V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame?

Defense Industry Daily


V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame?

31-Mar-2008 21:30 EDT


Every once in a while, a defense-related controversy becomes large
enough to hit mainstream news outlets. Making the cover of TIME
Magazine is often a good sign for world leaders, but it's almost
always a very bad sign for military programs. Especially a program
that is just making its combat debut. TIME's Oct 8/07 cover story
"V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame" pulls few punches:

"The saga of the V-22 - the battles over its future on Capitol Hill, a
performance record that is spotty at best, a long, determined quest by
the Marines to get what they wanted - demonstrates how Washington
works (or, rather, doesn't). It exposes the compromises that are made
when narrow interests collide with common sense. It is a tale that
shows how the system fails at its most significant task, by placing in
jeopardy those we count on to protect us. For even at a stratospheric
price, the V-22 is going into combat shorthanded. As a result of
decisions the Marine Corps made over the past decade, the aircraft
lacks a heavy-duty, forward-mounted machine gun to lay down
suppressing fire against forces that will surely try to shoot it down.
And if the plane's two engines are disabled by enemy fire or
mechanical trouble while it's hovering, the V-22 lacks a helicopter's
ability to coast roughly to the ground - something that often saved
lives in Vietnam. In 2002 the Marines abandoned the requirement that
the planes be capable of autorotating (as the maneuver is called),
with unpowered but spinning helicopter blades slowly letting the
aircraft land safely. That decision, a top Pentagon aviation
consultant wrote in a confidential 2003 report obtained by TIME, is
"unconscionable" for a wartime aircraft. "When everything goes wrong,
as it often does in a combat environment," he said, "autorotation is
all a helicopter pilot has to save his and his passengers' lives."

Recent developments are about to address one of these concerns, but
TIME has hardly been the Osprey's only critic, or the most thorough.
That distinction probably belongs to a report published by the left-
wing Center for Defense Information, which makes a number of very
specific allegations the V-22's technical and testing failings...

* The V-22: Controversy, Turrets & the CDI Report [updated]
* Key Allegations & Excerpts from the CDI Report [updated].
Includes sections covering Flight control, Performance, Reliability &
maintainability, and Survivability.
* Additional Readings

The V-22: Controversy, Turrets & the CDI Report

AIR_V-22_Rear-Ramp_Gunner_Loading.jpg
V-22 ramp gunner
MV-22 ramp gunner
(click to view full)

MV-22 Ospreys are currently headed to Iraq for deployment, reportedly
with significant limitations on their use in order to avoid a
catastrophe for the program. This is certainly a possibility given the
Osprey's $100+ million price tag, and costs of recapitalization can
leak into tactical decisions at a number of levels. Time will tell if
that proves to be the case.

If the worst happens, however, many will ask if key warnings went
unheeded. Lee Gaillard is a former Marine reservist and a widely
published defense and aerospace writer, and the left-leaning World
Security Institute's Center for Defense Information sponsored and
backed his 2006 indictment of the program: V-22: Wonder Weapon or
Widow Maker? [PDF format, 396k]. DID's typical "Additional Readings &
sources" section at the end of this article adds other relevant
information including Congressional Research Service reports, the full
Pentagon's OT-IIG testing report that certified the V-22, BAE's
proposal for a V-22 turret, and a response from the US Marines.

Before our savvy readers examine the CDI document and email us, DID is
aware that the CH-47 Chinook, cited as an alternative platform in
Gaillard's document, is not compatible with the internal dimensions of
amphibious assault ships (though the listed EH101 and H-92 are). We're
also aware that a solution may be imminent to a key deficiency cited
by TIME magazine and by Gaillard - the V-22's inability to provide
suppressive fire for its landing zones, because its only armament
points backward from an open rear ramp.

A subsequent US Navy NAVAIR release replied to TIME's allegations by
saying that:

"Over the past five years, side gunners firing from CH-46 Sea Knight
and CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan "found that
most of the threat was on the ramp...."

It would be helpful to know more about practiced escort doctrines for
these helicopters, in order to fully evaluate this statement. If AH-1
Cobras or AH-64 Apache attack helicopters are performing the landing
zone clearance role with forward firing weaponry, a gap may still
exist for the MV-22 because attack helicopters find it hard to keep
up. This creates a choice between reducing the MV-22's speed
accordingly and sacrificing a key advantage, using fixed-wing aircraft
instead and accepting their different attack strengths, attempting
convergence of separate flights at or near the LZ, or employing the
V-22s without helicopter gunship escorts.
ORD RWS RGS on MV-22 Slide
RGS for MV-22
(click to view full)

Meanwhile, BAE has been working on a solution. At AUSA 2007 in
October, BAE announced that it has tested the RGS turret solution for
the V-22, which would provide 360 degree coverage using a 3-barrel
7.62mm GAU-17 minigun. This weapon is not an immediate solution,
however; as of March 2008, it has not been added to the Ospreys bound
for Iraq will not be available until Q3 2008, and has been bought only
as a limited trial for SOCOM's CV-22.

With respect to other elements of the CDI report and/or TIME article,
DID would note that official responses referred to inaccuracies, but
did not directly address many of the serious claims Gaillard made. DID
has invited the US military and/or V-22 Program office to take up the
debate, and do so here in a publicly-accessible forum. As a
convenience to them and to our readers, DID has reproduced key quotes
from the CDI report that contain the most serious allegations. It is
our hope that this will stimulate a direct response that will address
their individual factual basis, and/or list remedial actions already
undertaken.

[N.B. Despite making a direct appeal to NAVAIR along these lines, it
would seem that NAVAIR does not wish to discuss these allegations
beyond its releases. DID received no response. Henceforth, we will
treat and reference the outstanding allegations below as true.]

Key Allegations & Excerpts from the CDI Report AIR_V-22_Cutaway.jpg
(click to view full)

The allegations tend to fall into several distinct categories. DID has
grouped them for convenience. The OT-IIG report is the 2005 Pentagon
report that declared the V-22 "suitable and effective." That is a
formal designation, allowing a weapons system to move into production.

Flight Control

The most heavily publicized issue with the Osprey is Vortex Ring
State, a situation that can occur with any rotorcraft and cause it to
lose lift. Most helicopters will just autorotate and either recover or
autorotate to the ground. The Osprey's big problem is that it risks
losing lift in just one of its two engines, in which case it will flip
over and begin to fall upside down. This has led to previous test
flight crashes which were fatal to all concerned. As the OT-IIG report
states, "When descending at a high rate with low forward speed, the
rotor can become enveloped in its own downwash, which can result in a
substantial loss of lift. âEURO| Should one rotor enter VRS and lose more
lift than the other rotor, a sudden roll can result, which quickly
couples into a[n inverted] nose-down pitch."

Gaillard alleges that recovery from the Vortex Ring Styate (VRS) that
has caused past fatal crashes may not be possible if the pilot is
flying at low altitude:

"The Pentagon's report tells us that OT-IIG ran flight tests to
address the problem, that "rapid recovery has been demonstrated by
rotating the nacelles forward at the first sign of VRS,"20 that
aircrews were able to accomplish their missions... nacelle would be able
to tilt forward 16 degrees over a 2-second period, resulting in
probable abort of any descent profile in progress. The altitude,
however, is discernible in context: they were at thousands of feet.
Such altitude and time are unavailable luxuries during rapid troop
insertion under fire passing through low altitude."

V-22 crew chief Staff Sgt. Brian Freeman's letter to Gannett's Marine
Corps Times, however, says that:

"Gaillard said the aircraft was limited to 800 feet per minute
vertical rate of descent� because of vortex ring state, but what he
fails to say or does not know is that most descents are performed from
200 feet and below in airplane mode. The total time from airplane mode
at 200 feet to wheels on deck is two minutes, give or take a few
seconds. That is based on four years of flying on the aircraft and
performing more than 300 hours of confined area landings" [i.e. actual
descent is about 1,000 feet/minute].

