Feather Duster I and II programs

Hello

When I have read Clashes some time ago, I found interesting part about
Feather Duster tests. Sadly I wasnt long and focused mostly on
tactics. About a/c involved was writen only that old F-86H have
simulated MiG-17 in Feather Duster 1 (in FD 2 were bigger formations
used) and among the others F-105 and F-4 were tested in combats.
Were also other USAF fighters participating on this program?
Was it sole USAF test or also USN fighters were involved?
And was also simulated by some types (possibly F-106 like on Top Gun)?

Ivan

Zajcevi wrote:

Hello

When I have read Clashes some time ago, I found interesting part about
Feather Duster tests. Sadly I wasnt long and focused mostly on
tactics. About a/c involved was writen only that old F-86H have
simulated MiG-17 in Feather Duster 1 (in FD 2 were bigger formations
used) and among the others F-105 and F-4 were tested in combats.
Were also other USAF fighters participating on this program?
Was it sole USAF test or also USN fighters were involved?
And was also simulated by some types (possibly F-106 like on Top Gun)?

One of the Featherduster F-104C pilots, Tom Delashaw, died in a Hunter
crash a couple of months ago. A mutual friend had discussed Featherduster
with Tom at some length some years back, and Tom had also shown him the
declassified reports from the tests. Here's an excerpt from an old email
from my friend, discussing the arrangement and scope of the tests:

-----------------------------------------------------------------
Project Featherduster was instigated by TAC to help develop
proper tactics against likely opponents that TAC aircraft
might face in SEA. The TAC aircraft of concern were the F-
100C/D/F, F-4C, F-105D and F-104C. Opponents included the
F-102A and F-106A (MiG-21), F-86H (MiG-17), F-8C/D (MiG-
19) and the F-5N (another story altogether). The TAC
aircraft were also flown against each other to practice
dissimilar air combat training (DACT) and to further evaluate
their individual strengths and weaknesses.

It should come as no surprise that the F-8s did pretty well
against the F-100s. It probably won't surprise too many to
learn that the F-4s generally beat up on the F-105s. The big
shock to most, however, was the fact that the F-104C ended
up at the top of the heap. It not only bested all the other
aircraft, but it did so regularly and by a surprising margin.
Only when dictated to fly high altitude, subsonic turning
engagements did the 104 fall short of its opponents.
-----------------------------------------------

The rest of the email describes why the F-104 cleaned up, a combination of
tactics, training and a/c performance and features. Delashaw also flew
F-104Cs in the Navy "Maneuvering Target Test", which involved Navy F-4Bs
developing tactics to use Sparrows in WVR combat.

Guy

*The F-5N was a version of the F-5 that Northrop was trying to sell to the
USAF.

Zajcevi posted:

When I have read Clashes some time ago, I found interesting part about
Feather Duster tests.

Couple years ago I tried to find whatever declassified documents I
could at Maxwell AFB (for Ed...maintaining my card catalog and photo
copying currency).

The only thing I brought home was five pages I photo-copied from a
March 1966 Fighter Weapons Newsletter (published by the Fighter
Weapons School at Nellis AFB). I'm looking at it right now...

Sadly I wasnt long and focused mostly on
tactics. About a/c involved was writen only that old F-86H have
simulated MiG-17 in Feather Duster 1 (in FD 2 were bigger formations
used) and among the others F-105 and F-4 were tested in combats.

The final report (at the time) was classified SECRET NOFORN, if
sombody wants to do the FOIA request, the report was titled "TAC
Mission FF-857, Air Combat Tactics Evaluation F-100, F-104, F-105 and
F-4C versus MiG-15/17 type aircraft (F-86H)." It was published May
1965 by the USAF Fighter Weapons School.

