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Nick Coleman,
Got back my copy of FOTI this weekend and turned to the segment you mention. From Coonts' narrative, the route sounds a bunch like the OB-16 route. IIRC, OB-16 started in northern Oregon and ended at the B-16 nuclear bullseye at NAS Fallon, NV. The early legs of this route took one into the canyons of the John Day River system, including one particular canyon that runs almost exactly N-S. After watching canyon walls go by for about 20 nm, the terrain begins to broaden and you change course to roughly SSE for a ~70 nm leg to Harney Lake. The few charts I saved of this area confirm the existence of some low hills and shallow valleys along this otherwise flattening route. I would guess these are the hills Coonts was visualizing as threats to Jake and Morg when he wrote this segment. (For those among you who are limited to the likes of a Rand-McNally road atlas, the route starts at a little burg named Kimberly which is about 60 nm SSW of Umatilla, OR.) There's no specific thing that Coonts mentions in his narrative that would cause Morg to scream for a pull-up. Morg has just put his head back into the hood, so he is not looking at the pilot's VDI. (Neither apparently is Jake, since he is not maintaining the 1,000 feet of clearance he has cranked into the VDI's offset impact bar.) Since Jake is viewing SRTC on the VDI, Morg is limited to a PPI display on his DVI. Morg may have noted a way-too-strong radar return too close-in for comfort. Or maybe things just "didn't look right" to him, the sound of that little voice we all carry within us. Or maybe this was just some artistic license taken by Coonts. Night or IMC conditions are absolutely the most demanding environment for low-level flight. Jake clearly has let his scan deteriorate away from the SRTC info and (as the narrative states) dwell too much upon other things like engine instruments and fuel state. Unless you're heading directly for a canyon wall, your radar altimeter readings do not deteriorate from 1,000 feet to 100 feet in only an instant. Coonts' narrative is one of many good examples of the value of having two pairs of eyeballs sitting side by side for attack work. For low-level, all wx ops this was the gold standard of that era. The situational awareness such an arrangement facilitates - and demands - of both pilot and B/N undoubtedly saved many a mission, bird and crew. -- Mike Kanze "It was like being a rat living under a bowling alley." - Willem Dafoe, commenting on what it was like to sleep in a compartment just below the flight deck of an aircraft carrier. |
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