The Osprey's ability to operate at night was not tested properly, and
indicates maintenance issues:

"Although the test plan included 29 mission profiles at night, they
only accomplished 12."54 That's only 41 percent of their objectives.
The report provided no explanation of what would seem to be a
significant testing inadequacy. Not only that, but just before the
operational evaluation, "proprotor gearbox problems significantly
curtailed flight operations. As a result, VMX-22 could not completely
qualify the expected number of aircrew to conduct night operation
aboard the ship."

Inadequate shipboard testing for landing under realistic conditions:

"At night or by day, in flight or on deck, the V-22 is dangerously
susceptible to sudden aerodynamic instabilities resulting from wakes
of other aircraft during formation flight, disturbed flow fields
downwind of the ship's superstructure, or turbulence generated by
idling props of other aircraft preparing for takeoff. Testing under
just such conditions is, therefore, crucial. But night shipboard
testing is revealed to have been less than realistic: only slightly
more than half the rotorcraft that would normally operate off the deck
of the USS Bataan were present during the testing, and "with more
aircraft expected on board, there will be an adverse effect upon
flight deck operations."62 As indicated, serious and potentially
dangerous aerodynamic issues come into play here, given prop wash from
multiple MV-22s operating in close conditions on a dark and crowded
flight deck, yet V-22 production was approved before testing under
such conditions had even been attempted. This outcome is particularly
disturbing coming four years after the GAO had soundly criticized
NAVAIR's previous round of V-22 tests for lack of operational realism
inherent in its "formation flight limitations - wingman shall avoid
and not cross lead aircraft wake during formation flights, 250 ft.
lateral and 50 ft. step-up separation shall be maintained."
AIR_MV-22_Downwash_Dust_Cloud.jpg
MV-22, landing
(click to view full)

Despite its status as an aircraft with exceptionally heavy downwash,
operations in brownout conditions that have caused the loss of many
rotary craft over the years were not properly tested in the OT-IIG:

"VMX- 22 did not encounter landings under conditions with severe
visibility degradation during OT-IIG ... [because] an unusually wet
spring resulted in a large amount of vegetation that prevented severe
brownouts during landing attempts."52 Why no re-testing at a later
date in an appropriate locale? So much for critical testing that would
have provided valuable insights into operation under conditions
prevailing in Iraq, Afghanistan, or other desert-type locations where
the Osprey may well see combat in 2007....

The OT-IIG report itself states that "in more severely degraded
environments, such as in brownout conditions, the immediate area
affected by downwash is large," and "approximately 25 percent of the
landings in severe brownout conditions resulted in unintended wave-
offs."

A Nov 19/07 US Navy NAVAIR release by Col. Glenn Walters responds
that:

"My squadron flew in desert environments on multiple occasions
totaling months of tests. The squadron now in Iraq completed several
desert training periods prior to deploying. In fact, we just had
another squadron of MV-22s in California and Arizona doing more of the
same. Not only can the Ospreys fly in the desert, the aircraft's
advanced technology makes it easier than in any other rotorcraft to
land in brownout conditions."

Flawed flight control software had contributed to fatal V-22 crashes
and been a source of problems for the program, but the OT-IIG tests
didn't use actual aircraft:

"To evaluate flight control system (FCS) software and hardware, the OT-
IIG report tells us that the "manufacturer integrated three simulation
[author emphasis] laboratories. This triple tie-in lab allowed a pilot
in a realistic cockpit simulator to fly mission profiles and perform
emergency procedures using actual flight control system hardware and
software."

Performance
V-22 underslung M777
V-22 With M777
(click to view full)

Tests purporting to show the MV-22's ability to carry 24 Marines were
not honestly conducted, and unsuccessful:

"Other test exercises used "a ballast weight of 4,760 pounds in lieu
of 24 combat equipped Marines,"57 which translates to an underweight
and highly unlikely estimate of 198 pounds per body armor-equipped
Marine carrying rifle, ammo, and full combat pack: allowing a modest
60 pounds for all that gear puts each hefty Marine at roughly 138
pounds. That's not a realistic test. With five aircraft assigned to
each mission, the outcome was that "two aircraft aborted the day
mission because of mechanical failures,"58 and "the test team had
previously scaled back the night mission to three aircraft, of which
one aborted"59 - a 50 percent aircraft abort/ cancellation rate with
no live troops carried. The official summary of this operation borders
on the inexplicable: "VMX-22 successfully executed the TRAP missions
within the scope of aircraft and environments available for each
mission."

Osprey cannot carry up-armored Humvees:

"...since the V-22 is unable to carry an up-armored Humvee on a single
cargo hook, the OT-IIG external lift profile cited transport of a
6,250-pound water trailer and a 7,200-pound "operational combat
vehicle"67 later identified by the V-22 program's PAO as a standard -
unarmored - Humvee. When standard Humvees proved extremely vulnerable
in combat in Iraq, the acute need for up-armored versions quickly
became apparent. Now, more than three years later, certification of
the V-22 to carry up-armored Humvees on two hooks has not yet occurred
and has not even been "identified as a requirement by the Marine Corps
or prioritized in their funding of flight tests."

Osprey not tested for load carriage paramaters, which may be untrue:

"Even compartments in Table III-1 on page 15 of the OT-IIG report,
"MV-22 Block A Performance Results," are filled with fudge: for
Amphibious External Lift with a required 10,000-pound vehicle, a 6,900-
pound vehicle is substituted, but the Block A Projection [author
emphasis] suggests that a 10,000-pound vehicle therefore ought to be
able to be carried 115 nautical miles (nm), even while another box
admits that the improved Block B V-22 can be projected to carry said
weight only 40 nm instead of the required 50 nm."

Deployability hampered by lack of ICAO qualifications:

"Despite the Osprey's ostensible transoceanic self-deployment
capability with air-to-air refueling, the Marine Corps' V-22
leadership failed to account for the need to meet International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements specifically for
highfrequency (HF) radio installation for beyond line-of-sight
communication. NAVAIR's March 27, 2003, Tech Review states: "Current
UHF/VHF and SATCOM capability cannot fulfill this function,"98 and
urges that they "convince HQMC to establish requirement."99 Given the
ICAO's well-known and long-standing requirement, this V-22 omission
represents a significant oversight. Three years later, it remains
uncorrected."

Inability to communicate when in anti-jam mode:

"Furthermore, the OT-IIG report tells us that critical Osprey voice
information exchange requirements (IERs) cannot be met when its radio
system is operating in the anti-jam mode - a key expectation in
combat, one would assume. Moreover, "user ID numbers greater than 399
causes the mission computer to cycle continuously, blanking out flight
displays,"...It would therefore seem that the MV-22's Single Channel
Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) is essentially useless."

Heating and cooling are inadequate for most anticipated combat zones,
which feature climate extremes:

"...inadequate cooling and heating systems that cannot anticipate both
hot climates, with a need to keep cargo and troops in heavy combat
gear cool, and cold climates, when long flights might necessitate
extra heating. Troops arrive dehydrated and enervated by the heat, or
chilled and stiff from the cold. This concern was raised four years
earlier in the previously cited GAO report: "Cabin environment cannot
be adequately controlled to prevent extreme temperature
conditions."118 Troops have also voiced complaints about the cabin
temperatures. "I have a big concern about the temperature of the
inside of the aircraft. You could have heat casualties before they
even get on the ground," reported one Marine.119 Another declared:
"ECS is designed to keep the cabin [plus] 10 degree ambient. On cold
days with sub-zero wind-chill and temperature crewmembers are
literally freezing. Hot days are the opposite extreme." 120"

Troop accommodations slow exit, and create risks to soldiers:

"...poorly designed seat belts with hard-to-manipulate latches that
entangle easily. Unfortunately, this "may [read will] increase the
time for embarkation and debarkation, posing a safety risk during
combat or emergency evacuations."121 The short seat pans cut
circulation and "caused [troops'] legs to fall asleep during
flight"122 (not to mention the possible onset of potentially fatal
deep vein thrombosis), because shock-attenuating pistons under the
seats force troops to stow their combat packs on their laps
(aggravating leg circulation problems) or in the aisle, causing
congestion that "may [read will] impede an emergency or combat
egress."

