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Old May 15th 04, 10:16 AM
Guy Alcala
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Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
.. .
Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.

Kevin Brooks wrote:


snip corrosion lead-in

You are forgetting the corrosion problems with the E models--corrosion

tends
to reduce fatigue life, too, IIRC from my long-ago materials science
classes...


Corrosion is an issue with any a/c -- certainly the KC-135Rs as well,

which
(after all) were 135As before, just as the Es were.

It sounds to me like the only way you are going to get that long
a life from the E's would be if you also replaced some structural

components
(meaning you are going even further than the old R model mods, IIRC).


Why is corrosion and fatigue on the Es supposedly so much more serious

than the
Rs, when they all started out as 135As?


I'd assume they are both going to exhibit corrosion problems, but didn't the
R's go through a significant IRAN as part of their upgrade?


Not that I can find, but that's not definitive. Boeing replaced the lower wing
skinsof 746 C/KC-135s, but that seems to have been applied to all models in
service. All I can figure is that the old nacelles and struts (from 707s) may be
causing the difference, which would go away if they were upgraded to Rs (which
get new struts and nacelles as well as engines).

The USAF, per
those comments from the three-star last year, seems most concerned with the
E's.


See above, or possibly just because the Es were less effective than the Rs, so
sure, say they're falling apart because of corrosion so we can buy new a/c.
You've got to come up with some justification.

snip

Wait a second--spend *more* money on trying to upgrade E's, while doing
*another* study to determine if/when/how we replace the E's?


What do you mean, _trying_ to upgrade the Es? We know perfectly well how

to
upgrade them -we've got 400+ prototypes in service, after all, with the

R&D all
paid for.


No, no, no--that was not what I meant. My point is that at this point
tossing *more* money into the upgrade of the E models seems a bit
shortsighted, when that same money (along with the savings accrued from
cheaper operating costs) could go towards purchasing new-build airframes. We
did not have that option (or the money to make it happen) available back
when the original R program started--we do now.


Actually, we don't have the money at the moment, which is why the whole lease
thing was suggested. But look at it another way -- might it make more sense to
upgrade some/all Es to Rs at far lower cost than than buying 767s, while we
perhaps decide to skip the 767 generation entirely and buy either a 7E7 tanker,
or even a BWB one around 2015 or so, if the latter a/c is more suitable in the
long term? Considering the difference in cost between upgrading an E to a Pacer
Crag R vs. buying new KC-767s, it's going to take a considerable time (a couple
of decades, I imagine) for the O&M cost advantage of the latter to overcome
purchase cost advantageof the former, assuming that it ever does (at least one
source claims that it won't).

That sounds
like a fine...bureaucratic solution? Even the GAO was saying in the

1990's
that the USAF needed to get off its duff and start planning the

replacement
of the KC-135E fleet.


Sure. It didn't say what to replace them with.


Nope. The USAF has said what they want to replace them with--you have no
trust in the USAF?


The USAF said what it wanted to replace them with in 2001, when they had no
other US choice, and still haven't justified the _need_ to replace them now, vs.
other options. The assumptions have changed, as has the situation.

Studies are great--unfortunately, they have a tendancy
of becoming an ends-unto-themselves. We have a good proposal that the

USAF
has supported--it puts new airframes into the mission much more quickly

than
if we follow the "usual" method of purchasing new aircraft (of course,

you
could use the F/A-22 or F-35 model...which would mean if we started that

new
study right now, we might plan on seeing some new tankers around

what...2015
at best?), and it takes advantage of an existing excess production
capability/inventory at the only US company currently building aircraft

of
that class--sounds like a good plan to me.


Who says we need new airframes _right_ now? As we both agree, buying more

pods
and converting more Rs to carry them is the best solution in the short

term to
the navy/Allies problem, while converting Es to Rs _may_ be the best

solution
for increasing our tanker force in a hurry. Or it may not be, butsince

the USAF
never did an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), we don't know.


Upgrading to R's does not do a great deal towards "increasing our tanker
force"--it instead is more of a "spend some money now to reduce O&M costs in
the long run, and keep the force from being *reduced* as E models break". Of
course, the 767 option does ptretty much the same thing--albeit with an even
greater reduction in operating costs, and a significantly better possibility
of future upgrades (at what point does it become impractical to keep trying
to modernize a 43 year old airframe?).


