Mr. Kambic makes some good points below, and the first paragraph of his I
left below is very true. The Navy has never quite seemed to been able to
integrate its reserve forces in the manner that the USAF has, even with the
drawdown after Desert Storm, when the reserves became a greater percentage
of the total force. The last USNR squadron I was in had spent the last few
years conducting 6 month deployments aboard ship. Unheard of not long
before.

What are some advantages of a robust reserve force? A typical RESFORON is
manned by aviators with an average of ten or more years of experience. These
aviators come at a cost of about 1/3 of their active duty counterparts. They
leave active duty for a variety of reasons, but allowing them to continue to
serve in a reserve capacity enables the Navy to retain experienced people at
a low cost. People who can be mobilized in time of national crisis. It's a
face card in the back pocket of the leadership.

I think someone made a statement that getting rid of some of the RESFORONS
will free up airframes for active duty squadrons.To me, that reasoning
sounds like a poor Band-Aid for an airframe availability problem. The
airframes the reserves get are usually the beaters and cast-offs from the
active duty. (It took a good deal of scraping to find FOUR airframes to
stand up HSL-60, all of which were put through rework before being sent to
the squadron.) Decimating reserve squadrons is not going to solve the woes
of the active duty side of nav air. As Mr. Kambic alluded to in his second
paragraph below, it may, in fact, lead to other problems in the future. If
getting rid of RESFORONS, hardware, and people, is seen as a solution to
budget problems, I think there may some more serious, underlying issues at
work.

Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides
of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the
spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin.

One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of
"augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few
questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the
reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and
operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I think
so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to
them.

Of course, as with any plan, the one that started this whole thread could
change by next week. In the end we shall see what we shall see.

Just my 2 cents.

Eric Scheie


"Bill Kambic" wrote in message
...

More to the point, loss of an internal Reserve hardware capability is
unlikely to EVER return. The RESFORONS have always been "poor relations"
but made do with what they had and sometimes embarassed Active Duty types
in
head to head competition. The Active Duty types have, in my personal
presence, often noted the vast "wastage" of funds on the Reserve hardware
units. (To be completely fair, a fair number have also "looked behind the
curtain" and seen the reasons why hardware units are a Very Good Thing.)

The likelyhood of facing the hords of the Red Army (or the late,
unlamented
Soviet Navy) is very small. But there are still places where you can lose
a
bunch of aircraft and people in a hurry and have to replace them the same
way (a "dust up" in North Korea comes to mind). The complexity of modern
aircraft means that the "WWII Approach" of 90 day wonder to Fleet Fighter
Pilot in a year (or so) is unlikely to EVER be seen again. This means
that
you have to have a "well" of trained people to draw on in time of crisis.
The REFORON/SRU hardware units filled that need. When they "go away" so
will a cheap solution to an expensive problem.

Bill Kambic

Formerly of VS-73 (the SRU part whose numbers escape me) and VP-93
(ditto),
NAF Detroit, 1974-1978