An interesting paragraph in the FWN article says..."In testing and
analyzing air combat tactics against aircraft of unlike performance,
the Featherduster [ed--one word] tests, like most of our recent air
combat tactics analyses and future aircraft development evaluations,
have capitalized on the energy maneuverability theory deveoped by
Major John Boyd and Mr Tom Christie and Staff, of Systems Command APGC
PGTOS, Eglin AFB, Florida."

What smacks me in the forehead is simply remembering this article was
from March 1966, then you read Michel's "Clashes" and ask, "why in the
world didn't the FWS get behind this issue?" or informally, "what the
**** were they thinking they accomplished by ignoring ACM/ACT?"

Thank goodness the USN had the Ault Report...and made they changes
required. BTW Ivan I highly encorage you to get a copy of Robert
Wilcox' superb "Scream of Eagles."

But I digress...

Were also other USAF fighters participating on this program?

From the FWN article...about Featherduster 1 Part 1..."The Mission
FF-857 was accomplished during the period 26 April-7 May 1965 .

1. F-100, F-104, F-105 and F-4C were alternated in "attacker" and
defender" positions.

2. F-86H were similarly alternated in "attacker" and "defender"
positions.

[paraphrasing now]

Mostly 1-v-1 with a limited number of 2-v-2 engagements, to check the
defensive-split capability of a defending unit.

Profiles were either defender at 35,000' and defender at typical
combat patrol speed (adjusted back to .9 mach so the F-86H could make
an attack), or defender at 20,000 feet and typical ordnance loaded
airspeed for the type fighter involved (360 knots for the F-105).

A total of 128 sorties were flown, lasting approx 45 minutes each,
including two to four engagements, all jets were "clean" (no tanks or
suspension equipment) so about 180 engagements total.

Featherduster 1 Part 2 was conducted 28 Jun-2 Jul 1965 and it involved
two F-5A from the 4441 CCTS at Williams AFB and the prototype F-5N
(with uprated J-85-15 motors, 4300# thrust each eng) versus ANG
F-86Hs, the profiles were the same as Part 1. A total of 62 sorties
were flown, the F-5 fought 35 engagements as the defender and 47 as
the attacker. F-5 agility was impressive says the FWN article.

Featherduster 2 Part 1 looked at the low altitude environment, AIM-7B
and AIM-9B considerations, what to do if caught at slow speed on the
deck...

This phase was conducted 16 Aug-22 Sep 1965 using the same four TAC
fighters flying 1-v-X, 2-v-X, and 4-v-X versus the F-86H.

The F-5 flew 1-v-X only due to availability of jets.

Two A-1Es flew as defenders only (the obvious implication is SAR force
defensive maneuvering).

Total sorties were 298 with over 200 engagements. Typical setups had
the "defenders" at 5,000', 1,000', and 500' AGL flying airspeeds
ranging from 360 to 420 KCAS.

Was it sole USAF test or also USN fighters were involved?

USAF and ANG it would appear.

And was also simulated by some types (possibly F-106 like on Top Gun)?

Not according to this article.

Juvat

Juvat wrote:

Couple years ago I tried to find whatever declassified documents I
could at Maxwell AFB (for Ed...maintaining my card catalog and photo
copying currency).

Commendable. I'll drop some opinions in at relevant places below:

The only thing I brought home was five pages I photo-copied from a
March 1966 Fighter Weapons Newsletter (published by the Fighter
Weapons School at Nellis AFB). I'm looking at it right now...

FYI, in 1966, the FWS was a fragmented school. There were three
separate divisions, with three separate curricula: F-100, F-105 and a
newly developing F-4C section. Criteria for attendance was 1000 hours
in type.

The final report (at the time) was classified SECRET NOFORN, if
sombody wants to do the FOIA request, the report was titled "TAC
Mission FF-857, Air Combat Tactics Evaluation F-100, F-104, F-105 and
F-4C versus MiG-15/17 type aircraft (F-86H)." It was published May
1965 by the USAF Fighter Weapons School.