You'd better ask Bufdrvr (or the Air Force) about that one;-) However, I
disagree with your premise - upgrading Es to Rs does indeed increase our tanker
force, both by improving MC rates, and by increasing offload and reducing runway
length requirements, just as the KC-767 would. The E is restricted by lack of
thrust in the amount of fuel it can lift off many runways, compared to the R or
a 767 (Boeing claims the 767 can lift the same fuel load from a 4,000 foot
shorter runway). The A model was even worse, of course, being essentially
useless during DS from most runways in the middle east. Hot and/or high has
become pretty typical for us, so tankers that have trouble operating from such
fields are essentially operationally useless (which is what the USAF general
claiming that we needed the 767 to replace the Es said).

snip

The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above.
From
what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was

averaging
$4.6
million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs

That is an additional $130 million bucks each *year* in operating cost

(not
exactly chump-change...but even that is a "lowball" figure...). What

would
be the operating cost of the 767? Less than the 135R (two engines versus
four, better fuel economy, more maintenance friendly subsystems, less
likelihood of inspection-and-repair work, more stringent (and more

frequent)
inspections, etc.), that is for sure. So your operating cost per year
differential measured against the 767 is going to be greater. Add in the
cost of bringing those E's to a full PACER CRAIG R model level, and the

cost
is going to be significant, to say the least. Not a wise investment

plan,
IMO. If you managed your personal auto program in this manner, then you


would still be driving (only--no newer cars allowed) a 1960's era car,

and
one which you had paid to drop new engines in, along with paying to

modify
the emissions system to keep it in compliance (like the noise

requirements
the KC-135's face), and here in 2004 you would be saying that instead of
buying a new vehicle, you'd be better off paying to essentially

completely
rebuild the one you have and drop *another* new engine in it, along with
updating the other systems in the dash, maybe a new trannie to be

compatible
with that new engine, etc. I don't think you would endorse such a plan

(I
made the mistake once of trying to extend the life of a noble little

Nissan
pick-up at the 170K point by dropping a *used* engine in it, and that

was
*not* cheap--and I found that within 10K more miles I was *had* to break
down and buy a new vehicle).


If most people maintained their cars the way that the military does its

tankers,
and only drove them 1/10th as much as the average 'driver', then upgading
themwith new componenets might well be the most cost effective solution

for the
long-term. The numbers I have seen quoted for the E to R (plus Pacer

Crag)
conversion vs. new 767 comparison imply that the conversion is indeed the

most
cost-effective option, but without knowing every assumption made I'll

withhold
judgement.


I don't buy that. My personal experience was in the more mundane area of
military trucks (we used various models in the combat engineer units). As a
company commander (late eighties/early nineties) I had dump trucks in my
unit that were manufactured in the late sixties and had pretty low mileage.
Somewhat like the KC-135 fleet, but a bit younger. Guess what? We still had
problems resulting from *age* (sometimes less use is not a *good* thing for
mechanical equipment, especially anything that has hydraulics), and we soon
(not long after I gave up command) faced a "train wreck" in terms of
supportability (the Army found it uneconomical to continue carrying the
spare parts inventory for the oldest trucks)--with no replacements
immediately available. Not unlike the situation facing the KC-135, IMO. If
the military services managed equipment like civilian entities do ( run it
to the point of best return in terms of depreciation, then unload it and buy
new equipment), the KC-135 would have been gone long ago, before corrosion
(among other factors) ever became a serious concern.


I agree that too little use can sometimes be almost as bad as too much. By
that logic, then, you're recommending that the Air Force have fewer tankers but
fly them more, so let's just stick with the Rs we have and fly them till their
wings fall off, then buy all new in 15 years or so. By that point the
procurement bow wave of the F-22 and F-35 should have died down freeing up some
money, and who knows, we may not even need conventional tankers by then.

That would be one
extreme, IMO--the other being what we are doing, in acting as if the KC-135
(or the B-52, for that matter) will be able to fly forever.


No doubt they'd be chasing the DC-3s that are still in commercial service ;-)

We stretched the
KC's by doing the R conversion a few years back, when there was no option to
buy new airframes. Now there is an alternative to our continuing to slap
hundred-mile-an-hour tape on old equipment in hopes of keeping it viable
forever, and "carpe diem" would be an advisable course of action IMO. Again,
at what point do you stop tossing money into trying to keep the E models
viable, and instead commit that money to recapitalizing the fleet?


