Navy opposition to STOVL is about SHIPS not aircraft. They oppose the
concept because they think it threatens 95,000 ton carriers. It is clever
sophistry to argue against STOVL JSF on the basis of the performance of the
Harrier and, Woody, you know that shipmate. The Harrier uses an entirely
different lift/propulsion system, the technology of which is fundamentally
unchanged from the introduction of the AV-8A in the early 70s. While later
models (Night and Radar/Night) added up-to-date avionics and defensive
systems, the lift/propulsion system is little changed. As a consequnce, its
accident rate is similar to the jets of the era in which it was designed --
F-4, F-14 etc. The design suffers from maintainability issues similar to
aircraft of its design era also. $$ for materiel issues have long been a
problem, but as materiel problems have been fixed (like the #3 bearing),
accident numbers have gone down. STOVL JSF is an entirely different animal.
It is simple to fly -- even fighter guys can do it on the first try (and you
don't take it to "near stall" to transition to the landing configuration
anymore than you do a conventional aircraft). For STOVL JSF to transition
to the SDD phase, the technology issues had to be assessed by the government
as "low risk." It is predicted to meet the performance KPPs even at its
current weight.

On the warfighting side, if fighting an air war was simply a matter of
stacking jets somewhere, we could cover the entire battlespace with B-1s or
B-2s. (A trivia question -- how many CV sorties does it take to cover the
same number of DMPIs that ONE B-1 with a full load of SDBs can cover?) And
if tanking isn't an "issue," what's up with all the bragging about what a
great tanking capability the Navy's brand new STRIKE aircraft provides...?

45% of Marine CAS sorties during OIF were flown by Harriers -- that's hardly
a trivial number, particularly if you're on the ground getting shot at, or
facing the prospect of having to deal with massed armor and indirect fires.
IIRC, about 1500 strike sorties were flown off L-class ships, principally
Bataan and BHR which each operated 20-25 jets. A couple hundred were flown
from a "recovered" airfield within 10 minutes of Baghdad. An additional
500+ sorties by the one land based squadron in Kuwait. At one point last
year, 100-ish of the roughly 110 fleet AV-8s were deployed in real-world
events somewhere in the world -- that total included a Det of land-based
AV-8s supporting the Army and SOF bubbas in Afghanistan for a year.

"Too little benefit..."?? I think not.

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article ,
"Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in
message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an
asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just
"nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient
bed-down
space for them will be available, both of which were in short supply last
year.
In 1991, because we had access to Saudi and Turkish bases, the USAF was
able to
put 350 tankers on just 5 airbases. Last year, they only had 200 tankers
(plus
100 for the airbridge; others were supporting ops in Afghanistan and the
Horn of
Africa), and had to scatter them on 15 airbases. Because of the lack of
ramp
space, the marines graded a FOB in the northern Kuwaiti desert with a
parallel
pair of 6,000 foot dirt runways, where they based many of their KC-130s
and
helos. In addition, they offloaded the helos, men and equipment from two
LHA/LHDs, operating each of them with a full AV-8B squadron, just so they
wouldn't take up space on an airfield in Kuwait that was needed by the
CTOL
aircraft.

The USAF weren't the only ones with tanker problems. From an article in
the
April 14th, 2003 AvLeak, "Lessons Learned", pg. 26, by AvLeak's
correspondent at
a Marine airbase in Kuwait:

"Its air campaign has been shaped to a large extent by the fact that the
service
has only 24 KC-130 tankers in the region, a relatively small number
compared with
the number of strike aircraft it has assembled. What further complicated
the
tanker issue is that most KC-130 sorties were dedicated to transporting
fuel for
helicopters, as well as tanks and other ground vehicles, to forward areas.
It is
a "rare occurence" for a Marine F/A-18 or AV-8B to be refueled in the air,
said a
senior Marine Air Group 13 representative, who described the tanker
shortage as
'huge'. Problems the USAF has had with its own tankers -- such as poor
availability because of the age of the KC-135s -- have exacerbated the
dilemma,
Marine Corps officials asserted. 'Tanking was very limited,' one Royal
Air Force
Harrier pilot noted . . . .

"Without refueling, fixed-wing a/c operating from here can only fly over
Baghdad
or points north for a few minutes before having to return to base. Pilots
from
Harrier squadron VMA-214 noted that without aerial refueling, they had
little
time to find targets in the 30 x 30-mi. 'kill boxes' set up around
Baghdad.

"The Marines hope to mitigate the problem by establishing forward
operating bases
for AV-8Bs and potential F/A-18s. For its helicopter force, the Marines
have
already built an extensive series of [FARPs]. So far, the Marines have
built
more than 10 FARPs and have even closed down the first few that are no
longer
tactically relevant."

They definitely established a Harrier FARP and were sitting ground alert
and/or
turning AV-8Bs at an airfield east of the Euphrates that the marines had
captured
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the AvLeak
guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was around
al-Kut.

Which is why the V/STOL F-35 is unnecessary.

Logic fault. You are claiming that because it was allegedly not
required in
this instance, it will never be required. Kind of hard to support that
kind
of argument. Given a scenario like Afghanistan, where the CAS assets
had to
transit great distances to and from the required area of operations,
the
ability to get STOVL assets into the A/O early in the campaign could
be a
big advantage, and reduces the load on the other assets (like those
F-15E's
and F-16's transiting out of the Gulf area). If it is unnecessary, why
is
the USAF now joining the STOVL bandwagon--merely to make nice with
their
USMC brethren?

Precisely... With one important distinction they're more than likely
hoping
to take their USMC brethren's place and to keep unit costs down by
ensuring
that the STOVL version doesn't get axed.

And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in
Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130
mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that being
able to
operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs) might be
a good
thing?

I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that
would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as
regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

Brooks


What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for
that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so let's
get rid
of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been dropping
like
flies.

Guy