An interesting paragraph in the FWN article says..."In testing and
analyzing air combat tactics against aircraft of unlike performance,
the Featherduster [ed--one word] tests, like most of our recent air
combat tactics analyses and future aircraft development evaluations,
have capitalized on the energy maneuverability theory deveoped by
Major John Boyd and Mr Tom Christie and Staff, of Systems Command APGC
PGTOS, Eglin AFB, Florida."

Certainly the EM work of Boyd was being tested, and Featherduster
proved that his concepts were correct. The thinking that most fighter
types take for granted today was revolutionary at the time.
Understanding that energy was both potential and kinetic, that the two
were interchangeable, that the vertical offered some advantages, and
that there were chartable corners of the performance envelope that
revealed strengths and weaknesses were all new ideas.

What smacks me in the forehead is simply remembering this article was
from March 1966, then you read Michel's "Clashes" and ask, "why in the
world didn't the FWS get behind this issue?" or informally, "what the
**** were they thinking they accomplished by ignoring ACM/ACT?"

The USAF at that time was led by senior generals who were
predominantly from the bomber force. SAC controlled. The senior
fighter leadership was secondary overall and most dated back to WW II
when the fight was considerably different.

Worst of all was the reluctance to accept an element of risk in
training. Air/air requires max performance maneuvering, close to
another aircraft that is trying to be unpredictable. That smack of
mid-air potential.

Second, the concept was well established even through the Korean war
that "fighting wing" was the way to employ. Senior pilots, as flight
and element leads did the shooting, while junior pilots were supposed
to fly fighting wing and "clear lead's six." Really they merely
occupied the potential shooter's position, thereby becoming the
alternative target for the attacker and thus protecting the lead.



Were also other USAF fighters participating on this program?

From the FWN article...about Featherduster 1 Part 1..."The Mission
FF-857 was accomplished during the period 26 April-7 May 1965 .

1. F-100, F-104, F-105 and F-4C were alternated in "attacker" and
defender" positions.

2. F-86H were similarly alternated in "attacker" and "defender"
positions.

[paraphrasing now]

Mostly 1-v-1 with a limited number of 2-v-2 engagements, to check the
defensive-split capability of a defending unit.

A reflection of the limited training available at the time to
operational crews in 2-v-2 engagement. Might as well do 1-v-1, since
the two-ship will rapidly lose mutual support, the wingman would only
be dragged along in fighting wing anyway, and we can save training
sorties by going 1-v-1.

Profiles were either defender at 35,000' and defender at typical
combat patrol speed (adjusted back to .9 mach so the F-86H could make
an attack), or defender at 20,000 feet and typical ordnance loaded
airspeed for the type fighter involved (360 knots for the F-105).

Whoa---ain't no F-105 that ever went anywhere at 360. If you needed to
save gas, you might hump along at 420, but if you were in a threat
envrionment, even with wall-to-wall ordinance, you were doing 540
KIAS.

A total of 128 sorties were flown, lasting approx 45 minutes each,
including two to four engagements, all jets were "clean" (no tanks or
suspension equipment) so about 180 engagements total.

The "clean" configuration minimizes over-G, but may not be
representative of real-world combat situations. Probably pros and cons
to both sides of the issue here.

Featherduster 1 Part 2 was conducted 28 Jun-2 Jul 1965 and it involved
two F-5A from the 4441 CCTS at Williams AFB and the prototype F-5N
(with uprated J-85-15 motors, 4300# thrust each eng) versus ANG
F-86Hs, the profiles were the same as Part 1. A total of 62 sorties
were flown, the F-5 fought 35 engagements as the defender and 47 as
the attacker. F-5 agility was impressive says the FWN article.

The 4441st was the training squadron for Foreign Military Sales
support of the F-5A. They trained the customers who were buying the
airplane. The cadre was mostly high experience F-100 and F-86 pilots
at that time. Because a lot of the customers were interested in air
defense, they did a lot of air-to-air training in their syllabus.