I agree that the Es aren't particularly viable per se, but for operational not
cost reasons, so let's make them Rs and see what we want to _buy_ (if that makes
the most sense) when we can afford to.

snip

The most critical KC-135 tanker metric is age, and
the
most pressing KC-135 problems are corrosion and stress corrosion
cracking-both age related. Stress corrosion cracking is one of the most
difficult structural failures to predict." Are you saying that all of

these
problems have been solved since that date?


Apparently they've been ameliorated to a considerable extent, so that this

is no
longer a driving factor. And again, why is the E's corrosion problem

supposedly
so much worse than the Rs, when they started from exactly the same

airframe?

Again, age and , I suspect, a pretty extensive (and comparitively costly)
IRAN process during the upgrade. Can we conquer the corrosion process in the
E model? No doubt we can--but would it be worth the cost of doing so for a
43 (or more) year old airframe?


If it's worth it for the 42 year-old Rs, then it's worth it for the 43 year old
Es, at least if we make them Rs. I don't hear the USAF complaining about the
Rs, so the corrosion issues would seem to be due to the different engines plus
the slight difference due to age.

snip old ground

One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis,
that the
767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't),

Well, the DSB also says the corrosion problem is something we can easily
discount,


Actually, I believe what they said was that the facility responsible for

dealing
with it has learned to handle it so well that they are able to do the work

much
quicker and cheaper than expected. I can't find the quote, unfortunately,

but
I'm still looking.


Hopefully this corrosion revelation came after the LTG quoted above gave his
testimony--a quick google on the subject did not give me any hits on sites
that indicate the corrosion problems are licked.


The DSB only began their study in February of this year, so yeah, their data is
recent. I'll keep trying to find the quote, or else hopefully the actual report
will get put up soon.

and has apparently decided that *outsourcing* the tanker mission,
or buying second-hand aircraft, is the way to go. Outsourcing may be

great
for the RAF, etc., but the USAF is another story, IMO. Then there is the
"spend the money on already used aircraft" approach--wonderful! As if
tossing more money down the O&M pit for the E model is not enough, we

should
take the money we have and buy older airframes than we can afford? (And

yes,
we can afford new tankers under the current deal being offered)


They've said that it _may_ be the way to go, and:

"The report by the Defense Science Board says that, contrary to Air Force
claims, corrosion of the aging tanker fleet is "manageable" and several
options exist to refurbish the fleet.


Manageable at what cost?! Ask the DSB members how many of them are driving
even twenty year old cars that they find economical to periodically strip,
inspect, repaint, and replace corroded parts as necessary--I'll bet it won't
be many, if any. That they are proposing outsourcing the tanker role seems
to me to be unrealistic for the USAF, and is indicative of a study probably
done by "experts"--not the flying kind, or the kind that even manage the
fliers, but the other kind (what we used to sarcastically define as, "an
expert is an SOB from out of town with a briefcase". Again, at what point do
you think it is unwise to keep dumping money down the tube in an effort to
keep the 135E viable, versus using that same money to help purchase new
airframes with lower operating costs and greater potential for future
upgrade?


When its no longer the most cost-effective option which achieves the operational
goals, just like any such choice should be made. I've owned four cars in my
life, a '65 Chevy Impala bought new by my Dad, and still running great on the
original engine 23 years later with 240,000 miles on it when I sold it, as no
longer meeting my 'operational' needs; a '69 Datsun 2000 roadster which I bought
used in '78 and drove for several years because it was fun, but not worth the
money (by me) to fix up; an '88 Subaru 4Wd wagon bought new (which replaced the
Chevy), which lasted me for 14 years and which I'd still be happily driving now
if it hadn't been stolen, and my current car (another Subaru), which I'll drive
until it no longer meets my needs or becomes so unreliable to operate that its
more trouble than it's worth, and there's something new that's so much better
that it's worth laying out the money upfront. In short, I expect to get 20 or
more years out of a car. Now, I drive far less than the average driver, and
most of the miles I put on are easy ones on the interstate rather than stop and
go commuting (kind of like the Air Force's tankers), so such lifespans can be
expected.

If officials are willing to tolerate increased maintenance costs, "you can
defer major near-term . . . investments" to replace the tanker fleet, the
report said.


