"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...


A better indicator might be the number of airplanes air wings deploy with.
On my first cruise, an air wing had 90 aircraft. My most recent cruise:
70. That's all funding-driven. Sure we still have 46-50 bomb-droppers,
but
we could have more (i.e. an even better tooth-to-tail) if the budget would
allow it. The leadership has allowed (even promoted) the decrease to keep
aircraft carrier decks filled and because it looks more efficient.

To key on the last sentence here - I wonder if the cuts that have been
proposed are an effort to create a perceived decrease in cost and increase
in efficiency. Even flag officers have people above them they have to answer
to. Unfortunately, short term challenges may be met with short term
solutions which may create long term problems.


[snipped bits here]


The net result will be
(a) "Termination" of the Navy's "insurance policy" (such as VFA-201
provided
for CVW-8 this year) and
(b) Loss of 60% of the Navy's adversary players (all reserve squadrons
right
now).

Because of the lack of adversary units, (and the fact that in the last 3
"wars" that there was no credible air-to-air threat) the case will be made
that air-to-air training syllabi can be decreased and/or civilian units
flying CAT III aircraft will be brought in to augment the VFC's. This
"cart
before the horse" mentality will certainly work in the short term, but
will
leave Naval aviators ill-prepared for conflicts involving better equipped
and more serious forces.


I recall hearing about a company in Florida that advertised adversary
services ( http://www.aerogroupinc.com/welcome.html ). Good, bad, or ugly, I
can't say. Could such a company step in and effectively fill the need for
adversary training? Perhaps. Might this be what the leadership is looking at
when they consider disestablishing reserve squadrons currently filling that
role? Would this create a perception of budget savings - would it "look more
efficient"? The question of whether a private company can fill this roll is
interesting. Contractors may have a somewhat checkered reputation, though
such a contractor would have to hire the same kind of people who would have
manned a reserve squadron.

Issues this raises are -

1. The loss of corporate knowledge for the strike community.
2. Can a civilian company hire and retain quality people and ensure the
training provided will meet the needs of the fleet?

Regarding the strike community, I think the loss of "corporate knowledge"
and effective training is a serious issue. While diminishing this capability
may save a few dollars in the short term, my feeling is that the bill will
come due in the long term. This bill will likely be paid in blood.

In the face of proposed cuts, this thread has identified a number of
problems. I'll venture some ideas for some solutions: (when the term
"reserve" is used, assume it includes the guard as well, when applicable.)

1. War fighters (NOT exclusively strike). Keep the reserves alive. Retain
good people and hard earned corporate knowledge in a robust environment
where it can be applied and the people in the fleet can reap the benefits of
training from experienced, motivated peers.

2. Logistics can be contracted to civilian companies. "Ash and trash" is not
a war-fighting specialty, and there are plenty of companies in business
right now that can provide aerial logistics capability. This would eliminate
the need for NAVAIRES C-9 and C-130 squadrons. How much money would be saved
if the replacement of C-9s with 737s was scrapped? Reserve C-12s and the
Gulfstream squadron in DC could be disestablished and their roles be
outsourced as well.

3. VP, HS, HSL. There are missions close to home, homeland security being a
new priority, that these communities can support, especially now with many
of our active (and reserve!!) forces deployed. A revised mission statement,
along with revised funding priorities would make these units invaluable
assets for homeland and western hemisphere tasking - an ideal role for
reserve assets. If HS and HSL still have to be eliminated, send the budget
savings to the Coast Guard.

The revised mission statement: decreased emphasis on ASW and an increased
emphasis on patrol, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

4. Create (and support!!) reserve units of experienced reserve personnel who
can be utilized in the training and operational augmentation of active
units.

5. All service branches get together to determine how their respective
reserve resources can be best coordinated and utilized to create a more
comprehensive and effective supporting force structure.

My 2 cents.....OK, maybe more than 2 cents, how about 2 bits?

Eric Scheie