Reliability & Maintainability
AIR V-22 Osprey Stowed Position
MV-22, stowed
(click to view full)
Poor reliability cited in official reports:

"According to the table on page 26, V-22 mission commanders should be
prepared for false alarms after every 1.6 hours of flight, for an
aircraft mission abort after the equivalent of eight three-hour
flights, or a parts failure any time an aircraft has flown more than
90 minutes.

Mission planners are to be prepared for... post-abort mean repair time
of nine hours before the rotorcraft will be ready for resumption of
the mission - when "the MRTA threshold requirement for the Block A
aircraft is 4.8 hours or less.... the individual component repair list
classifies over 500 of more than 590 items as 'Repair Not Authorized
at the I-Level.' Those items have to be returned to depot-level repair
facilities when they fail."

While a Jan 23/08 release from the USMC stressed the V-22's 68.1%
reliability rate, it also suggested that spares were being used up at
a rapid clip. In March 2008, Aviation Week quoted Marine Corps V-22
program manager Col. Matt Mulhern conceding that V-22 engine
maintenance issues in Iraq may drive the U.S. Marine Corps to look for
entirely new engines. Despite a recent redesign to improve dust
handling, Mulhern is quoted as saying that "...as we actually operate
the aircraft, the engines aren't lasting as long as we [or the
government] would like." This is reportedly forcing a move from the
current "Power By the Hour" framework of payment per flight-hour,
which Rolls Royce can no longer support. Key problems include erosion
in the compressor blades, and lack of power margin to handle expected
weight growth. Mulhern reportedly said that "We need to move on, with
or without Rolls-Royce." The Marines' forthcoming CH-53K heavy lift
helicopter is slated to use General Electric's GE38-1B, the only
turbine engine in the same power class.

Cabin damage (such as bullet holes) affect load-bearing integrity -
and can't be fixed in the field:

"Damage to [the cabin wall] can make the aircraft unavailable for an
extensive period"90 because it cannot be repaired in the field. NAVAIR
knew two years earlier that since "the cabin wall is load-bearingâ
EURO|[it] may not be repaired without first performing an engineering
assessmentâEURO|not available at the combat unit level."91 The key
recommendation in the report, "re-design of cabin wall,"92 was not
done. "Unfunded,"93 the report noted."

If maintenance requires unfolding the wings, difficulties arise at
sea:

"...heat from the V-22's rotor/prop turbine exhaust caused the USS
Bataan's flight deck to buckle under the right engine following more
than 20 minutes of idle; the same problem had occurred on both the USS
Wasp and USS Iwo Jima during the previous round of testing. Since
space limitations mandate that "any maintenance actions requiring the
proprotors to be spread [out of their folded mode] must be conducted
on the flight deck,"101 both bad weather and flight operations would
still delay such repairs. Furthermore, incompatibility of ship and
aircraft power sources unnecessarily complicates logistical support:
118 volts on the USS Bataan vs. an MV-22 requirement (for its
sensitive avionics system) of 115 [plus or minus 2] volts."

Survivability
AIR_MV-22_Ropedown_Zone.jpg
MV-22, ropedown
(click to view full)
Lack of visibility inside the Osprey creates poor awareness of outside
threats:

"Windows are small and so poorly placed that "crew chiefs still
[author emphasis] criticize the poor outside field of view,"109
rendering them unable "to scan for traffic and airborne or ground
threats."110 Previous testing had revealed this critical deficiency
years earlier, yet no design changes were implemented. "Crew chief/
observer will not be able to get visual on Bandits or SAMs due to poor
porthole size,"111 said one participant. E "This was a very
frustrating flight because of the crew chief 's inability to provide
the pilots with vital information regarding the aggressors'
location,"112 according to another."

And the threat displays & aids aren't much help:

"...a separate threat display makes it difficult to correlate
displayed threat information with aircraft position presented on the
cockpit map display."148 Furthermore, "the synthetic warning voice
provided by the APR-39 is unintelligible to all crew members."149 In
brief, confusion may reign in the cockpit as the aircraft approaches a
hot landing zone and the pilot has to look back and forth between
different screens to locate the threats, even as the recorded voice
warning about those threats is providing meaningless and distracting
information, and while main cabin windows' "limited visibilityâ
EURO|prevents the crew chief from providing effective lookout against
surface and airborne threats."150

The V-22's hydraulic lines are redundant, but can be disabled all at
once in several places:

"But "operation" is not combat. In many areas of the wings and
nacelles, the three brittle titanium 5,000 psi hydraulic lines often
run parallel routes in very close proximity to each other. What
happens when an RPG or 30 mm AA round explodes in the midst of such a
nexus? Most likely, a rapid and complete loss of hydraulic pressure,
followed by loss of aircraft control.51 True triple redundancy would
involve a totally different configuration of widely separated
hydraulic lines in the V-22."

No autorotation means any crash is likely to kill everyone on board.
This issue was also given a fair bit of space in the TIME magazine
report:

"[The OT-IIG] report's own executive summary states: "Emergency
landing after the sudden failure of both engines in the Conversion/
Vertical Take-Off and Landing modes below 1,600 feet altitude are not
likely to be survivable. The V-22 cannot [author emphasis] autorotate
to a safe landing."168 A subsequent comment in the summary states:
"Additional flight tests should be conducted to provide validated
procedures for dual-engine failure [and none have been conducted]."

In their Oct 15/07 response to the TIME Magazine article, US Navy
NAVAIR states that:

"The Osprey has unusually thick wings, which give the aircraft lift at
very low air speeds and allow it to glide at speeds as low as 40
knots. A hovering Osprey doesn't need to fully convert to airplane
mode to leverage this advantage. A small tilt on the nacelles does the
trick, allowing the bird to glide to the ground as well as, if not
better than, other fixed-wing aircraft.... The autorotation wording was
dropped from the requirement in 2004 when Corps officials changed it
to say only that the Osprey must perform a survivable emergency
landing in the event both engines are lost."

This is helpful, but details regarding the real-world survivability
testing for this proposition would have been more helpful. There's
also the issue of confined space. While an autorotation is a very
vertical affair, a glide requires horizontal space that may not
necessarily be available, or may include obstacles that reduce crash
survivability. If the V-22 will not be used in the same way as a fixed-
wing aircraft, the criteria must take its employment into account when
designing the tests.

The CDI report also alleges no real tests for single-engine shutdown:

"Although a V-22 program spokesperson told me that its testing regimen
has included a number of one engine inoperative (OEI) transitions in
level flight and in steeply angled descents to roll-on landings (and
equivalent rolling short takeoffs),16144 it is disturbing to note that
during its 17 years of evaluation, the V-22 has never been tested in
this purely vertical OEI landing or takeoff mode with one engine
completely shut down, exactly the kind of landing or takeoff necessary
from a small clearing in a jungle or on a mountainside. Since this key
test was omitted, the report's claim cannot be considered seriously.
Furthermore, because any OEI situation will immediately deprive the
aircraft of 50 percent of its previous max power capability, and given
that the V-22's prop design does not permit a helicopter-type pre-
landing flare, vertical landing of a loaded OEI Osprey would result in
substantial landing impact with probable damage to the aircraft."

