"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in message
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Quant wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01 is
Matthew Ackerman" writes:
snip
I may say I stand corrected on one thing though, I assumed that the
discussion was about the war time '67 and the War on Yom Kippur. If these
IAF pilots shot down Soviet Piloted Migs they were better pilots as the
Israelis fight most of their air to air battles with cannon fire not air
to
air heat seeking rockets.

Actually, the situation in that engagement was so that the Israelis have
purposedly set-up a trap: they have sent Phantoms to hit that Egyptian radar
station and act as a demonstration group, knowing that any attack in _that_
area would cause the Soviets to react - not Egyptians. The purpose was to
deliver a message to the Soviets: don't play with us. When the Soviets
reacted as expected, additional groups of Israeli Mirages and Phantoms - all
flown by hand-picked pilots, every single one of which had far more fresh
combat experience than all the Soviets together - hit them from the side.

So, the Soviets fell to their own ignorance as much as they did to missiles
fired from their fighters: they considered themselves "better" than the
Israelis because of what they were at hom ("best" Soviet pilots), not
because of their true combat experience (which was 0). Also because they
would not listen to the "stupid Arabs", which were warning them that new air
combat methods and weapons were needed in order the counter the Israelis.
The Soviets believed they did not need anything better than MiG-21s and
their nifty weaponry. Israelis, on the other side, concentrated all of their
best pilots to deliver the message: these were excellently trained in
air-to-air gunnery, and also knew the MiG-21 and the weaknesses of its
weapons system so well, they could exploit this in combat to their
advantage.

The Israelis knew, for example, that the R-13 - (AA-2 "Atoll", the main
air-to-air missile used by the MiG-21) - was completely useless in air
combat, so they could maneuver and use afterburners without the fear of
being hit, while their own missiles were functioning. They were, however,
neither "super" nor the "best": they were only better than the Soviets and
the Egyptians at the time and place. Of course, that was what counted and
what was important at the time and place.

As a matter of fact several of "best" Israeli "aces" are known for poor
section discipline: they were fighting alone, leaving their wingmen alone
and without support (which caused quite some losses in air combats in 1973,
when the Arabs got better).

That requires geting in close and out flying the
enemy planes and the pilots. Israel due to this found ways to reload the
Gpods of their planes much faster than any other nation had.

Hm, somehow I have a feeling you're missing here too. Guns were important
mainly during the Six Day War. Subsequently, an increasing number of kills
were scored by missiles.
If I recall it exactly all the Israeli kills against Soviets on 30 July 1970
were scored by missiles, just for example....

The US sent
their ground crew instructors to study how Iseal in Yom Kippur war put US
planes refuled and reloaded back in the air in 15 minutes when the US
ground
crews needed an hour.

The turn-around times were more important on the first day of the Six Day
War, in 1967, than in 1970 or 1973: on the first day of the Six Day War the
Israelis had to fly as much in order to keep the enemy under the constant
pressure. The situation changed already on the next day, when the threat
from Arab air forces was minimized. On specific days during the October War,
1973, the IDF/AF flew not more than 150-200 sorties, while having something
like 400 combat aircraft at the time. Means, obviously less than 50% of the
force was flying at all. So, I doubt there was a need for the US to send
anybody to Israel in 1973 to see these Israeli super-turbo turn-around
times...

In fact, in 1973 the Israelis had nothing like turn-around times of 15
minutes: this was neither really needed, nor advisible, and in the cases
where it was attempted the results were heavy losses. The first reason was
that the pilots could not be properly briefed for such operations as fought
in 1973: as after such fast turn-around times the pilots were sent to hit
targets they did not know where to find they got shot down while looking
around... On the first day of the Six Day War, the situation was simplier,
as they had to strike mainly Arab airfields.

Also, in 1973 the IDF/AF was flying Phantoms: a single Phantom can carry as
many bombs as four or more Mirages - and deliver them with far better
precision, over a longer range, at a higher speed. A "salvo" of 12 Mk.82s
dropped from a single F-4E in 1973 could shut down an Arab airfield for
several hours: in 1973 one needed at least four Mirages, or SMB.2s, or
Vautors to do the same job. Consequently they did not need fly as many
sorties as in 1967.

Israel during the wars often found themeselves with
more Combat ready pilots than planes. Actually it was always that way as
the planes meant buying planes and a lot of spare parts.

According to this logic of yours: buying spare parts = bad.

Hehe, I doubt anybody working in any air force could agree with this....

Not every pilot
could fly 24 * 7 any way for the entire war.

As a matter of fact, nobody can do this. Not "even" the Israelis: please,
permit them to remain human beings. Four sorties a day - and for a single
day - yes, but that's already the limit. Three a day for duration of three,
four, perhaps five days. That can function too. But more would only decrease
the capability of the pilot: it would simply drain him down.

So while they refitted the
planes with more fuel, refilled Gpods, and other weapons used up, they
often
changed pilots allowing the pilot that already flew 1 to 5 missions to get
some rest and a fresh rested pilot took his place.

Could you name a single Israeli pilot that flew five sorties in one day,
either in 1967 or 1973? I couldn't. Feel free to correct me, but I can only
remember several that flew four sorties on the first day of the Six Day War,
not a single one that flew as much in 1973.

Now you indicate they outclassed the Soviets who would have sent their
best
in not their worst.

This is nothing special: the fact that the Soviets considered their "best"
pilots "best" means not these were indeed the "best" around. They've got
shot down in air combats fought on a number of other places too... You can
bet your annual income that the same can be said for the Israelis too: some
of their "best" were shot down several times. So also the "best" Arab pilot
ever, Syrian Bassam Hamshu, who shot down nine Israelis in air combats
between 1970 and 1973 - and then got himself shot down and killed in 1982:
there is always somebody who's _better_.....

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585