Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was: #1

Subject: Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was:
#1
From: Guy Alcala

We're talking heavies, Art. Longer missions than the mediums, much more time
(sometimes three hours or more) spent over defended territory, at alitude on

The longer the mission the greater the pilot strain. The tighter the formation
the greater the pilot strain. Heavies rarely flew missions as tight as rhe
mediums did.

acing a much more numerous (and usually more determined) fighter threat.

I see you never flew in a medium that was attacked by fighters have you? Are
you suggesting that the fighters were serious whee they attacked heavies but
just fooling around when they attacked mediums?. Where do you get this crap
from?

Not an option for the heavies, for the reasons I gave above. They flew tight
formation until they'd crossed the coast on the return and started the let
down.

Are you suggesting that they flew as tight to and from the target as they did
on the bomb run? More crap.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was:
#1
From: Guy Alcala

We're talking heavies, Art. Longer missions than the mediums, much more time
(sometimes three hours or more) spent over defended territory, at alitude on

The longer the mission the greater the pilot strain. The tighter the formation
the greater the pilot strain.

Which is why they needed two pilots to switch off flying formation, as stated.

Heavies rarely flew missions as tight as rhe
mediums did.

I'll leave it to you to argue that point with pilots of heavies.

acing a much more numerous (and usually more determined) fighter threat.

I see you never flew in a medium that was attacked by fighters have you? Are
you suggesting that the fighters were serious whee they attacked heavies but
just fooling around when they attacked mediums?. Where do you get this crap
from?

I'm saying (not suggesting) that until the mediums were on the continent, only the
heavies were attacking targets in Germany. The German response to attacks by
mediums on tactical targets in France, Belgium, and Holland was much less
determined than their response to attacks on targets in Germany, for obvious
reasons. Intercepting the mediums was optional, intercepting the heavies
mandatory, in the period in question. Or are you claiming that the heavies 4.2%
ETO loss rate for 1943 as a whole, vs. the B-26's 0.5% in the same period, was due
to the B-26 being able to take more damage than the B-17 or B-24?

As an example of the different defense responses, I've been re-reading
Middlebrook's "Schweinfurt-Regensburg Raid", which details the dual mission of
August 17th, 1943. In addition to the heavies and their escorts (U.S. P-47s and
RAF Spitfires) going to the targets in Germany, there were also five diversionary
or support missions to French targets by U.S. B-26s, RAF B-25s, and Typhoons,
escorted by Spits or Typhoons.

The Germans intercepted one of the B-26 formations, the one to Bryas Airfield by
the 36 a/c of the 386th BG, escorted by 8 squadrons of Spits (a much higher ratio
of fighters to bombers than was possible with the heavies). On this occasion,
they did choose to intercept in about Gruppe strength, with two Staffels of
ME-109s and one of FW-190s, roughly 20-30 fighters total (facing about 90 Spits).
At least one of the units involved, 11/JG 26, was a training and replacement unit
for the rest of the Jagdgeschwader, with largely inexperienced pilots. Total
losses, two German fighters, two Spits, and no B-26s.

Dive bombing attack against Lille-Vendeville airfield by 8 Typhoons, escorted by
12 more. One small German force that had been looking for the U.S. force that had
bombed Bryas slightly earlier made contact with this group instead, and took some
long range shots that cost one Typhoon. This attack may have delayed the
concentration of II/JG 26 at Lille from its dispersal bases, possibly preventing
this unit from attacking the Schweinfurt force on their way inbound.

Similar strength Typhoon dive bombing attack against Poix Airfield, no
engagements, no losses.

7 Mitchells of RAF No. 226 Squadron, and 6 from 320 Dutch Squadron, each with
three squadrons of Spits as escort, were sent to attack railyards at Dunkirk and
Calais respectively, mainly as diversions, with any damage caused being
serendipitous. 226's mission was aborted due to escort rendezvous and formation
problems; the Calais mission went as planned. The Luftwaffe completely ignored
both missions.

Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe was repositioning fighters from bases in Northern Germany
and Western France to those in Belgium, Holland, and Central Germany to hit the
heavies on their way in and, in the case of the Schweinfurt force, on the way
out. And so they did, with many units flying two or in a few cases three sorties,
for a total of about 500-550 sorties (vs. perhaps 30 sorties total for all five
diversionary/support missions). against the Schweinfurt force they were able to
assemble 13 Gruppen of single-engined fighters, perhaps 300 fighters total, plus
twins to pick off cripples. And of course, they shot down 60 B-17s, out of the
376 dispatched, at a cost of 42 fighters.

And here's an example of their attitude:

"Only a few days earlier Major Galland [CO of II/JG 26, Adolf's brother, shot down
and KIA this day by a 56th FG P-47] had gathered his officers together and
stressed to them that their best effort must henceforth be directed against the
American four-engined bombers which were posing such a threat to Germany."