The F-104 bunch that did so well was predominantly from the 435th TFS
"Black Eagles" of the 479th TFW at Homestead. They were one of few
"day fighter" units in the USAF at the time and were leaders in the
development of "fluid attack" tactics in which, rather than fighting
wing, the element flew as a mutually supporting team, not chasing the
leader's tail but maneuvering counter-plane and positioning to deny
counters and swap roles to maintain pressure on the defender. They
were leaders in vertical maneuver application. (Former 435th Black
Eagle--but not in F-104s).


Probably the most critical aspect of Featherduster, but largely
ignored until the '70s was the identification of the value of
dissimilar training. Rather than fighting your own type, which
inevitably lead to a "I can fly slower than you" contest, the
dissimilar battle requires understanding of both aircraft's potential
and maximizing your own while minimizing your opponent's.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Ed Rasimus posted:

Certainly the EM work of Boyd was being tested, and Featherduster
proved that his concepts were correct. The thinking that most fighter
types take for granted today was revolutionary at the time.

Indeed, and it is still amazes me that later issues of the FWR
contained comments by the editor that Fuild Four (with the concomitant
Fighting Wing formation) is "the way" it's to be done.

The USAF at that time was led by senior generals who were
predominantly from the bomber force. SAC controlled. The senior
fighter leadership was secondary overall and most dated back to WW II
when the fight was considerably different.

No argument with the first part, but the last four words I'd quibble
with. It wasn't that air to air was so different (AIM-9B were serevely
limited, no?) but the USAF was concentrating on the nuke aspect and
TAC needed a piece of the pie, so air to air was passe in the "bucket
of sunshine" era.

And...by the mid-70s even the FWR in those "Anythig Else is Rubbish"
articles was telling F-4 guys that closing for guns was the desired
tactic (assuming you're hauling a gun, C/D or E)...the desired way for
an engagement to culminate.

Worst of all was the reluctance to accept an element of risk in
training. Air/air requires max performance maneuvering, close to
another aircraft that is trying to be unpredictable. That smack of
mid-air potential.

Oh yeah...clearly thru the end of the SEA war. FWR articles come right
out and say [paraphrasing], "first MASTER fluid four...then perhaps
you can attempt something like Double Attack...but mid-air collisions
are a very high threat."

Second, the concept was well established even through the Korean war
that "fighting wing" was the way to employ. Senior pilots, as flight
and element leads did the shooting, while junior pilots were supposed
to fly fighting wing and "clear lead's six." Really they merely
occupied the potential shooter's position, thereby becoming the
alternative target for the attacker and thus protecting the lead.

Amen...Blesse's "No Guts No Glory" article published in FWN and ISTR
his confirmation in his book that fighting wing worked even in the
F-4. When everybody else in the F-4 recognized that the wingman was
simply holding on for life trying to "match" fuselages and not to get
"sucked' to the 6 o'clock...lots of checking six going on during hard
maneuvering.

Whoa---ain't no F-105 that ever went anywhere at 360. If you needed to
save gas, you might hump along at 420, but if you were in a threat
envrionment, even with wall-to-wall ordinance, you were doing 540
KIAS.

Except the first F-105s shot down by MiG-17s (unobserved entry ISTR)
guys hovering near a bridge waiting their turn to attack.

The "clean" configuration minimizes over-G, but may not be
representative of real-world combat situations. Probably pros and cons
to both sides of the issue here.

What was Korat's guidance WRT to pickling pylons and suspension
equipment in an escape maneuver?

Probably the most critical aspect of Featherduster, but largely
ignored until the '70s was the identification of the value of
dissimilar training.

Which is another less critical way of conveying my question, "why the
**** didn't the FWS get behind ACM/ACT?"

Juvat

Juvat wrote:

Ed Rasimus posted:

Certainly the EM work of Boyd was being tested, and Featherduster
proved that his concepts were correct. The thinking that most fighter
types take for granted today was revolutionary at the time.