V-22 crew chief Staff Sgt. Brian Freeman's letter to Gannett's Marine
Corps Times, however, says that:

"...during the last four years flying on the MV-22, I have been single-
engine two times; on both occasions, the aircraft responded as if
nothing had happened. The aircraft's ability to provide lift comes
from its torque available vs. torque required - simply put, if you
limit the amount of torque that a student pilot can use during takeoff
or landing training events, which we do, you in turn simulate a single-
engine profile. I can tell you that there is no difference between
actual and simulated single-engine performance."

Very large radar reflection:

"Nevertheless, the countermeasures dispensing system was found to have
insufficient capacity for longer missions, and radar reflection from
the V-22's total propeller disc area of more than 2,267 square feet
rivals that of two Boeing 707s in formation.146 (Given that situation,
one can only wonder at the logic behind the development of top-secret
"stealth paint" for the fuselage at a cost of $7,500 per gallon; the
one aircraft they painted required 10 gallons for a paint job costing
$75,000 - but those huge, whirling discs were still there, bouncing
back radar signals with gusto.)"

Evasive maneuvers not tested properly:

"Aware of such maneuvering often required in the stress of combat, in
late 2002 one military observer specifically recommended adding to
V-22 testing three specific evasive maneuvers that included "maximum
rate course reversals and landing zone aborts." This should have been
nothing new; as he formally cited, such maneuvers had long been an
integral part of accepted and official rotorcraft doctrine -
"consistent with the definition of 'aggressive agility' as required
for utility rotorcraft in ADS-33E, Performance Specification, handling
Qualities Requirements for Military Rotorcraft, 21 Mar 2000."153
NAVAIR agreed that these maneuvers should be tested, but they still
had not done so more than a year later "because the V-22 rotor control
system repeatedly exceeded rotor disk flapping limits154 while
approaching the requested conditions."155 As V-22 Red-Ribbon Panel
Coordinator Col. Harry Dunn explained, "Whereas virtually all
helicopter rotors have a limit of 28 to 30 degree blade flapping
capability, the V-22 propellers are limited to 10 degrees to avoid
damage to the rotor, rotor swash plates, and rotor hubs...[E]xceeding
these limits can result in rotor failure or breakage, leading to
aircraft control failures."

(Originally published Oct 4/07.)

Additional Readings

* How Stuff Works - V-22 Osprey

* NAVAIR - V-22 Program Office

* USAF Fact Sheets - SOCOM's CV-22

* Rolls Royce - AE 1107C-Liberty engine.

* The Pentagon, Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, Office
of the Director (September 2005) - V-22 Osprey Program: Report on
Operational and Live Fire Test and Evaluation (OT-IIG)

* Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (updated
March 13/07) - V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft [Full
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31384.pdf]. Very fair. Catalogs
all of the program's travails in detail, and presents the arguments
both for and against the V-22 Osprey well.

* Center for Defense Information (2006) - V-22: Wonder Weapon or
Widow Maker? [PDF format, 396k]. Contains the most detailed and
specific set of allegations to date concerning the V-22.

* Project On Government Oversight Investigations Archive - MV-22
Osprey. See also DID's "POGO Takes Aim At V-22 Osprey"

* G2 - The V-22 Continues to Fail. Former USMC officer Carlton
Meyer has been one of the programs biggest critics, and his pages
include specific allegations not detailed in the CDI report, or
addressed in the OT-IIG evaluation. As such, those allegations are not
addressed in this article, either.

* Aviation Week, via Military.com (March 18/08) - Marines May Seek
New V-22 Engines. As a result of issues that have arisen with V-22
engine maintenance in Iraq. Seems to confirm observations the Jan
23/08 USMC article. Despite a recent redesign, Marine Corps V-22
program manager Col. Matt Mulhern is quoted as saying that "...as we
actually operate the aircraft, the engines aren't lasting as long as
we [or the government] would like." This is forcing a move from the
proposed "Power By the Hour" framework of payment per flight-hour,
which Rolls Royce can no longer support.

* US Marine Corps (Jan 23/08) - MV-22 'Osprey' brings new
capabilities to the sandbox. The April 14/07 NY Times reported that
the V-22s would be kept out of combat situations. These days, that
isn't very hard to do in Anbar province; they key to evaluating this
report is clarifying what the Marines are defining as a "combat
sortie." The sentence at the end of the excerpt also hints that
questions rates of spare parts use would be informative:

"The squadron has completed more than 2,000 ASRs in the first 3
months of the deployment, keeping approximately 8,000 personnel off
dangerous roadways and accruing approximately 2,000 flight hours....
VMM-263 has flown 5 Aeroscout missions, 1 raid, more than 1400 combat
sorties and maintained an average mission capable readiness rate of
68.1%... The range and depth of aviation supply parts is the latent
limitation for high availability rates."

* DID (Jan 17/08) - BAE's Turret to Trial in CV-22s. Refers to the
MGS.

* US Navy NAVAIR (Oct 15/07) - Defending the Osprey. Answers some
of the charges in the TIME Magazine article.

* TIME Magazine special report (Oct 8/07 issue) - V-22 Osprey: A
Flying Shame

* CBS Evening News (Oct 4/07) - Troubled Osprey Set To Take Flight
In Iraq. Claims that one of the 10 Ospreys deploying to Iraq had to
abort the mission due to mechanical issues, and had to return to USS
Wasp [LHD 1] for repairs before resuming the flight.

* BAE Systems (Oct 2/07) - RGS V-22 turret briefing from AUSA
2007. Press release: "a" [PDF] | RGS Data Sheet [PDF] | Slides [PDF] |
Briefing video [Windows Media] | Live fire testing video [Windows
Media WVX]. "BAE Systems, which has been working with the user
community to develop and demonstrate this capability since mid-2005,
is planning to make the system available for installation beginning in
the third quarter of 2008."

* NAVAIR, V-22 Program Office (Sept 19/07) - 1st squadron of V-22s
quietly deployed to Iraq

* NY Times (April 14/07) - Combat, With Limits, Looms for Hybrid
Aircraft. "They will plan their missions in Iraq to avoid it getting
into areas where there are serious threats," said Thomas Christie, the
Pentagon's director of operations, test and evaluation from 2001 to
2005, who is now retired." Also contains testimonials (both good and
worrisome) from people who have flown in them.

* DID (March 12/07) - Lots Riding on V-22 Osprey. The USMC is
designing several ancillary programs around the MV-22, setting key
requirements for vehicles, howitzers, and more based on the Osprey's
dimensions and capabilities. Is this why they're buying a $120,000
jeep?

* Gannett's Marine Corps Times (Dec 11/06) - Report blasts Osprey
testing, readiness. Discusses the CDI report, and includes some
responses from the US Marines. See also the subsequent Marine Corps
Times letters section, which includes a response from a V-22 crew
chief.

* DID (Nov 1/05) - V-22's "Cloud Stall" Not a Stall At All

* DID (July 14/05) - Osprey Tilt-Rotor Declared "Suitable and
Effective".

* U.S. Naval Institute (1999) - How Will We Escort the MV-22?
(registration required). If attack helicopters aren't fast enough, and
fighter jets are too fast, and Ospreys aren't really armed...

On Apr 4, 12:38*pm, Mike wrote:
Defense Industry Daily

V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame?