Not an option for the heavies, for the reasons I gave above. They flew tight
formation until they'd crossed the coast on the return and started the let
down.

Are you suggesting that they flew as tight to and from the target as they did
on the bomb run? More crap.

I'm stating that they flew tight formations the whole way, because any unit in
loose formation drew fighters like bees to honey. While they flew enroute in a
combat box of 54 a/c, for the bomb run the three groups (lead, high and low)
switched to trail with each group bombing individually, before reforming into the
combat box for the route back. Indeed, on the Regensburg mission, Lemay insisted
that his units (4th Bomb Wing) climb to enroute height before setting out instead
of forming at a lower altitude and then cruise climbing, so that they could get
the formation tightened up before they hit the defenses. They held that to the
target, loosened up somewhat for the next couple of hundred miles, then tightened
up again while they flew past the German fighter fields believed to be on Sardinia
and Corsica, before loosening up once safely past and making their way to North
Africa.

Guy

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
Which is why they needed two pilots to switch off flying formation, as stated.

Two pilots was obviously better than a single pilot when flying
formations, however that does not mean the RAF would have gone down that
route for daylight ops. Bomber Command pilots were already flying 8 hour
sorties, some as long as 12 hours (in the Hampden the pilot could not
move from the seat - no access to the rest of the aircraft). It is more
than likely that Bomber Command would have retained the single pilot
(with the increased workload) faced with the need to modify aircraft and
a pilot shortage.

It is not correct to assume that since the USAAF had two pilot aircraft
and used two pilots on daylight ops, that you _need_ two pilots when
flying similar ops. Also, it is not correct to assume that since the
USAAF used large, tight combat boxes, that you _need_ to use such
tactics. There's even a suggestion that daylight ops may not be the only
answer when you take cloud cover into account.

--
John

John Halliwell wrote:

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
Which is why they needed two pilots to switch off flying formation, as stated.

Two pilots was obviously better than a single pilot when flying
formations, however that does not mean the RAF would have gone down that
route for daylight ops. Bomber Command pilots were already flying 8 hour
sorties, some as long as 12 hours (in the Hampden the pilot could not
move from the seat - no access to the rest of the aircraft).

Bomber Command a/c at night were able to fly much of the cruise part of the mission
on the automatic pilot, with no need to jockey throttles or make constant fine
corrections to stay in formation. 12 hour missions were certainly the exception,
and even 8 hours would be over the median. I have a copy of Walter Hughes
self-published "A Bomber Pilot in World War II." In it, he includes his
navigator's logs for each of his 35 missions (the counters) in a B-24 in '44-'45
(Note: B-24 missions were generally somewhat shorter than B-17 missions, as the
B-24 cruised faster).

Ignoring missions to targets outside of Germany, the shortest mission he flew was 5
hours 25 minutes (an airfield at Paderborn), the longest 12 hours 30 minutes
("Russian Troop Support, Ships and Docks, Swinemunde near Poland"). I'd say the
average mission ran about 7-7 1/2 hours, with quite a few around 6-6 1/2. A
_minimum_ of 45 minutes was spent in forming up the squadrons, group and combat
wing before setting off, something that night bombers didn't have to do (although
they usually did climb to a considerable height while circling their base). More
typically, it took 1-2 hours, and the longest he recorded was 3 hours from Take off
time to form up time, plus another twenty minutes before "Zero hour," the time when
they set off.



It is more than likely that Bomber Command would have retained the single pilot

(with the increased workload) faced with the need to modify aircraft and
a pilot shortage.

We assumed that they'd do so at first, while the necessary mods were studied.

It is not correct to assume that since the USAAF had two pilot aircraft
and used two pilots on daylight ops, that you _need_ two pilots when
flying similar ops.

Of course not. Actually, at least one B-26 Group (I think it was either the 323rd
or 386th) in the ETO was given the B-26C-6 model, with only a single pilot and
controls, as a test. The opinions in the group seem to have be uniformly negative,
and they were fairly quickly re-equipped with dual control a/c. Of course, the 3
US groups of A-20s in the ETO were flying almost identical missions as the B-26s
with a single pilot, and suffering similar (slightly higher) loss rates, but those
missions were a lot shorter than the heavies, at lower altitudes and, as mentioned
elsewhere, generally facing fewer fighters.

Also, it is not correct to assume that since the
USAAF used large, tight combat boxes, that you _need_ to use such
tactics.

