F2A2-American Zero?

I have been looking over the performance data on the A6M2. Although
examination of the A6M2 showed that we could have built a fighter like the
zero but sacrificed performance for pilot/plane protection overall
performance considering all factors. The F2A3 was not, being built for
extreme long range without drop tanks, a long range scout/fighter with
additional internal protection to increase survivability.. Unfortunately it
got caught in a tactical situation that was impossible for its limited
purpose. it having already been relegated to 2nd class fighter use for the
Marines pending additional supplies of F4F's.. However, had the F2A3's
escorted bombers to the Japanese carriers as I think was originally
envisioned at Midway, they might have proved at least adequate with the
overstreched Zeros concentrating on the bombers.
I wonder if we were right in not continuing to produce more F2A2's
(possibly with drop tanks). I wonder if they might have taken out more
Japanese planes earlier, further eroding the limited Japanese pilot pool .
Brewster production problems have been to some extent distorted. Up
to WWII they produced as many F2A's as did Gruman F4F's, although far more
Brewsters went to foreign customers.

IMO, aggressive US pilots would have preferred performance to
protection? There has been some data that US pilots would have preferred
F2A2's over the F4F3. By producting heavily "armored" fighters did we
severely limited the opportunity of our early WWII pilots to inflict heavy
fighter loses on the enemy?

When you say 'heavily armored' what you're talking about is generally
a vertical panel of steel plate about 3/8 inch thick behind the
pilot's seat. weighing perhaps 135 pounds (if 2' by 4') The rest of
the airframe weight was heavier construction to meet carrier operating
requirements. I have seen a Zero replica under construction and that
airframe was deliberately made as light as possible. Note that the
wing fold consisted of about two feet at each wingtip - designed that
way to save weight. The end result is the many cases of Zeros
disintegrating under 50 cal fire. When have you ever read of a Buffalo
or a Wildcat coming apart like that? Note that armor was added to
later model Zeros. Also note that about 80% of all fighters shot down
were shot down by people sneaking up behind them.
Walt BJ

"old hoodoo" wrote in message
...


IMO, aggressive US pilots would have preferred performance to
protection? There has been some data that US pilots would have preferred
F2A2's over the F4F3. By producting heavily "armored" fighters did we
severely limited the opportunity of our early WWII pilots to inflict
heavy
fighter loses on the enemy?



No we saved their lives. Once the weakness of the Zero was identified
they were seen to be rather vulnerable. With no self sealing tanks
even minor damage could see them going down in flames or not
making it back to the carrier. The most precious commodity in
any air war are experienced pilots, something the IJN didnt seem
to fully understand.

Keith

old hoodoo wrote:

IMO, aggressive US pilots would have preferred performance to
protection?

There was some of that, but it certainly wasn't a clear-cut
preference. The Wildcat could definitely have benefited from more
power -- IIRC, the trend was for later models to weigh more with no
corresponding power increase. Of course, it could also have benefited
from guns that jammed far less frequently.

On the other hand, pilots came around pretty quickly to the
understanding that if one played the Wildcat's strengths, it was a
formidable fighter. It was tough, its guns (when they weren't jammed
or flat out of ammo) packed a wallop, and it dove well. So long as
pilots avoid dogfighting and fighting alone, they managed fairly well.

did we severely limited the opportunity of our early WWII
pilots to inflict heavy fighter loses on the enemy?

A quick look at various references* indicates the F4F was responsible
for 900 kills in the Pacific, with a 5.9:1 kill ratio. This is against
the best of Japan's aviators. Sure, maybe things could have been
better, but "severely limited" seems a bit of overstatement.

* - "Victory at Sea" - Dunnigan & Nofi, "Combat Aircraft of World War
II" - Weale

--
Joel.





--
Joel Shepherd

http://www.cv6.org/
"May she also say with just pride:
I have done the State some service."

Brewster production problems have been to some extent distorted. Up
to WWII they produced as many F2A's as did Gruman F4F's, although far more
Brewsters went to foreign customers.

That was one of the things that prejudiced the Navy against Brewster. The
managers at Brewster used political contacts to allow them to sell to foreign
customers over the Navy and the Navy didn't care for that at all.

Brewster may have produced as many F2As as Grumman did Wildcats for a while but
Brewster at that time had an inherently antiquated and absurd production scheme
that involved moving parts of the aircraft up and down freight elevators in the
multi story factory in Queens, assembling the aircraft then disassembling it in
order to transport it by road to Newark, NJ in order to reassemble it and test
fly it. Grumman learned how to build aircraft faster at a factory with its own
airfield and the learning curve on the Wildcat really paid off on the Hellcat.
Every single Hellcat was made by Grumman in Long Island. That must have been
about 8 or 10 thousand aircraft in 2 or three years. By the time Brewster began
to rationalize its production scheme the managers started going to jail for war
profiteering and it was all down hill from there.

By all accounts the early marks of the F2A were delightful aircraft to fly with
the landing gear being the major weak point. They clearly dominated Soviet
flown aircraft of contemporary mid 30's design heritage over Finland. Brewster
took a wrong turn with the -3 model. Increasing range with internal tanks
would only have worked if they could have put an R-2800 or R-2600 on it and by
then they would have been better off with a clean sheet of paper to start from.

Brewster was the only major armaments producer in the US to declare bankruptcy
in the wake of WW2. Enough said.

John Dupre'

Another factor to consider was that the F6F Hellcat and Vought F4U were both
under development at the time that the Wildcat was holding the line during 1942
and the first months of '43.

It stands to reason that neither the F4F nor the F2A should have received
considerable resources to improve them in light of the fact that these better
a/c had already flown and were being readied for squadron service. The much
unheralded Hellcat wound up having a 19:1 kill ratio, which I believe was the
best among Allied fighters. The Corsair also had a kill ratio in excess of 10:1
which was even more amazing since the aircraft used during the Solomons
campaign were "birdcage" and early "-1A" models that had significant
maintenance problems that produced a relatively high "out of service rate"
until the "-1D" arrived in early 1945. This I gleaned from some of the
anectodal information published on the activities of VMF-214 and other
squadrons where missions were often flown by smaller "divisions" from multiple
squadrons and in some cases one squadron would borrow a/c from another to
complete their missions. It also would seem that there was a pretty high rate
of mission aborts due to mechanical problems. These problems probably being
caused more by the shortage of spares and mission tempo rather than any
shortfall of the mechanics who had to work with what they had. I am sure that
this was due to the lack of having enough spare aircraft as well. I would not
bet my house on it but this is the impression I am left with after reading
about the missions.

Although I could be wrong, I feel that the only reason the F4F evolved into the
FM-2 was to provide convoy coverage in the Atlantic where they operated from
Jeep carriers and there was no German fighter opposition.

Nonetheless, the F4F/FM-2 were good a/c and probably the easiest to restore and
maintain if you could find one now. (No hydraulics except the brakes).

Paul Varga