Indeed, and it is still amazes me that later issues of the FWR
contained comments by the editor that Fuild Four (with the concomitant
Fighting Wing formation) is "the way" it's to be done.

Purely a reflection of the ingrained training. Taught by WW II and
Korean War vets, the Fluid Four concept was what was done. When you
went to FWS, you had a 1000 hours, so you were going to be a leader,
not a fighting wing hanger-on. You were going to be the shooter, not
the shootee. The mere idea that a Lt could be capable of maneuvering
on his own and then being authorized to pull the trigger was anathema.

The USAF at that time was led by senior generals who were
predominantly from the bomber force. SAC controlled. The senior
fighter leadership was secondary overall and most dated back to WW II
when the fight was considerably different.

No argument with the first part, but the last four words I'd quibble
with. It wasn't that air to air was so different (AIM-9B were serevely
limited, no?) but the USAF was concentrating on the nuke aspect and
TAC needed a piece of the pie, so air to air was passe in the "bucket
of sunshine" era.

What I meant by "the fight was considerably different" was the large
number engagements that quickly devolved into 1-v-1s, all at guns
range. It was either that or the slashing, unseen blow-throughs for
high angle deflection shots.

And, of course, you're spot-on with the nuke delivery mentality of the
TAC forces. That was also a single-ship mission in which the A/A
defense was low, fast and straight ahead.

And...by the mid-70s even the FWR in those "Anythig Else is Rubbish"
articles was telling F-4 guys that closing for guns was the desired
tactic (assuming you're hauling a gun, C/D or E)...the desired way for
an engagement to culminate.

By mid-70's, the thinking had evolved. We ended Vietnam hostilities by
'73. We introduced Aggressor squadrons in '75 and had operational F-15
units dedicated exclusively to A/A in '75 as well.

In my squadron at Torrejon (F-4C), we were doing exclusively fluid
attack/loose deuce, with lots of "hook/eyeball" or shooter-cover stuff
to allow for VID by one partner while the other employs the stand-off
ordinance. Lag pursuit to AIM-9J employment was the answer for low
aspect kills. We had no plans for A/A carriage of the SUU-23.


Worst of all was the reluctance to accept an element of risk in
training. Air/air requires max performance maneuvering, close to
another aircraft that is trying to be unpredictable. That smack of
mid-air potential.

Oh yeah...clearly thru the end of the SEA war. FWR articles come right
out and say [paraphrasing], "first MASTER fluid four...then perhaps
you can attempt something like Double Attack...but mid-air collisions
are a very high threat."

A reflection undoubtedly of the '60s thinking regarding "jack of all
trades" training for TAC types. Everyone did everything and
specialization was looked down upon. Introduction of the F-15 with an
exclusive A/A mission changed that.


Whoa---ain't no F-105 that ever went anywhere at 360. If you needed to
save gas, you might hump along at 420, but if you were in a threat
envrionment, even with wall-to-wall ordinance, you were doing 540
KIAS.

Except the first F-105s shot down by MiG-17s (unobserved entry ISTR)
guys hovering near a bridge waiting their turn to attack.

There's always 10% that don't get the word.

The "clean" configuration minimizes over-G, but may not be
representative of real-world combat situations. Probably pros and cons
to both sides of the issue here.

What was Korat's guidance WRT to pickling pylons and suspension
equipment in an escape maneuver?

We jettisoned ordinance, not suspension gear. That was easier and
quicker, since you were probably already "green" to drop and it simply
meant punching the pickle button. Tanks had integral pylons. The
outboard pylons were low drag and we never paid much attention to
them.

Probably the most critical aspect of Featherduster, but largely
ignored until the '70s was the identification of the value of
dissimilar training.

Which is another less critical way of conveying my question, "why the
**** didn't the FWS get behind ACM/ACT?"