Guy, that is a telling statement. I suspect the USAF folks are as afraid of
that statement as I would have been when I was on the green suit
side--because they know that when the money does get short, the first thing
that usually ends up getting cut (or really stre-e-e-e-tched) is usually the
O&M money. Those "increased maintenance costs" (for an aircraft that is
already the most expensive in its class, the E model?) represent an
increased chunk of a finite pool of O&M money. Not to sound like a broken
record, but at what point is enough enough, where you start using that money
to instead buy into newer, less costly (to operate and maintain) airframes?


See above, and after you've done a proper Analysis of Alternatives to see just
what the most cost-effective solution is, which is what the DSB says we have
time for. They're not saying you can go on forever, they're saying we don't
have to rush out and buy a new 'car' tomorrow; we've got the time to study
Consumer Reports as well as Car and Driver, go to Edmunds.com, take some test
drives, figure out what our needs really are (as opposed to what we'd like to
have), look at several different ways we might meet them, and then see which is
the cheapest. Works for me.

"There is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a
replacement program prior to the completion of" a lengthy analysis of
alternatives and other studies, the report said. "


Hooray! "There is no compelling material or financial reason (of course,
you'll have to foget about that whole "increased maintenance costs" part of
what we just said),


Oh come now, Kevin. Putting an extra $500 into my old car every year to keep it
running while I spend more time deciding whether it makes more sense for me to
buy a $25,000 dollar car next year, or wait another year or two so I can decide
if the really neat $30,000 hybrid gas/electric SUV that will be available then
is a better fit for my long terms needs, is not "forgetting about that whole
'increased maintenance costs' part of what we just said." We all have to make
such decisions all the time, at least those of us whose last name isn't Gates
(and I bet he makes them too).

so like the bureaucrats we be, let's study it...and
study it...and analyze what we studied, and then study it some more...


For at most, 18 months, and it seems more likely, to the end of this year, a
study that we should have done back in 2001 but didn't.

while
you guys keep paying out those "increased maintenance costs" you should be
oh-so-happy to "tolerate", not to mentioon having bitten the bullet and sunk
the requisite funds into belatedly upgrading the E models to R as (if?) you
secure the funding to do so..."?


See above. If you can come up with $2 billion a year for the 767 lease, you can
sure as hell come up with only $130 million a year instead (compared to the
KC-135R costs) for the Es extra O&M, even if you decide to leave them completely
unmodified.

snip

The biggest things you have to buy spares for are the avionics (which

are
more plug-and-play than they were in the 135 era), and engine related
systems. There are a lot of 767's that will remain in service in the
civilian sector for decades to come--they will need spares too, and in

the
end they become another source for spares for the KC version. I don't

see
this as a deal-breaker.


Given that airlines are already looking to replace their 767s ( a 20-year

old
design, let's remember) with the next generation, and given that world oil
production is predicted to peak sometime in the 2007 (the pessimists) --

2040
(the optimists) period, considerably improved fuel consumption may well

drive
the mass replacement of older a/c, just as the post 9/11 slump did. It's
definitely an issue.


But you find the improved fuel consumption of the 767 versus the R models,
and especially the E models, to be a non-issue?


I'm not sure that the 767 has a fuel consumption advantage over a 135R across
the spectrum of tanker roles (it has a small offload advantage owing to higher
gross weight), but of course it's an issue, one to be properly analysed to see
just _how much_ of an issue it is, or is likely to become. In other words,
let's do this using our brains rather than just going on gut feeling.

snip

Which
is better suited for the role?

Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?

Not likely.


Depends on the specific mission, and more importantly, what percentage of

the
mission spectrum does that particular mission occupy. There are missions

now
where the faster KC-135 is better suited than a KC-767 would be, and

others
where the latter comes out ahead.


Sorry, but I can't buy that the extra five one-hundredths mach is going to
be an issue either way.


Certainly can be, depending on how fast your fighters have their best cruise at,
at what altitude, and what their best tanking speed is. M0.05 works out to
about 30 knots true at typical tanker altitudes (25-35,000 feet). If that
higher cruise speed allows the fighters to tank significantly higher or faster,
i.e. without having to drop down out of their best cruise envelope or at speeds
that put them on the back side of the drag curve, I think you'll agree that will
give a significant decrease in fuel offload required, improve range, decrease
transit time, or what have you. For deployment tanking or when transiting
to/from distant tanker tracks, higher speed gives you better utilization because
you get more trips per unit time. In emergencies, a tanker getting there a
minute or two earlier may well be the difference between saving or losing an a/c
(at say $40 million each, that could buy a lot of fuel).