31-Mar-2008 21:30 EDT

Every once in a while, a defense-related controversy becomes large
enough to hit mainstream news outlets. Making the cover of TIME
Magazine is often a good sign for world leaders, but it's almost
always a very bad sign for military programs. Especially a program
that is just making its combat debut. TIME's Oct 8/07 cover story
"V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame" pulls few punches:

"The saga of the V-22 - the battles over its future on Capitol Hill, a
performance record that is spotty at best, a long, determined quest by
the Marines to get what they wanted - demonstrates how Washington
works (or, rather, doesn't). It exposes the compromises that are made
when narrow interests collide with common sense. It is a tale that
shows how the system fails at its most significant task, by placing in
jeopardy those we count on to protect us. For even at a stratospheric
price, the V-22 is going into combat shorthanded. As a result of
decisions the Marine Corps made over the past decade, the aircraft
lacks a heavy-duty, forward-mounted machine gun to lay down
suppressing fire against forces that will surely try to shoot it down.
And if the plane's two engines are disabled by enemy fire or
mechanical trouble while it's hovering, the V-22 lacks a helicopter's
ability to coast roughly to the ground - something that often saved
lives in Vietnam. In 2002 the Marines abandoned the requirement that
the planes be capable of autorotating (as the maneuver is called),
with unpowered but spinning helicopter blades slowly letting the
aircraft land safely. That decision, a top Pentagon aviation
consultant wrote in a confidential 2003 report obtained by TIME, is
"unconscionable" for a wartime aircraft. "When everything goes wrong,
as it often does in a combat environment," he said, "autorotation is
all a helicopter pilot has to save his and his passengers' lives."

Recent developments are about to address one of these concerns, but
TIME has hardly been the Osprey's only critic, or the most thorough.
That distinction probably belongs to a report published by the left-
wing Center for Defense Information, which makes a number of very
specific allegations the V-22's technical and testing failings...

* * * The V-22: Controversy, Turrets & the CDI Report [updated]
* * * Key Allegations & Excerpts from the CDI Report [updated].
Includes sections covering Flight control, Performance, Reliability &
maintainability, and Survivability.
* * * Additional Readings

The V-22: Controversy, Turrets & the CDI Report

AIR_V-22_Rear-Ramp_Gunner_Loading.jpg
V-22 ramp gunner
MV-22 ramp gunner
(click to view full)

MV-22 Ospreys are currently headed to Iraq for deployment, reportedly
with significant limitations on their use in order to avoid a
catastrophe for the program. This is certainly a possibility given the
Osprey's $100+ million price tag, and costs of recapitalization can
leak into tactical decisions at a number of levels. Time will tell if
that proves to be the case.

If the worst happens, however, many will ask if key warnings went
unheeded. Lee Gaillard is a former Marine reservist and a widely
published defense and aerospace writer, and the left-leaning World
Security Institute's Center for Defense Information sponsored and
backed his 2006 indictment of the program: V-22: Wonder Weapon or
Widow Maker? [PDF format, 396k]. DID's typical "Additional Readings &
sources" section at the end of this article adds other relevant
information including Congressional Research Service reports, the full
Pentagon's OT-IIG testing report that certified the V-22, BAE's
proposal for a V-22 turret, and a response from the US Marines.

Before our savvy readers examine the CDI document and email us, DID is
aware that the CH-47 Chinook, cited as an alternative platform in
Gaillard's document, is not compatible with the internal dimensions of
amphibious assault ships (though the listed EH101 and H-92 are). We're
also aware that a solution may be imminent to a key deficiency cited
by TIME magazine and by Gaillard - the V-22's inability to provide
suppressive fire for its landing zones, because its only armament
points backward from an open rear ramp.

A subsequent US Navy NAVAIR release replied to TIME's allegations by
saying that:

"Over the past five years, side gunners firing from CH-46 Sea Knight
and CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan "found that
most of the threat was on the ramp...."

It would be helpful to know more about practiced escort doctrines for
these helicopters, in order to fully evaluate this statement. If AH-1
Cobras or AH-64 Apache attack helicopters are performing the landing
zone clearance role with forward firing weaponry, a gap may still
exist for the MV-22 because attack helicopters find it hard to keep
up. This creates a choice between reducing the MV-22's speed
accordingly and sacrificing a key advantage, using fixed-wing aircraft
instead and accepting their different attack strengths, attempting
convergence of separate flights at or near the LZ, or employing the
V-22s without helicopter gunship escorts.
ORD RWS RGS on MV-22 Slide
RGS for MV-22
(click to view full)

Meanwhile, BAE has been working on a solution. At AUSA 2007 in
October, BAE announced that it has tested the RGS turret solution for
the V-22, which would provide 360 degree coverage using a 3-barrel
7.62mm GAU-17 minigun. This weapon is not an immediate solution,
however; as of March 2008, it has not been added to the Ospreys bound
for Iraq will not be available until Q3 2008, and has been bought only
as a limited trial for SOCOM's CV-22.

With respect to other elements of the CDI report and/or TIME article,
DID would note that official responses referred to inaccuracies, but
did not directly address many of the serious claims Gaillard made. DID
has invited the US military and/or V-22 Program office to take up the
debate, and do so here in a publicly-accessible forum. As a
convenience to them and to our readers, DID has reproduced key quotes
from the CDI report that contain the most serious allegations. It is
our hope that this will stimulate a direct response that will address
their individual factual basis, and/or list remedial actions already
undertaken.

[N.B. Despite making a direct appeal to NAVAIR along these lines, it
would seem that NAVAIR does not wish to discuss these allegations
beyond its releases. DID received no response. Henceforth, we will
treat and reference the outstanding allegations below as true.]

Key Allegations & Excerpts from the CDI Report AIR_V-22_Cutaway.jpg
(click to view full)

The allegations tend to fall into several distinct categories. DID has
grouped them for convenience. The OT-IIG report is the 2005 Pentagon
report that declared the V-22 "suitable and effective." That is a
formal designation, allowing a weapons system to move into production.

Flight Control

The most heavily publicized issue with the Osprey is Vortex Ring
State, a situation that can occur with any rotorcraft and cause it to
lose lift. Most helicopters will just autorotate and either recover or
autorotate to the ground. The Osprey's big problem is that it risks
losing lift in just one of its two engines, in which case it will flip
over and begin to fall upside down. This has led to previous test
flight crashes which were fatal to all concerned. As the OT-IIG report
states, "When descending at a high rate with low forward speed, the
rotor can become enveloped in its own downwash, which can result in a
substantial loss of lift. âEURO| Should one rotor enter VRS and lose more
lift than the other rotor, a sudden roll can result, which quickly
couples into a[n inverted] nose-down pitch."

Gaillard alleges that recovery from the Vortex Ring Styate (VRS) that
has caused past fatal crashes may not be possible if the pilot is
flying at low altitude:

"The Pentagon's report tells us that OT-IIG ran flight tests to
address the problem, that "rapid recovery has been demonstrated by
rotating the nacelles forward at the first sign of VRS,"20 that
aircrews were able to accomplish their missions... nacelle would be able
to tilt forward 16 degrees over a 2-second period, resulting in
probable abort of any descent profile in progress. The altitude,
however, is discernible in context: they were at thousands of feet.
Such altitude and time are unavailable luxuries during rapid troop
insertion under fire passing through low altitude."

V-22 crew chief Staff Sgt. Brian Freeman's letter to Gannett's Marine
Corps Times, however, says that:

"Gaillard said the aircraft was limited to 800 feet per minute
vertical rate of descent *because of vortex ring state, but what he
fails to say or does not know is that most descents are performed from
200 feet and below in airplane mode. The total time from airplane mode
at 200 feet to wheels on deck is two minutes, give or take a few
seconds. That is based on four years of flying on the aircraft and
performing more than 300 hours of confined area landings" [i.e. actual
descent is about 1,000 feet/minute].

