence. Eastern and southeastern Europe
were to be designated as Germany's sphere. Third, there would be
agreements on arms limitations for land, sea, and air power
(Chamberlain had long sought an air pact with Germany, as this was a
particular concern for British security.) Fourth, colonial issues
would be resolved, including how best to develope Africa. ... Sir
Horace Wilson said that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would
release Britain from her commitments to Poland; thus, the Danzig
question would lose much of its importance for Britain."

Wohlthat asked what authority lay behind these British proposals.

"When asked whether Chamberlain had approved these plans, Wilson
asserted that the Prime Minister had given his full consent." - Shore
pg 90.

therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
shrouded in the utmost secrecy.

So you think these were discussions "...vis-a-vis Germany..." held
between the German themselves. Or, you're just trying to weasle out
of their uncomfortable implications.

The latter, I think.

Only when Germany's willingness to
negotiate has been ascertained,

One might think that the German Embassy might already have an idea of
Germany's willingness to negotiate. Or, you're just trying to weasle
out of their uncomfortable implications.

The latter, I think.

and at leaset unanimity regarding the
program, perhaps regarding certain general principles, has been
attained, will the British government feel strong enough to inform the
public of its intentions and of the steps it has already taken. If it
could in this way hold out the prospect of an Anglo-German adjustment,
it is convinced that the public would greet the news with the greatest
joy, and the obstructionists would be reduced to silence. So much is
expected from the realization of this plan that it is even considered
a most effective election cry, one which would assure the government
parties a victory in the autumn elections, and with it the retention
of power for another five years.


So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong

They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
to go to Poland's aid.

...In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."

Wishful thinking in action since on the 14th July Sir Nevile Henderson
discussed with Baron von Weizsäcker, German State Secretary at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that
"Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir
Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by His Majesty's
Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would
support Poland in resisting force by force

And what did HMG do in the interval to acquire the capability to
support Poland in resisting by force? Hitler saw no such actions or
preparations. Hence, he discounted the threat. In Halder's war diary
entry for 14 August, concerning a discussion he had with Hitler that
day, Hitler is noted as saying that the British haven't even given a
loan to the Poles, indicating that they think the Polish position
bankrupt, and not worth spending money on.

Hitler had another test of British intentions:

From Shore, pg 112, on German Foreign Ministry official Erich Kordt's
contact with Sir Robert Vansittart:

"I learned from Hewel that Hitler said...that it it comes to the
conclusion of an alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet
Union, then he would cancel the action against Poland... But if the
Western Powers embarass themselves and go home empty-handed, then I
can smash Poland without the danger of a conflict with the West."

Shore goes onto say:

"Kordt related this information to (British Foreign Office Chief
Diplomatic Advisor) Vansittart because he, along with Weizacker, hoped
that the British would be sufficiently disturbed by the news that they
themselves would conclude an alliance with the Soviets and discourage
Hitler from war."

Shore goes on to note the increasing pressure on Chamberlain to
conclude the Grand Alliance, but he manfully resisted. Far from being
disturbed into a hasty alliance with the USSR, he increased contacts
with Germany. "Rather than seeking to discourage Hitler by
intensifying the triple alliance talks, Chamberlain did precisely the
opposite." (pg 114)

snip


From March onwards (when Germany seized the remains of
Czechoslovakia) there was a deterioration of relations which made
everbody understand the inevitability of war

Sure, once the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put paid to the idea of
Anglo-German agreement:

"For all the other acts of brutality at home and aggression
without, Herr Hitler had been able to offer an excuse, inadequate
indeed,
but not fantastic. The need for order and discipline in Europe,
for strength at the centre to withstand the incessant infiltration of
false and revolutionary ideas - this is certainly no more than the
conventional excuse offered by every military dictator who has ever
suppressed the liberties of his own people or advanced the conquest
of his neighbors. Nevertheless, so long as the excuse was offered
with sincerity, and in Hitler's case the appearance of sincerity were
not lacking over a period of years, the world's judgement of the man
remained more favorable than its judgement of his actions. The faint
possibility of an ultimate settlement with Herr Hitler still, in these
circumstances, remained, however abominable his methods, however
deceitful his diplomacy, however intolerant he might show himself of
the rights of other European peoples, he still claimed to stand
ultimately for something which was a common European interest, and
which therefore could conceivably provide some day a basis for
understanding with other nations equally determined not to sacrifice
their traditional institutions and habits on the bloodstained altars
of the World Revolution.

