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Old May 3rd 07, 09:03 PM posted to rec.aviation.military,sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military.naval
Vince
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Posts: 134
Default VISUAL AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION

Jack Linthicum wrote:
On May 3, 2:58 pm, Vince wrote:
Jack Linthicum wrote:
On May 3, 2:15 pm, Vince wrote:
Jack Linthicum wrote:
On May 3, 11:35 am, Vince wrote:
TMO
http://www.p-38online.com/recon.html
A quick and logical explanation for the death of the P-38, P-4 and P-5
was the birth of the U-2. Hardly likely that two such systems,
especially with the U-2's superior altitude performance, would co-
exist.
not really
The U2 was not suited for battlefield reconnaissance. USAF tried the
Canberra but it was a failure and then the RB-66 derived from the
skywarrior which was a success
Vince
They were used for that purpose in Cuba, one got shot down.
By October 19 the U-2 flights (then almost continuous) showed four
sites were operational.
and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_U-2
Cuba was not a "battlefield"
Vince
Tell that to the guys who flew over it.
President Kennedy's favorite photograph of all those taken during the
Cuban crisis was shot with the camera displayed at the museum on Nov.
10, 1962 (from less than 500 feet altitude at a speed of 713 mph).
Clearly shown are Soviet-built SA-2 surface-to-air missiles in place
at launch sites. These defensive missiles protected offensive weapons
sites and posed a serious threat to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. A
copy of this portion of the strip photo was mounted in the President's
office. Viewed with a stereoscopic projector, the features have a
three-dimensional effect. The pattern of dots surrounding several
launch sites are actually camouflage nets which were intended to
conceal the equipment positioned beneath them, but the strip camera
rendered them ineffective.
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/fac...et.asp?id=1876

Spies get shot at all the time
Doesn't make it a "battlefield"
they were CIA flights

Vince


Air Force. http://www.afa.org/magazine/valor/1295valor.asp

Good spies are never detected only suspected. Name me a spy who was
shot by the other side. Usually it's your own people doing Penkovskii
and his like in so they can't remember anything later.


the pilots were airforce but the flights were CIA. They were reported
by the CIA

The track of the mission approved on 9 October was plotted to include
coverage of the San Cristóbal trapezoid. The overflight did not actually
occur until 14 October, owing to inclement weather forecasts and the
time needed to train an air force pilot in the intricacies of the more
powerful U-2s operated by the CIA.[79] But eventually, Maj. Richard
Heyser piloted the U-2 that took 928 photographs in six minutes over an
area of Cuba that had not been photographed for 45 days.[80] The film
was rushed to Suitland, Maryland, for processing and arrived at NPIC on
the morning of 15 October. Shortly before 4:00 p.m., the CIA
photo-interpreter on a team of four analysts announced, “We’ve got MRBMs
[medium range ballistic missiles] in Cuba.”[81] It was a “moment of
splendor” for the U-2, its cameras and film, and the photo-interpreters,
as Sherman Kent later put it, if not the CIA’s finest hour of the Cold
War.[82] The president issued blanket authority for unrestricted U-2
overflights on 16 October, and the missile crisis commenced in earnest.


https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol4...hoto_Gap_2.htm


"On the morning of October 14, 1962, a U-2 aircraft, piloted by Air
Force Major Richard D. Heyser, flew a reconnaissance mission over the
western part of Cuba, flying from south to north. The 928 photographs
obtained during the 6-minute flight over the island produced the first
verified evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive missile sites in
Cuba. Analysis and interpretation of the photographs at the National
Photographic Intelligence Center revealed that three medium-range
ballistic missile sites were being developed near San Cristobal, in
Pinar del Rio province. Photo analysts counted eight large MRBM
transporters at the three locations and four erector launchers in
tentative firing positions. Two further U-2 missions, flown on October
15 by pilots of the Strategic Air Command, revealed a fourth MRBM site
near San Cristobal, and two intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)
sites were discovered at Guanajay. Photos also revealed 21 crates for
Soviet IL-28 Beagle medium-range bomber aircraft at San Julian airfield.
(Chronology of Air Force Actions During the Cuban Crisis, 14 October-30
October 1962; USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, pages 11-12)

At 8:30 p.m. on October 15 CIA Deputy Director Carter reported to
McGeorge Bundy the hard evidence of the MRBM's, but the President's
Special Assistant decided not to notify the President that evening. In a
memorandum to the President, dated March 4, 1963, Bundy explained his
reasons for this decision: "

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/di...ba/cuba016.htm




On October 10, NSA reported that the Cuban air defense system seemed to
be complete. They had just begun passing radar tracking from radar
stations to higher headquarters and to defensive fighter bases using
Soviet procedures. Their system, with Russians in advisory positions at
every point, was ready for business. It was into this defensive thicket
that a CIA U-2 flew four days later. Although it survived, on October 25
another U-2 was shot down.

http://www.nsa.gov/publications/publi00033.cfm



Vince