The Osprey's ability to operate at night was not tested properly, and
indicates maintenance issues:

"Although the test plan included 29 mission profiles at night, they
only accomplished 12."54 That's only 41 percent of their objectives.
The report provided no explanation of what would seem to be a
significant testing inadequacy. Not only that, but just before the
operational evaluation, "proprotor gearbox problems significantly
curtailed flight operations. As a result, VMX-22 could not completely
qualify the expected number of aircrew to conduct night operation
aboard the ship."

Inadequate shipboard testing for landing under realistic conditions:

"At night or by day, in flight or on deck, the V-22 is dangerously
susceptible to sudden aerodynamic instabilities resulting from wakes
of other aircraft during formation flight, disturbed flow fields
downwind of the ship's superstructure, or turbulence generated by
idling props of other aircraft preparing for takeoff. Testing under
just such conditions is, therefore, crucial. But night shipboard
testing is revealed to have been less than realistic: only slightly
more than half the rotorcraft that would normally operate off the deck
of the USS Bataan were present during the testing, and "with more
aircraft expected on board, there will be an adverse effect upon
flight deck operations."62 As indicated, serious and potentially
dangerous aerodynamic issues come into play here, given prop wash from
multiple MV-22s operating in close conditions on a dark and crowded
flight deck, yet V-22 production was approved before testing under
such conditions had even been attempted. This outcome is particularly
disturbing coming four years after the GAO had soundly criticized
NAVAIR's previous round of V-22 tests for lack of operational realism
inherent in its "formation flight limitations - wingman shall avoid
and not cross lead aircraft wake during formation flights, 250 ft.
lateral and 50 ft. step-up separation shall be maintained."
AIR_MV-22_Downwash_Dust_Cloud.jpg
MV-22, landing
(click to view full)

Despite its status as an aircraft with exceptionally heavy downwash,
operations in brownout conditions that have caused the loss of many
rotary craft over the years were not properly tested in the OT-IIG:

"VMX- 22 did not encounter landings under conditions with severe
visibility degradation during OT-IIG ... [because] an unusually wet
spring resulted in a large amount of vegetation that prevented severe
brownouts during landing attempts."52 Why no re-testing at a later
date in an appropriate locale? So much for critical testing that would
have provided valuable insights into operation under conditions
prevailing in Iraq, Afghanistan, or other desert-type locations where
the Osprey may well see combat in 2007....

The OT-IIG report itself states that "in more severely degraded
environments, such as in brownout conditions, the immediate area
affected by downwash is large," and "approximately 25 percent of the
landings in severe brownout conditions resulted in unintended wave-
offs."

A Nov 19/07 US Navy NAVAIR release by Col. Glenn Walters responds
that:

"My squadron flew in desert environments on multiple occasions
totaling months of tests. The squadron now in Iraq completed several
desert training periods prior to deploying. In fact, we just had
another squadron of MV-22s in California and Arizona doing more of the
same. Not only can the Ospreys fly in the desert, the aircraft's
advanced technology makes it easier than in any other rotorcraft to
land in brownout conditions."

Flawed flight control software had contributed to fatal V-22 crashes
and been a source of problems for the program, but the OT-IIG tests
didn't use actual aircraft:

"To evaluate flight control system (FCS) software and hardware, the OT-
IIG report tells us that the "manufacturer integrated three simulation
[author emphasis] laboratories. This triple tie-in lab allowed a pilot
in a realistic cockpit simulator to fly mission profiles and perform
emergency procedures using actual flight control system hardware and
software."

Performance
V-22 underslung M777
V-22 With M777
(click to view full)

Tests purporting to show the MV-22's ability to carry 24 Marines were
not honestly conducted, and unsuccessful:

"Other test exercises used "a ballast weight of 4,760 pounds in lieu
of 24 combat equipped Marines,"57 which translates to an underweight
and highly unlikely estimate of 198 pounds per body armor-equipped
Marine carrying rifle, ammo, and full combat pack: allowing a modest
60 pounds for all that gear puts each hefty Marine at roughly 138
pounds. That's not a realistic test. With five aircraft assigned to
each mission, the outcome was that "two aircraft aborted the day
mission because of mechanical failures,"58 and "the test team had
previously scaled back the night mission to three aircraft, of which
one aborted"59 - a 50 percent aircraft abort/ cancellation rate with
no live troops carried. The official summary of this operation borders
on the inexplicable: "VMX-22 successfully executed the TRAP missions
within the scope of aircraft and environments available for each
mission."

Osprey cannot carry up-armored Humvees:

"...since the V-22 is unable to carry an up-armored Humvee on a single
cargo hook, the OT-IIG external lift profile cited transport of a
6,250-pound water trailer and a 7,200-pound "operational combat
vehicle"67 later identified by the V-22 program's PAO as a standard -
unarmored - Humvee. When standard Humvees proved extremely vulnerable
in combat in Iraq, the acute need for up-armored versions quickly
became apparent. Now, more than three years later, certification of
the V-22 to carry up-armored Humvees on two hooks has not yet occurred
and has not even been "identified as a requirement by the Marine Corps
or prioritized in their funding of flight tests."

Osprey not tested for load carriage paramaters, which may be untrue:

"Even compartments in Table III-1 on page 15 of the OT-IIG report,
"MV-22 Block A Performance Results," are filled with fudge: for
Amphibious External Lift with a required 10,000-pound vehicle, a 6,900-
pound vehicle is substituted, but the Block A Projection [author
emphasis] suggests that a 10,000-pound vehicle therefore ought to be
able to be carried 115 nautical miles (nm), even while another box
admits that the improved Block B V-22 can be projected to carry said
weight only 40 nm instead of the required 50 nm."

Deployability hampered by lack of ICAO qualifications:

"Despite the Osprey's ostensible transoceanic self-deployment
capability with air-to-air refueling, the Marine Corps' V-22
leadership failed to account for the need to meet International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements specifically for
highfrequency (HF) radio installation for beyond line-of-sight
communication. NAVAIR's March 27, 2003, Tech Review states: "Current
UHF/VHF and SATCOM capability cannot fulfill this function,"98 and
urges that they "convince HQMC to establish requirement."99 Given the
ICAO's well-known and long-standing requirement, this V-22 omission
represents a significant oversight. Three years later, it remains
uncorrected."

Inability to communicate when in anti-jam mode:

"Furthermore, the OT-IIG report tells us that critical Osprey voice
information exchange requirements (IERs) cannot be met when its radio
system is operating in the anti-jam mode - a key expectation in
combat, one would assume. Moreover, "user ID numbers greater than 399
causes the mission computer to cycle continuously, blanking out flight
displays,"...It would therefore seem that the MV-22's Single Channel
Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) is essentially useless."

Heating and cooling are inadequate for most anticipated combat zones,
which feature climate extremes:

"...inadequate cooling and heating systems that cannot anticipate both
hot climates, with a need to keep cargo and troops in heavy combat
gear cool, and cold climates, when long flights might necessitate
extra heating. Troops arrive dehydrated and enervated by the heat, or
chilled and stiff from the cold. This concern was raised four years
earlier in the previously cited GAO report: "Cabin environment cannot
be adequately controlled to prevent extreme temperature
conditions."118 Troops have also voiced complaints about the cabin
temperatures. "I have a big concern about the temperature of the
inside of the aircraft. You could have heat casualties before they
even get on the ground," reported one Marine.119 Another declared:
"ECS is designed to keep the cabin [plus] 10 degree ambient. On cold
days with sub-zero wind-chill and temperature crewmembers are
literally freezing. Hot days are the opposite extreme." 120"

Troop accommodations slow exit, and create risks to soldiers:

"...poorly designed seat belts with hard-to-manipulate latches that
entangle easily. Unfortunately, this "may [read will] increase the
time for embarkation and debarkation, posing a safety risk during
combat or emergency evacuations."121 The short seat pans cut
circulation and "caused [troops'] legs to fall asleep during
flight"122 (not to mention the possible onset of potentially fatal
deep vein thrombosis), because shock-attenuating pistons under the
seats force troops to stow their combat packs on their laps
(aggravating leg circulation problems) or in the aisle, causing
congestion that "may [read will] impede an emergency or combat
egress."