And there are obviously missions where it makes no difference whatsoever, or
where the slower speed may be preferable -- time spent loitering on tanker
orbits probably being one such, and the likely better takeoff and landing
performance being another. So let's look at the tradeoffs.

Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion
issues
down the road?

Maybe, but doubtfull, as corrosion awareness was better incorporated

into
the 767 manufacture than it was in the 135.


And will be even more incorporated into the 7E7, especally since (AFAIK)

there
is no corrosion of composites yet known.


But you have been claiming that corrosion is not a problem withthe 135 any
longer--now you want to use corrosion as a deciding point between the 767
and an aircraft that has yet to even fly, much less become available in a
tanker form?


Kevin, when did I ever say that corrosion is not a problem? I said that the DSB
said it's currently manageable, and not a major driving issue _now_. At no
point did I ever say or imply that it would _never_ be an issue. Of course you
want to consider how it might affect life-cycle costs and utility, for the 767
and 7E7 just as much as with the 135. My '88 Subaru had a bit of rust on the
drivers side A-pillar; it wasn't a major issue at the time, but it might have
become one at some point, which would have factored into my decision as to when
to replace it.

How about the 20% better fuel efficiency?

Sounds good, but then again you have to examine the interval between the
time the 767 would be available and the (elsewhere not mentioned, AFAIK)

7E7
tanker version (expect what, a five or six year period at best before

the
first tanker 7E7 could be available?)...I'll be kind and use a five year
period, at 131 E models costing maybe $2 million each more per year in
operating costs than the 767, that works out to around $1.3 billion in

extra
operating costs? That is a hell of a lot of gas...


Check out how much the KC-767 tankers cost.


You were talking gas, right?


I was talking total cost, purchase/lease plus O&M for comparable capability.

OK, lets be more realistic and say that if we
canned the 767 proposal and started from scratch, we'd likely not see a new
tanker enter the inventory until 2011 or so. That would be six years to the
*start* of replacing the E models. Of course, that pretty much forces you
into converting those to R's--GAO estimates the cost for that to be some
$3.6 billion.


No, it doesn't, although it might be the best choice to do so. Remember,
currently, the KC-135E fleet costs ca. $131 million (your figure) per year more
than a comparable number of 135Rs to operate. So, multiplying $131 million x 7
(to get us from here to 2011) is only an extra $917 million, vs. the $3.6
billion for the conversion, minus the incremental savings from the improved
operating costs ca. $1 million per conversion/yr. For the sake of argument,
let's assume that the average number of conversions available is half the fleet
over that period, so the conversions save an average of $65 million per year on
O&M, or $455 million over the whole 7 year period. So the total net cost looks
like $917 million (keep the unmodified Es) vs. $3.15 billion (upgrade them all
to Rs and reap the O&M savings), to the start of replacement date.

For the sake of argument, let's assume that the E vs. R O&M disadvantage doubles
for that period, which still only costs us $1.834 billion vs. $3.15 billion. In
2011, we start discarding them and replacing them with whichever a/c we decide
to replace them with, having saved ourselves somewhere between $1 - $2 billion
in the meantime.

In this simplified calc I haven't bothered to take account of the operational
advantages of an R over an E, which would of course need to be factored in, but
it does show that under certain conditions keeping the Es as they are while
waiting to buy a tanker better suited to our long-term needs, may be the
preferred solution.

If we work *really fast* to do that, we can maybe get it done
over about a four year period, so for the last two years of that period up
to 2011 we can use the cheaper O&M cost of the R model ($3.7 million per
year per aircraft) which is (we'll assume, based upon KC-10 operating costs,
which would likely be a bit more than the 767) maybe $1.5 mil per year
greater than the 767 cost. Two years times 131 aircraft times $1.5 mil is
about $400 mil. Of course, we have that earlier period (four years)when the
E's (or the ever decreasing number remaining of them as they undergo upgrade
to R) are still flying as is, and that would add maybe another $600 mil. Say
a billion bucks total versus the operating cost of the 767's (yeah, I know
we would not get all of the 767's delivered in lump sum, but I am trying to
keep this simple and fair as well, so I am not going to figure the post-2011
additional operating cost of the 135R's versus 767 into the mix to try and
keep things even). That is a total of $4.6 billion you have just dumped into
keeping the 135E's flying just until 2011.