Combat losses are acceptable, training losses aren't. It was a huge
uphill fight to get Red Flag training tolerated when the tall dogs
discovered there would be losses there.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Ed Rasimus wrote in message . ..
Juvat wrote:
Minor correction - The 435th/479thTFW was at George AFB. However us
Zipper pilots at Homestead read the same books. Mainly, Boyd, Riccione
and Rutowsky - I was squadron weapons officer 1964-1966 and got
'double attack' adopted. The way I sold it was describing it as 'fluid
four' with no wingmen. We normallly flew in pairs anyway. Since we had
28 F104As looking at 125 MiG 21s down in Cuba, pairs maximized
flexibility. We also had a comprehensive combat crew training program
to get new pilots up to flight lead as soon as possible. This of
course made 'double attack/loose deuce' eminently practical. FWIW a
program similar to 'Featherduster' was flown in 1968 with the Dash 19
104As as players. I had gone over to the 'dark side' by then (F4s) but
two of my very good friends went out to Edwards and flew against the
MiGs. No contest; the Dash 19 was unattackable in high cruise by the
MiG 17 (M 0.95) and the MiG 21 couldn't sustain energy in maneuvering.
FWIW using takeoff/maneuvering flaps (limit 550/1.8M) the 104A could
out-turn the F4. Corner velocity was around 425 IAS.
FWIW I was a 104 flight examiner and IP/maintenance test pilot in the
F4.
Walt BJ

Juvat wrote:

Zajcevi posted:

snip


Was it sole USAF test or also USN fighters were involved?

USAF and ANG it would appear.

And was also simulated by some types (possibly F-106 like on Top Gun)?

Not according to this article.

I can hear the conversation now -- "You're thinking of mentioning our
mortal enemy, the USN, and their participation in Featherduster in the
FWR? How well do you like your career?"

F-8s were the only a/c that gave the F-104s trouble, at high
altitude/subsonic where the F-8's wing loading rules. The F-8's were also
flying an early form of Loose Deuce (The 104s were flying Double Attack).

Guy

P.S. Do the articles you found describe the F-104 tactics used against the
F-86Hs? I've got that.

Ed Rasimus wrote:

Juvat wrote:

Ed Rasimus posted:

snip

Whoa---ain't no F-105 that ever went anywhere at 360. If you needed to
save gas, you might hump along at 420, but if you were in a threat
envrionment, even with wall-to-wall ordinance, you were doing 540
KIAS.

Except the first F-105s shot down by MiG-17s (unobserved entry ISTR)
guys hovering near a bridge waiting their turn to attack.

There's always 10% that don't get the word.

snip

I think the losses preceded Featherduster, or at least its publication.
According to several accounts I've seen, they had showed up a bit early to
bomb the Dragon's Jaw (4 April 1965), so had to orbit to wait their turn,
and were churning around at 325 KCAS when they got tapped. The A/A threat
was probably assessed as minimal at the time, especially that far south,
although F-100s had been assigned as MiGCAP and/or escort.

Guy

Guy Alcala posted:

P.S. Do the articles you found describe the F-104 tactics used against the
F-86Hs? I've got that.

I don't...I have a couple "Double Attack" articles from FWR (1971 I
think)...with editor's note at the end of each reminding readers that
Fluid Four is how to get the job done.

But I do have a few F-4 RTU manuals from 1966 the dearth of air-to-air
information is nothing short of amazing. [Kinda like the first couple
versions of the F-16 Dash 1...comic book length.] Then you contrast
that to the MCM 3-3 (an unclassified airplane specific behemoth
manual) from the 80's...amazing.

Specifically I have TACM 51-6 Aerial Combat Training, AFM 51-34 F-4
Aircrew Training (Tactical Fighter), TACM 55-4 v1 F-4 Aircrew
Operational Procedures, plus three Phase manuals from MacDill's RTU
course.

Juvat