Reliability & Maintainability
AIR V-22 Osprey Stowed Position
MV-22, stowed
(click to view full)
Poor reliability cited in official reports:

"According to the table on page 26, V-22 mission commanders should be
prepared for false alarms after every 1.6 hours of flight, for an
aircraft mission abort after the equivalent of eight three-hour
flights, or a parts failure any time an aircraft has flown more than
90 minutes.

Mission planners are to be prepared for... post-abort mean repair time
of nine hours before the rotorcraft will be ready for resumption of
the mission - when "the MRTA threshold requirement for the Block A
aircraft is 4.8 hours or less.... the individual component repair list
classifies over 500 of more than 590 items as 'Repair Not Authorized
at the I-Level.' Those items have to be returned to depot-level repair
facilities when they fail."

While a Jan 23/08 release from the USMC stressed the V-22's 68.1%
reliability rate, it also suggested that spares were being used up at
a rapid clip. In March 2008, Aviation Week quoted Marine Corps V-22
program manager Col. Matt Mulhern conceding that V-22 engine
maintenance issues in Iraq may drive the U.S. Marine Corps to look for
entirely new engines. Despite a recent redesign to improve dust
handling, Mulhern is quoted as saying that "...as we actually operate
the aircraft, the engines aren't lasting as long as we [or the
government] would like." This is reportedly forcing a move from the
current "Power By the Hour" framework of payment per flight-hour,
which Rolls Royce can no longer support. Key problems include erosion
in the compressor blades, and lack of power margin to handle expected
weight growth. Mulhern reportedly said that "We need to move on, with
or without Rolls-Royce." The Marines' forthcoming CH-53K heavy lift
helicopter is slated to use General Electric's GE38-1B, the only
turbine engine in the same power class.

Cabin damage (such as bullet holes) affect load-bearing integrity -
and can't be fixed in the field:

"Damage to [the cabin wall] can make the aircraft unavailable for an
extensive period"90 because it cannot be repaired in the field. NAVAIR
knew two years earlier that since "the cabin wall is load-bearingâ
EURO|[it] may not be repaired without first performing an engineering
assessmentâEURO|not available at the combat unit level."91 The key
recommendation in the report, "re-design of cabin wall,"92 was not
done. "Unfunded,"93 the report noted."

If maintenance requires unfolding the wings, difficulties arise at
sea:

"...heat from the V-22's rotor/prop turbine exhaust caused the USS
Bataan's flight deck to buckle under the right engine following more
than 20 minutes of idle; the same problem had occurred on both the USS
Wasp and USS Iwo Jima during the previous round of testing. Since
space limitations mandate that "any maintenance actions requiring the
proprotors to be spread [out of their folded mode] must be conducted
on the flight deck,"101 both bad weather and flight operations would
still delay such repairs. Furthermore, incompatibility of ship and
aircraft power sources unnecessarily complicates logistical support:
118 volts on the USS Bataan vs. an MV-22 requirement (for its
sensitive avionics system) of 115 [plus or minus 2] volts."

Survivability
AIR_MV-22_Ropedown_Zone.jpg
MV-22, ropedown
(click to view full)
Lack of visibility inside the Osprey creates poor awareness of outside
threats:

"Windows are small and so poorly placed that "crew chiefs still
[author emphasis] criticize the poor outside field of view,"109
rendering them unable "to scan for traffic and airborne or ground
threats."110 Previous testing had revealed this critical deficiency
years earlier, yet no design changes were implemented. "Crew chief/
observer will not be able to get visual on Bandits or SAMs due to poor
porthole size,"111 said one participant. E "This was a very
frustrating flight because of the crew chief 's inability to provide
the pilots with vital information regarding the aggressors'
location,"112 according to another."

And the threat displays & aids aren't much help:

"...a separate threat display makes it difficult to correlate
displayed threat information with aircraft position presented on the
cockpit map display."148 Furthermore, "the synthetic warning voice
provided by the APR-39 is unintelligible to all crew members."149 In
brief, confusion may reign in the cockpit as the aircraft approaches a
hot landing zone and the pilot has to look back and forth between
different screens to locate the threats, even as the recorded voice
warning about those threats is providing meaningless and distracting
information, and while main cabin windows' "limited visibilityâ
EURO|prevents the crew chief from providing effective lookout against
surface and airborne threats."150

The V-22's hydraulic lines are redundant, but can be disabled all at
once in several places:

"But "operation" is not combat. In many areas of the wings and
nacelles, the three brittle titanium 5,000 psi hydraulic lines often
run parallel routes in very close proximity to each other. What
happens when an RPG or 30 mm AA round explodes in the midst of such a
nexus? Most likely, a rapid and complete loss of hydraulic pressure,
followed by loss of aircraft control.51 True triple redundancy would
involve a totally different configuration of widely separated
hydraulic lines in the V-22."

No autorotation means any crash is likely to kill everyone on board.
This issue was also given a fair bit of space in the TIME magazine
report:

"[The OT-IIG] report's own executive summary states: "Emergency
landing after the sudden failure of both engines in the Conversion/
Vertical Take-Off and Landing modes below 1,600 feet altitude are not
likely to be survivable. The V-22 cannot [author emphasis] autorotate
to a safe landing."168 A subsequent comment in the summary states:
"Additional flight tests should be conducted to provide validated
procedures for dual-engine failure [and none have been conducted]."

In their Oct 15/07 response to the TIME Magazine article, US Navy
NAVAIR states that:

"The Osprey has unusually thick wings, which give the aircraft lift at
very low air speeds and allow it to glide at speeds as low as 40
knots. A hovering Osprey doesn't need to fully convert to airplane
mode to leverage this advantage. A small tilt on the nacelles does the
trick, allowing the bird to glide to the ground as well as, if not
better than, other fixed-wing aircraft.... The autorotation wording was
dropped from the requirement in 2004 when Corps officials changed it
to say only that the Osprey must perform a survivable emergency
landing in the event both engines are lost."

This is helpful, but details regarding the real-world survivability
testing for this proposition would have been more helpful. There's
also the issue of confined space. While an autorotation is a very
vertical affair, a glide requires horizontal space that may not
necessarily be available, or may include obstacles that reduce crash
survivability. If the V-22 will not be used in the same way as a fixed-
wing aircraft, the criteria must take its employment into account when
designing the tests.

The CDI report also alleges no real tests for single-engine shutdown:

"Although a V-22 program spokesperson told me that its testing regimen
has included a number of one engine inoperative (OEI) transitions in
level flight and in steeply angled descents to roll-on landings (and
equivalent rolling short takeoffs),16144 it is disturbing to note that
during its 17 years of evaluation, the V-22 has never been tested in
this purely vertical OEI landing or takeoff mode with one engine
completely shut down, exactly the kind of landing or takeoff necessary
from a small clearing in a jungle or on a mountainside. Since this key
test was omitted, the report's claim cannot be considered seriously.
Furthermore, because any OEI situation will immediately deprive the
aircraft of 50 percent of its previous max power capability, and given
that the V-22's prop design does not permit a helicopter-type pre-
landing flare, vertical landing of a loaded OEI Osprey would result in
substantial landing impact with probable damage to the aircraft."

V-22 crew chief Staff Sgt. Brian Freeman's letter to Gannett's Marine
Corps Times, however, says that:

"...during the last four years flying on the MV-22, I have been single-
engine two times; on both occasions, the aircraft responded as if
nothing had happened. The aircraft's ability to provide lift comes
from its torque available vs. torque required - simply put, if you
limit the amount of torque that a student pilot can use during takeoff
or landing training events, which we do, you in turn simulate a single-
engine profile. I can tell you that there is no difference between
actual and simulated single-engine performance."

