wrote:
Nicholas Kliewer wrote:
: I agree that they had confused the MAP with the FAF.

: One scenario I am thinking is that he had dialed in the MAP
: into the GPS and was planning on using it for DME. Then, when
: told that he was going to be holding for half-an-hour figured
: that he would dial the FAF into the GPS to use for holding and
: use the DME from the FAF to determine the MAP.

: When he was unexpectedly cleared for the approach while turning
: inbound, he forgot that he hadn't swapped the GPS over to the FAF
: yet. That would also provide an explanation why he didn't see
: the airport pass on the GPS -- he thought that he was getting
: distance from the FAF.

Interesting scenario and is consistent with the data. I haven't found any
word that there was an actual DME onboard. If your idea is correct, it would provide
fuel for the knee-jerk "Pilot error" explanation that appears to be applied in as many
cases as possible.

-Cory

"knee jerk" pilot error explanation? IF he was using a non-IFR certified
GPS to determine his DME, then it would definitely be pilot error, since
DME was not even needed for this approach, and if he used non IFR
certified equipment to provide something not needed and that contributed
to the mishap, then it was an error on the pilots part. I get the
impression, based on the wording in the report, that the aircraft had
operational DME, otherwise they would have pointed the lack of DME out
when they talked about the pilot requesting DME legs in the holding
pattern and referred to DME minimums. Perhaps he mistook station passage
of the LOM with station passage of the DME transmitter, knowing that
passing the LOM was start of final, but mentally expecting he would have
0 DME readout to confirm he passed the FAF. He started descent one mile
passed the MAP (MAP is 1 DME), so that would equate with a 0 readout on
the ILS/DME. It appears he started final descent as he overflew the DME
transmitter (wrong station passage).

It appears that he was initially navigating satisfactorily from the LOM
(he passed over it from the South to enter the hold) so he should have
known when he overflew it inbound and had passed the FAF inbound, and
yet he didn't descend at that point? The timelines indicate he was
probably 9 miles beyond the MAP when he initiated missed approach (He
was 3 miles past the airport at 1230:16 and called missed approach at
1233:21).

It may be something as simple as lack of situation awareness and not
studying the procedure before flying it, or it could be an aircraft
malfunction (one of the blades on the right propeller was bent aft
rather than forward; I thought that if it's spinning on ground contact
it bends forward), or something else. Guess we'll have to wait for the
final report to see what the conclusions are and if they can pinpoint
the cause.

I noticed the controller offered 10 mile legs; this exceeds the maximum
leg length for the size of pattern that would be expected at that
location based on holding speed and altitude. (This had no effect on the
mishap, and if the controller was using his MVA to provide obstruction
clearance, then it wouldn't matter)

No matter what the cause, it was a sad day for Hendricks motorsports.

JPH