Obviously. However, if you want to have a reasonable chance of surviving during
the period before the Jagdwaffe has lost the air superiority battle, then you'd
better be in those tight combat boxes. Bomber Command was able to operate by day
in relatively loose formations (compared to the 8th) from mid-'44 on because the
fighter threat had been seriously reduced, so that such formations (along with lots
of escort fighters, many now based on the continent) were able to survive. Prior
to that period, flying loose formation just made you a magnet for the fighters,
because you lose much of the formation firepower (and the RAF was already seriously
down on that compared to the US heavies, owing to fewer MGs of much less effective
caliber). Fly loose formation and the fighters are faced with a bunch of single
targets that they can concentrate on and overwhelm one at a time.

There's even a suggestion that daylight ops may not be the only
answer when you take cloud cover into account.

If you're going to bomb by radar the accuracy isn't all that much better by day
than by night, but it's still better (about 2 vs. 3 mile CEPs at that time). and
Oboe, Gee-H and Micro-H were all limited in range and required forward deployed
transmitters on the continent to reach the deeper German targets. That's the main
reason RAF Bomber Command accuracy was so much better on deep penetration targets
after the invasion. Here's the 8th AF blind bombing accuracy figures:

H2X only: 10/10 clouds; % within 1,000 feet, 0.2%; % over 5 miles, 41%.

H2X plus visual: 8-9/10 clouds; 1.0%; 18%.

H2X plus visual: 6-7/10 clouds; 2.0%; 9%.

H2X plus visual: 4-5/10 clouds; 4.4%; 4%.

Gee-H: various weather; 5.0%; 6%.

Micro-H: various Wx; 5.0%; 11%.

Visual: good Wx; 30.0%; 8%.

Visual: poor Wx; 9.4%; 9%.

(Source: "Eighth Air Force -- Tactical Development, August 1942 - May 1945," Aug.
1942 - June 1945, file 520.057-1, HRA, quoted in "America's Pursuit of Precision
Bombing, 1910-1945" by Stephen L. McFarland)

Guy

ubject: Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was:
#1
From: Guy Alcala

flying loose formation just made you a magnet for the fighters,

What does that mean? If you were there and fighters were there they would come
after you no matter what the formation. Period.

Fly loose formation and the fighters are faced with a bunch of single
targets that they can concentrate on and overwhelm one at a time.

We flew loose to and from the target. If fighters appeared we would tighten up.


Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr wrote:

ubject: Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was:
#1
From: Guy Alcala

flying loose formation just made you a magnet for the fighters,

What does that mean? If you were there and fighters were there they would come
after you no matter what the formation. Period.

snip

Generally true, although it depended on the state of morale and training of the
fighter unit. Inexperienced units and twin-engined nightfighters operating by day
were often told to only go after stragglers; units with shaky morale sometimes
found a reason not to attack (this was more prevalent in the 1944-45 period).
Still, given the choice of attacking the groups that were flying tight or the ones
that were flying loose, which do you think they chose? AOTBE, they chose to go
after the group with the worst formation, as numerous german fighter leaders have
stated.

Of course, that assumes that there are no escorts around to get in the way or make
them attack the first available formation, and sometimes there are other factors.
If all three groups in the wing box were flying good formation, then they'd
typically hit either the high squadron of the high group or more often the low
squadron of the low group, preferably the outside wingmen of the last element (aka
'Purple Heart Corner'), because they've got the least support of any a/c in the
formation, it's easier for the fighters to break away after a pass without worrying
about a collision, and if the bomber in that position is damaged it can't drift
back and down while passing through the formation and still deriving some
protection from the other a/c (for a while, anyway). When they fall back, they're
out all by themselves.

Guy

P.S. I'll be offline for a couple of days, so if you reply don't expect one from
me for a bit.

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
And you missed the essential difference that I pointed out, that RAF BC was able
to
fly fairly long missions at night with a single pilot, because the majority of
time
the autopilot was flying the a/c, and they had no need to fly in formation at
all.
Fly in formation and you can't let the autopilot fly the plane; the pilot has
to.
Now, with some autopilots it's is possible for the pilot to fly the a/c through
the
autopilot, giving him in effect power steering (this was the case with later B-
24s,
which were considered much ehavier on the controls than the B-17). That
decreases
the physical effort required, but not the stress from having to maintain
position for
hours. If you're a wingman, all of your attention has to be concentrated
maintaining
position on the lead a/c.

I appreciate your point, and agree with it, my point is that BC may not
have had the extra resources to hand to provide a 2nd pilot in large
numbers of aircraft. The aircraft themselves didn't have accommodation
for a second pilot and FE, so you'd lose him as well (or you train him
the rudiments of flight training as many pilots did unofficially). They
may have decided that for these reasons daylight ops with tight
formations, and therefore daylight ops would be too dangerous to fly, or
may have tried it anyway (with or without complaints from pilots).

