"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
While I agree in principle with what is stated here, I have to point
out some errors.

"Lawrence Dillard" wrote:

Viet Nam warfare proved to be a learning experience for the US aviation
community, which had come to believe, by the 1960's, that guided missiles
were all that would prove to be needed to prosecute aerial warfare.

Let's note that there was really only one tactical jet procurred by
the "US aviation community" which was missile only. The F-4. In the
mid-60's when the Vietnam War expanded, the USAF was operating the
F-100, F-105, F-104.

Did the F-100 routinely operate over N Viet Nam in either the fighter-bomber
or the CAP role? Did the F-104? Of the three you mention, only the F-105
had to requisite combination of bomb-load, range (with tanker supporta) and
high speed necesary for operations over the North; the F-104 hadn't either
the legs or the weight-carrying capacity and the F-100 might not have been
able to carry the needed load far enough. (The interesting thing, to me, is
that all three "Century Series" aircraft, whether originally intended for
(fighter-bomber type) interdiction, air-superiority or tactical nuclear
attack, all featured an integral gun-armament, not as a retrofit , but from
the drawing board onward. There never seems to have been any question over
whether these a/c "needed" an integral gun armament).

Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility of
the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
"commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well.


The USN was flying the A-4, F-8. All gun
equipped. Later (besides the F-4 B/C/D/J) there were the F-5, A-37,
A-1, A-7---all gun equipped.

Of the a/c mentioned above, only the F-8 had the internal guns, legs and
performance necessary for the CAP role over the North. However, what was
needed at the time was aircraft capable of performing primarily the
fighter-bomber role, with a secondary aia-to-air role. The F-105 had the
load-carrying capaility, the performance, and (with tanking) the legs to
accomplish the mission.


Alarming, if not distressing reports were received fairly early on that a
number of US a/c downed over N Viet Nam had been shot down in error by US
missiles fired from beyond range of positive visual identification by
other
US a/c.

ROE in MiG country until 1972--eight years into combat--always
required VID, except for a small number of Combat Tree,
close-controlled F-4s out of Udorn in '72. I can recall no
"distressing reports" of losses due to A/A fratricide. Simply didn't
happen.

I do recall such reports, with the caveat that the sources for the reports
were newspapers. It appears that under the stress of engagement and of
identifying a/c while under "g"-forces, some mis-identifications were made.
Allegedly, from certain aspects under the stress of maneuvering conditions,
an F-4 could appear to resemble a Mig-21. Occasionally, however, after hasty
identification, it proved necessary to open the range in order to employ,
say, an early Sidewinder or Sparrow. It allegedly was under such
circumstances that the friendly-on-friendly errors were committed.


That led to a belatedly-responded-to request, in which a redesign of the
F-4
(which took over from the F-105) to include a useable integral cannon
(F4E)
was accomplished.

While the F-4 was certainly deployed in-theater in '66, it didn't
"take over" for the F-105 which continued to carry most of the iron
into NVN until 1968 when it was finally attrited to the point of no
longer being combat effective.


Agreed, the F-4s didn't simply completely replace the F-105s all at once,
but were progressively introduced as the numbers became available.


The US aviation community learned that it had to be
especially careful in reaching the decision to fire a missile at another
a/c, if only because under the stress of "g"-forces, hurried
identifications
of fleetingly-sighted targets, occasional failures of IFF squawks, and
the
workload imposed on the friendly pilot team, enemy a/c were not so easy
to
distinguish from friendlies as it appeared to be in training.


If "under the stress of "g" forces" it would certainly mean visual
conditions and tail aspect in '66, '67. Certainly not a player for
AIM-7 shots and with the AIM-9B of the period, the firing limit was
max of 2.5 G.

IFF squawk was irrelevant to missile firing or fighter-to-fighter ID.
We didn't have that kind of equipment until a limited number of Combat
Tree birds showed up in '72.

In that case, I must be mistaken, as I had been told that US a/c of the day
were fitted with an IFF which offered approximaely 2048 discrete "squawk"
codes, which aided in distinguishing friend from foe. If these devices went
inop, a friendly could not reliably be distinguished from an enemy
electronically; the pilot would have to rely on his eyes.

Recall, however, that during the 1950's there was a prominent human factors
case involving an F-100 on a training mission which downed its target-towing
a/c, instead of the intended trailing target, under visual engagement
conditions, because under "g"-loading in a pursuit curve, the towing a/c
appeared to the F-100 pilot to be the target. The incident was dramatized in
a television program.


The solution was to close to ranges, before firing, at which a sound
visual
ID could be obtained. That measure not only tended to reduce
friendly-fire
losses, but also meant that rather often a US a/c would get so close to
an
enemy that the minimum firing distance for the missiles carried might be
reached before the positive ID could be made. Under such circumstances,
it
made sense to have an onboard cannon so as to deal with the situation.

It wasn't just tactically sound, it was ROE required. I agree
completely.

Missiles nowadays are far superior in reliability, and have much-improved
ranges.

I should have written "minimum engagement ranges".

Some radars carried aboard fighters have the capability of ID-ing an
enemy a/c simply from its radar-return. Hence it is considered safe to
fire
from beyond visual range, which allows the avoidance of close-in
WWI-WWII-Korea dogfighting. And that's good because it is hard enough to
maintain situational awareness even at a distance from an opponent with
the
aid of positive control via AWACS, much less than in a complicated
encounter
at close range.

Nonetheless, most pilots desire to have some sort of reserve punch, just
to
cover the odd case where missiles haven't done the job or have been
expended, and an opportunity to disengage successfully coud hinge on
being
able to shoot your way out.


More important than what you've said regard reserve punch is the
tactical practice of having a gun to threaten your opponent into
predictable action. Firing sequence wisely should be--BVR radar
missile, BVR/WVR all-aspect IR missile, then high angle gun shot as
you blow through the merge. Turn-n-burn should be avoided at all
costs.

I certainly agree with you. However, I am not sure that the immediately
above was generally understood or agreed upon until the advent of College
Dart, Top-Gun and Red Flag; air combat maneuvering at the speeds of Viet
Nam (and later) era a/c, in an environment of opposing SAMs threats and
enemy GCI-controlled interceptors, has proved to be a lot more complicated
and deadly than ever before. A dogfight can become unexpectedly hazardous in
a very short time.


If in a X-v-X engagement, your wingman maneuvers to insure the gun
threat on your adversary to allow for safe separation--i.e. keep him
turning as you break away to separate.

You're undoubtedly correct. At times, especially at close ranges, a "gun
threat" can be more imposing than a missile, because while missiles can
malfunction, a well-aimed burst of cannon fire can mean only one thing.

If we've got a man in the seat, we need a gun in the nose.

Agreed. A sentence worth a thousand images. How this truism was lost sight
of is beyond my ken.