Er, no. As I understand it, you've converted them to Rs and kept them flying
until then.

At $200 mil per 767, that is the
equivalent of some 23 new 767's right there--over half of what the USAF is
asking for in the first lot. If you go the lease route with the first forty
tankers, you could cover a significant part of the overall lease cost with
that money. And you are getting an aircraft that carries more fuel to boot.


Or you could take the $1 to $2 billion you saved by keeping the Es unmodified
and just start buying 767s (or what have you) outright, also saving yourself the
interest on the lease. We're talking about paying $2 billion per year on the
lease, which would buy 10 767s each and every year. As it was Boeing claimed
the lease was only going to allow us to start replacing 135Es about 3 years
earlier than otherwise. In short, I think the lease stinks, as we don't _need_
the new a/c right away (whatever type), so leasing instead of buying makes no
sense, especially as were going to keep the a/c for so long.

Respective runway and
ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.

Lose the outsourcing option from the get-go, IMO. Won't work for an
organization with the scope of tanking requirements that the USAF has.


Perhaps yes, perhaps no. Air bridge and training tanking doesn't require
military crewing. It's certainly an option worth looking at for at least

some
tanking requirements, if not all.


I am not crazy about the idea of having a portion of the tanker force
unavailable for use in the T/O (and no, this is not the same as my below
posit regarding using the 767's for these roles--those 767's could just as
well extend to the T/O where they provide full capacity tanking to USAF
assets, even with their (initially) marginal USN tanking support
capability).


We have a portion of the tanker force that is unavailable for use in the T/O
now, according to an AF general -- the 135Es. There will always be tankers that
are involved with routine duties outside the T/O.

snip

Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded

Es
and
later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers
need to
do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for

tankers
and the
type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be
properly
studied.

Again with the neverending studies? :-)


What never-ending study? The USAF failed to do such a study in the first

place,
especially an AoA. The latter was predicted to take about 18 months, but

the
head of AQ&L (Wynne) says they'll probably push it and complete it by

December
or so.


I was referring to your DSB folks..."studies" was the term they used. As in
"more than one".


Because there are several still underway as we speak, looking at various issues,
most of them ordered by the SecDef. The AoA is one of them, and almost
certainly the most important.

snip

I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the

materiel
costs,
which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's

just
buy
it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated

prices
later.

Even if it delays entry further, meaning you are also going to be paying
that higher O&M cost for the remaining E's even longer...?


If that allows us to make a better decision for the long term, sure. We

can get
upgraded Es (Pacer Crag Rs) into service faster than we can get 767s.


And pay some $3.6 billion for the privaledge of then having the longest
serving remaining KC-135's committed to an even longer period of service.


So? The Rs are only a year younger on average, and yet no one's raising a big
fuss about them hanging around until 2040. So we convert the Es, and maybe
start retiring them a few years earlier.

IMO, not a wise course of action--only to be used if the 767 deal gets
trashed due to both Boeing's stupid handling of what should have been a done
deal by now and the involvement of politicos-with-axes-to-grind, like
McCain.


Just which axe is McCain grinding, other than the one (widely shared) that the
lease makes no fiscal sense, and is essentially driven by the wish to give
Boeing a bailout?

IMO, if that is the way it plays out, we will see the conversion to
R's, then a mindset of, "What? You want a *new* tanker, after we just sank
all of that money into upgrading those last E models? Maybe next year we
might authorize a *study*..." set in, leaving the USAF in the lurch with an
open-ended KC-135 tanker force, and the BUFF's being replaced before they
are.


If that winds up with us having equal or greater capability at equal or lesser
price, I'm all for it. Given the choice between multipoint-capable Rs now and
single point 767s (or whatever) later, I'd take the Rs, unless the economics are
are shown to go the other way. So far, I've seen no evidence that they do,
which is why I want to see an AoA done.

snip

I am not as impressed with the summary of the DSB report as you are (but
then again, I tend to weigh the advice of the folks actually tasked to

fly
the missions a bit more than I do the DSB, GAO, etc).