The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact removed even this faint
possibility of an honorable peace."

Lord Lloyd of Dolobran "The British Case" Eyre & Spottiswoode Limited.
London, 1939, pgs 54-5, with a preface by Lord Halifax, the Foreign
Secretary.

And Lord Lloyd was no isolated right-wing crank. Within months of his
book being published, he was a member of Churchill's Cabinet, the
Secretary of State for Colonies.


No he was a realist,

A realist... who retained a touching faith in Hitler's "sincerity"
right up until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ROTFL!!

the Soviet German pact was clearly intended
to give Germany a free hand to start a war against the West.

There's no suggestion here that Lloyd was in favour of such
an agreement or was stating that such an agreement was being negotiated.

It shows that that Hitler was thought worthy of the benefit of every
doubt, until the M-R Pact.

He's simply pointing that AFTER the pact was signed it was clear
that Germany was planning war with Soviet connivance.

It shows that as long as the merest, threadbare shred of a hope of a
possibility of a chance that maybe, someday, in the course of time,
Hitler will join HMG in an anti-Soviet agreement, it is sufficient
reason to trust Hitler's sincerity and continue to judge him as better
than his actions.

In April Germany denounced the Anglo German Naval Agreement

The Germans alsocomplained about the negotiations
Britain was pursuing with the USSR complaining that
Britain and the Soviet Union were trying to encircle
Germany.

And the British offered to end those talks.

Molotov ended those talks.

Once they were clearly going nowhere. After all, nobody on the
British delegation he was talking to had any authority to agree to
anything.

They need not have feared since it was the Soviets who scuppered
any chance of an alliance to oppose Germany when Molotov
first sharply criticized the British suggestions of a defensive
alliance
against Germany and Italy and then rejected a series of drafts in
negotiations

Actually, it was the Soviet draft of 17 April 1939 that formed the
basis of the discussions, and as late as 19 August 1939, a mere week
before the planned start date for the German invasion of Poland, the
British delegation at the Moscow military staff talks had no authority
to commit to anything.



snip


Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer that war
would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland or
Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in anything
like their present form.

We suggest that it is now necessary to present this unpalatable truth
with absolute frankness to both the Poles and to the Roumanians. To
the Poles especially it ought to be pointed out that they have
obligations to us as well as we to them; and that it is unreasonable
for them to expect us blindly to implement our guarantee to them if,
at the same time, they will not co-operate in measures designed for a
common purpose.

The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best
way of preventing a war. ... At the worst if the negotiations with
Russia break down, a Russo-German rapproachment may take place of
which the probable consequence will be that Russia and Germany
decide to share the spoils and concert in a new partition of the
Eastern European States."


Clear evidence that the British were attempting to come
to an agreement with the USSR

Clear evidence that the Deputy Chiefs of Staff thought the Soviet
position a very good idea. Too bad PM Chamberlain wasn't convinced.
The Soviet position was refused, despite this advice from the Deputy
Chiefs of Staff. The British delegation at the Moscow military staff
talks was not authorized to agree to it. Clear evidence that the
British government had no intention to come to an agreement with the
USSR, despite this good advice from the Deputy Chiefs of Staff.

Thank You

More twisting, worming, weasling from you. But you're clearly
helpless.

These demands were clearly impossible to accept and were almost
certainly intended to end all such talks as the USSR was already
secretly negotiating with Germany.

No, these Soviet proposals were nothing more than the minimum of what
was militarily necessary for successful resistance to Nazi Germany.
No wonder Chamberlain had no interest in them.

It was of course Stalin who offered Germany a free hand in Western
Europe while the USSR would have a free hand in the east and
split Poland between them.

Much better than letting Nazi Germany get it all.

Germany did get it all

After paying a much higher price in blood than they would have if
they'd gotten it straight from Poland.

Stuart Wilkes