You missed my point again. I posted that sortie length info (_including_ time
taken
to form up, which the night bombers didn't have to do) to show that 8-12 hour
Bomber
Command missions, day or might, would be the exception rather than the rule.
The RAF
heavies cruised at about the same TAS as the B-17, slightly slower than the B-
24, but
the RAF night missions don't have all that extra time due to forming. So,
unless the
RAF was deliberately wasting time on their missions (i.e. other than evasive
routing), there's no way that most missions would run 8-12 hours. Indeed, there
are
numerous accounts of of individual BC a/c returning to base well before they
should
have been able to, by cutting the corners of the planned flight path, and
'adjusting'
the navigator's logs to show that they'd managed to find some truly miraculous
winds
(that no one else encountered).

I'm going off figures from 'Enemy Coast Ahead' by Guy Gibson V.C. Early
in the war the Hampdens were flying long trips over the North Sea and
into Germany. When they got to their allotted target they were to drop a
bomb every half hour, orbiting away from the target in between. This is
before the maximum effort raids later in the war, but those single
pilots were expected to fly for 8-12 hours.

--
John

Subject: Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was:
#1
From: John Halliwell

This is
before the maximum effort raids later in the war, but those single
pilots were expected to fly for 8-12 hours.

--
John

And they did it routinely every night. and all of us who were there knew it.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Guy Alcala wrote in message .. .

This will undoubtedly appear in the wrong place thanks to the
malfunctioning news server.

If you're going to bomb by radar the accuracy isn't all that much better by day
than by night, but it's still better (about 2 vs. 3 mile CEPs at that time). and
Oboe, Gee-H and Micro-H were all limited in range and required forward deployed
transmitters on the continent to reach the deeper German targets. That's the
main reason RAF Bomber Command accuracy was so much better on deep
penetration targets after the invasion. Here's the 8th AF blind bombing accuracy
figures:

H2X only: 10/10 clouds; % within 1,000 feet, 0.2%; % over 5 miles, 41%.

H2X plus visual: 8-9/10 clouds; 1.0%; 18%.

H2X plus visual: 6-7/10 clouds; 2.0%; 9%.

H2X plus visual: 4-5/10 clouds; 4.4%; 4%.

Gee-H: various weather; 5.0%; 6%.

Micro-H: various Wx; 5.0%; 11%.

Visual: good Wx; 30.0%; 8%.

Visual: poor Wx; 9.4%; 9%.

(Source: "Eighth Air Force -- Tactical Development, August 1942 - May 1945,"
Aug. 1942 - June 1945, file 520.057-1, HRA, quoted in "America's Pursuit of
Precision Bombing, 1910-1945" by Stephen L. McFarland)

These are identical figures to Exhibit R, "Percent of bombs within
certain distance of the aiming point, Eighth Air Force Bombing
1 September 1944 to 31 December 1944", in the USSBS "Bombing
Accuracy" report.

The table columns are Good to fair visibility (no cloud cover, no haze,
no smoke) / Poor Visibility (clouds, haze and/or smoke) / Gee H /
Micro H / H2X 4-5/10 clouds / H2X 6-7/10 clouds / H2x 8-9/10
clouds / H2X 10/10 clouds. Percentage of bombs within specified
distance of aiming point.

Note the table ignores 3 ground support missions in the given date range

% of total effort / 14 / 10 / 15 / 3 / 3 / 5 / 15 / 35
% with 1,000 feet / 30 / 9.4 / 5 / 5 / 4.4 / 2 / 1 / 0.2
% within 0.5 miles / 64.3 / 34.4 / 26 / 25.7 / 22.8 / 12.5 / 7.3 / 1.2
% within 1 mile / 82.4 / 58 / 56 / 52.4 / 48.5 / 36.5 / 22.5 / 5.6
% within 3 miles / 91.5 / 85 / 90 / 78.2 / 89.1 / 84 / 67.4 / 39.8
% over 5 miles / 7.8 / 8.6 / 6 / 11.5 / 4 / 9.5 / 18 / 41.5

The table includes the bomb tonnages, and the percentages are
of the bombs actually aimed at the target, as opposed to the
bomb tonnage dropped including on secondary targets. Total
effort is the percentage of bombs aimed at the target using the
particular aiming method.

I think you will find McFarland is referencing the above table, not
the 8th's accuracy record for the whole war. Which is what his
reference implies.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

ArtKramr wrote:

snip

I'll say it again. If you were there and fighters were there they would come
after you no matter what. Count on it and be prepared for it or you are dead
meat. End of story.

Former Luftwaffe fighter pilots disagree, and they're in a better position to
comment on their tactics, training, orders, and morale than you are, just as you
and your fellow ex B-26 crewmen are in a better position than ex-Luftwaffe fighter
pilots to comment on those same factors as they applied to B-26 ops.

Guy