Seeing as how the DSB works for the Pentagon, and Rumsfeld is the guy who

tasked
them to do the study back in February, I put a bit more weight on their

advice
than you do. Especially since opponents of the 767 deal (McCain to

thefront)
believed that the DSB was much too cosy with the military and Boeing (the

DSB
Chairman had to recuse himself because he was also a paid Boeing

consultant and
had been mentioned in internal company e-mails back in Dec.2002/Jan. 2003

as
willing to help push the deal), and fully expected them to support it. I
believe McCain's words were something along the lines of a "fox guarding

the
chickens." So yeah, when even they come out and say they that we've got

time to
do the study and the corrosion is manageable, I'm inclined to believe

them.

Then we will have to agree to disagree on this point.


Fair enough.

snip

In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even
further
than it already has been slowed?

According to the DSB, we have the time.

The DSB that claims, contrary to what the USAF LTG testified last year,

that
the corrosion problem is readily in-hand...?


the DSB's claim is based on the USAF unit doing the corrosion controls

data,
let's remember. The situation isn't static, and they've gotten better at

it
since last year.


You left out that whole "tolerate higher maintenance cost" part of the DSB's
corrosion solution--I don't think that is a "minor" part of the equation
here, though the DSB apparently does given the off-hand way they worded that
statement.


See my reply to you where you made much the same point, above.

And thinks out-sourcing tanker
requirements is a fine idea?


They're saying it's a viable option, it should be looked at in an AoA, and

we've
got the time to do so. No more, no less.


If you "tolerate higher maintenance costs" you have that time.


Yes, and lower acquisition costs.

I am not buying into either, at this point.


Until the AoA is actually done, we have nothing to base a decision on

other than
"because I think so," which IMO is a pretty poor way to spend billions of
dollars.


DSB did not say they *thought* keeping the E models would be more expensive
than what we are already paying--they said we would have to tolerate higher
maintenance costs, period, while the "studies" (plural) take place.


And the questions we need to answer are whether that is cheaper than leasing
767s, buying them outright, buying something else down the road, converting Es
to Rs, or what have you. Makes sense to me - it may cost us a bit more right
now, but may save us a bundle down the road. Exactly the opposite applies with
leasing rather than buying 767s.

snip

I remain unconvinced that AMC would throw a hissy fit if the USN wanted

to
include a secondary tanking capability to its C-40B's.


More likely, they'd suffer a rupture from laughing at the USN devoting

such a
large proportion of its budget to paying the NRE for so few a/c of such

limited
performance (as tankers).


Then the critical USN "requirement" that led off this thread...must be more
of a "desire" than it is a "requirement".


No, it just means that you spend your money wisely, and buying a few "KC-40s" of
limited performance and very high cost is anything but that.

Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary
refueling
capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely

silent
over
the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming
capability.

There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a

tanker
mod for
their C-40s, with all their other needs.

Exactly. So the lack of multi-point refuelers must not be such a

critical
one, eh?


Since no one else is even considering buying 737s as tankers, and the navy

is
only buying a few (somewhere between 5 and 8, as best I can tell), the

navy
would have to be nuts to make that kind of investment for so few a/c, even
assuming that they would be reasonable tankers. Given their limited
payload/range and performance, I have my doubts they would be, but it's

moot.

They (C-40A--I goofed with the "B", which is one of the USAF models) are
replacing the C-9 in the USN; from what I gather, the plan is to replace 27
C-9's, and I doubt that 8 C-40's can do that. I read where one of the
military lobbying groups noted that the CNO wants to procure three per year
(unspecified total delivery).


I've been unable to find a definitive total number either. 5-8 I'm pretty sure
of, but beyond that everything seems tenuous. Kind of like how many tankers the
USAF needs, of what type, and when;-)

I am not sure the 737 would make a superior
tanker, either--my point was more in the line of, "If the USN is *really*
worried about tanking capability for its aircraft, why have they not moved
to increase their own in-house capability beyond buddy tanking and C-130's,
especially when they have recently begun procuring a new dedicated land
based logistics support aircraft?" In other words, this a BIG priority for
them--as long as somebody else is footing the bill, that is. Otherwise, the
priority seems to be somwhere down in the weeds...


The only way to settle this is to wait and see how the USAF reacts if, after
selecting whatever new tanker they pick, the USN says "hey, we want some of
those for ourselves, and here's the money." Myabe the USAF will say "you're
welcome, and thanks so much for helping out with the R&D." Or maybe they'll get
all territorial; it's not as if turf wars are dead just because we've been
fighting real ones.

Guy