Very large radar reflection:

"Nevertheless, the countermeasures dispensing system was found to have
insufficient capacity for longer missions, and radar reflection from
the V-22's total propeller disc area of more than 2,267 square feet
rivals that of two Boeing 707s in formation.146 (Given that situation,
one can only wonder at the logic behind the development of top-secret
"stealth paint" for the fuselage at a cost of $7,500 per gallon; the
one aircraft they painted required 10 gallons for a paint job costing
$75,000 - but those huge, whirling discs were still there, bouncing
back radar signals with gusto.)"

Evasive maneuvers not tested properly:

"Aware of such maneuvering often required in the stress of combat, in
late 2002 one military observer specifically recommended adding to
V-22 testing three specific evasive maneuvers that included "maximum
rate course reversals and landing zone aborts." This should have been
nothing new; as he formally cited, such maneuvers had long been an
integral part of accepted and official rotorcraft doctrine -
"consistent with the definition of 'aggressive agility' as required
for utility rotorcraft in ADS-33E, Performance Specification, handling
Qualities Requirements for Military Rotorcraft, 21 Mar 2000."153
NAVAIR agreed that these maneuvers should be tested, but they still
had not done so more than a year later "because the V-22 rotor control
system repeatedly exceeded rotor disk flapping limits154 while
approaching the requested conditions."155 As V-22 Red-Ribbon Panel
Coordinator Col. Harry Dunn explained, "Whereas virtually all
helicopter rotors have a limit of 28 to 30 degree blade flapping
capability, the V-22 propellers are limited to 10 degrees to avoid
damage to the rotor, rotor swash plates, and rotor hubs...[E]xceeding
these limits can result in rotor failure or breakage, leading to
aircraft control failures."

(Originally published Oct 4/07.)

Additional Readings

* * * How Stuff Works - V-22 Osprey

* * * NAVAIR - V-22 Program Office

* * * USAF Fact Sheets - SOCOM's CV-22

* * * Rolls Royce - AE 1107C-Liberty engine.

* * * The Pentagon, Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, Office
of the Director (September 2005) - V-22 Osprey Program: Report on
Operational and Live Fire Test and Evaluation (OT-IIG)

* * * Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (updated
March 13/07) - V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft [Fullhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31384.pdf]. Very fair. Catalogs
all of the program's travails in detail, and presents the arguments
both for and against the V-22 Osprey well.

* * * Center for Defense Information (2006) - V-22: Wonder Weapon or
Widow Maker? [PDF format, 396k]. Contains the most detailed and
specific set of allegations to date concerning the V-22.

* * * Project On Government Oversight Investigations Archive - MV-22
Osprey. See also DID's "POGO Takes Aim At V-22 Osprey"

* * * G2 - The V-22 Continues to Fail. Former USMC officer Carlton
Meyer has been one of the programs biggest critics, and his pages
include specific allegations not detailed in the CDI report, or
addressed in the OT-IIG evaluation. As such, those allegations are not
addressed in this article, either.

* * * Aviation Week, via Military.com (March 18/08) - Marines May Seek
New V-22 Engines. As a result of issues that have arisen with V-22
engine maintenance in Iraq. Seems to confirm observations the Jan
23/08 USMC article. Despite a recent redesign, Marine Corps V-22
program manager Col. Matt Mulhern is quoted as saying that "...as we
actually operate the aircraft, the engines aren't lasting as long as
we [or the government] would like." This is forcing a move from the
proposed "Power By the Hour" framework of payment per flight-hour,
which Rolls Royce can no longer support.

* * * US Marine Corps (Jan 23/08) - MV-22 'Osprey' brings new
capabilities to the sandbox. The April 14/07 NY Times reported that
the V-22s would be kept out of combat situations. These days, that
isn't very hard to do in Anbar province; they key to evaluating this
report is clarifying what the Marines are defining as a "combat
sortie." The sentence at the end of the excerpt also hints that
questions rates of spare parts use would be informative:

* * "The squadron has completed more than 2,000 ASRs in the first 3
months of the deployment, keeping approximately 8,000 personnel off
dangerous roadways and accruing approximately 2,000 flight hours....
VMM-263 has flown 5 Aeroscout missions, 1 raid, more than 1400 combat
sorties and maintained an average mission capable readiness rate of
68.1%... The range and depth of aviation supply parts is the latent
limitation for high availability rates."

* * * DID (Jan 17/08) - BAE's Turret to Trial in CV-22s. Refers to the
MGS.

* * * US Navy NAVAIR (Oct 15/07) - Defending the Osprey. Answers some
of the charges in the TIME Magazine article.

* * * TIME Magazine special report (Oct 8/07 issue) - V-22 Osprey: A
Flying Shame

* * * CBS Evening News (Oct 4/07) - Troubled Osprey Set To Take Flight
In Iraq. Claims that one of the 10 Ospreys deploying to Iraq had to
abort the mission due to mechanical issues, and had to return to USS
Wasp [LHD 1] for repairs before resuming the flight.

* * * BAE Systems (Oct 2/07) - RGS V-22 turret briefing from AUSA
2007. Press release: "a" [PDF] | RGS Data Sheet [PDF] | Slides [PDF] |
Briefing video [Windows Media] | Live fire testing video [Windows
Media WVX]. "BAE Systems, which has been working with the user
community to develop and demonstrate this capability since mid-2005,
is planning to make the system available for installation beginning in
the third quarter of 2008."

* * * NAVAIR, V-22 Program Office (Sept 19/07) - 1st squadron of V-22s
quietly deployed to Iraq

* * * NY Times (April 14/07) - Combat, With Limits, Looms for Hybrid
Aircraft. "They will plan their missions in Iraq to avoid it getting
into areas where there are serious threats," said Thomas Christie, the
Pentagon's director of operations, test and evaluation from 2001 to
2005, who is now retired." Also contains testimonials (both good and
worrisome) from people who have flown in them.

* * * DID (March 12/07) - Lots Riding on V-22 Osprey. The USMC is
designing several ancillary programs around the MV-22, setting key
requirements for vehicles, howitzers, and more based on the Osprey's
dimensions and capabilities. Is this why they're buying a $120,000
jeep?

* * * Gannett's Marine Corps Times (Dec 11/06) - Report blasts Osprey
testing, readiness. Discusses the CDI report, and includes some
responses from the US Marines. See also the subsequent Marine Corps
Times letters section, which includes a response from a V-22 crew
chief.

* * * DID (Nov 1/05) - V-22's "Cloud Stall" Not a Stall At All

* * * DID (July 14/05) - Osprey Tilt-Rotor Declared "Suitable and
Effective".

* * * U.S. Naval Institute (1999) - How Will We Escort the MV-22?
(registration required). If attack helicopters aren't fast enough, and
fighter jets are too fast, and Ospreys aren't really armed...

Altitude can be used to recover a lost engine scenario. Immediate
pitch flattening followed by wing tilt recovery will allow the merger
wing to function.

I could only cringe at the high test flight loss problem also. JUst be
reminded that all complex designs seem to have not enough test flight
funding. I can not defend the lousey research program, but only warn
of the benefit. Lives will be saved using the aircraft. Fast
deployment speed saves lives on the battlefield.

It is a lousey equation though in this instance.

A direct nose down followed by a high speed recovery using the little
wing should be indicating a minimum safe altitude. I guessed at 1000
feet.

No guns appears an issue, but the deployment act will save many lives
of Marines.

Maybe speed money to train in low altitude recovery.

The little bittie wing can function.

Douglas Eagleson
Gaithersburg, MD USA