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I have a question about FAC operations in Vietnam. When a USMC got a
radio call for help, could he vector in aircraft from all services, or were only USN/USMC aircraft at his disposal? Also, did Army ground troops have the capability to contact any FAC in the sky regardless of what service was flying them? ie. could Army soldiers call up a USMC FAC? I'm just wondering how well-coordinated the ground/air was, or if it was service-specific. |
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![]() "Pauli G" wrote in message m... I have a question about FAC operations in Vietnam. When a USMC got a radio call for help, could he vector in aircraft from all services, or were only USN/USMC aircraft at his disposal? Also, did Army ground troops have the capability to contact any FAC in the sky regardless of what service was flying them? ie. could Army soldiers call up a USMC FAC? I'm just wondering how well-coordinated the ground/air was, or if it was service-specific. It depends on the date. It was very hard for anyone to get close air support (CAS) from the USAF early in the war. The House Armed Services Committee formed a Close Air Support Special Committee in October 1965 after the US Army complained about the problem to Congress. The US didn't go to a single USAF manager for all air assets until February 1968. Before that there was more separation between USAF and USMC aircraft and the Marine request would have gone to the 3rd Marine Air Wing, not the single air manager. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Directive 95-4, issued by General William Westmoreland on 13 July 1965 tasked the USMC to supply aircraft to the USAF 2nd Air Division (later the 7th Air Force) after it had completed tasking support for the III MAF (3rd Marine Amphibious Force). It gave up about 20% of its sorties. At that time, the USMC had the northern part of Vietnam (I Corps) pretty much to itself. As more US Army units moved into I Corps in 1967 and 1968, Westmoreland was upset because the Marines were giving proportionately more sorties to help the Marines in I Corps than it did the Army. So in February 1968, he placed all the aircraft in Vietnam under a single commander. If you are interested on a Marine point of view you can read "Single Air Manager In Three Wars: The Integration Of Marine Air With The Joint Environment" by Major Michael J. Manuche, USMC. To get it, go to http://192.156.75.139/isyspeq.html, click on "IRP CSC 95" under "Search database:" on the right, type in "single air manager" under "Enter the ISYS Plain English query:" on the left and click on the Search button. There was a lot more fighting over Marine air assets and much more USAF-US Army infighting about close air support during and immediately after the Korean War. To read about USAF/USMC cooperation in Gulf War II go to: http://www.afa.org/magazine/June2004/0604marine.asp Joe -----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =----- http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! -----== Over 100,000 Newsgroups - 19 Different Servers! =----- |
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On Tue, 22 Jun 2004 10:15:02 -0600, Ed Rasimus
wrote: There were all kinds of FACs. There were ground FACs, air-FACs, Fast-FACs and even strange, semi-civilian FACs in unusual places. It sounds like your question is in regard to classic, slow-mover, air-FAC in support of ground troops. The US military operates "jointly", meaning that forces of one service support forces of another service under control of a joint command structure. Marines on the ground could get support from any FAC who could employ any air. Ed, In the Vietnam era could Army ground troops at the company or lower level talk directly to a FAC? In the Vietnam era could Army ground troops at the company or lower level talk directly to a USAF aircraft providing CAS if a FAC wasn't around to coordinate? I'd like to hear your comments on this because I've heard (on the Army side) there were all sorts of coordination problems with CAS/FAC ops in SEA, and things weren't quite a "joint' as you indicate. In my experience in the late '70s/early '80s Army ground troops could not communicate directly with any USAF fast movers but they could communicate directly with Army aviation assets, i.e. basically the same set up as in SEA if my understanding is correct. [rest snipped] John Hairell ) |
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On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 12:55:39 -0400, John Hairell
wrote: On Tue, 22 Jun 2004 10:15:02 -0600, Ed Rasimus wrote: There were all kinds of FACs. There were ground FACs, air-FACs, Fast-FACs and even strange, semi-civilian FACs in unusual places. It sounds like your question is in regard to classic, slow-mover, air-FAC in support of ground troops. The US military operates "jointly", meaning that forces of one service support forces of another service under control of a joint command structure. Marines on the ground could get support from any FAC who could employ any air. Ed, In the Vietnam era could Army ground troops at the company or lower level talk directly to a FAC? Yes. Once a FAC was allocated to a ground maneuver unit, the ground commander could talk directly to the FAC. It might be the commander or the commander's representative. Artillery FOs could talk to FACs as well. In the Vietnam era could Army ground troops at the company or lower level talk directly to a USAF aircraft providing CAS if a FAC wasn't around to coordinate? Generally without a FAC, the ground Army couldn't talk to the fast-movers. USAF fast-movers operate on UHF, while Army maneuver units are communicating FM. The FAC (ground or air) was "radio-intensive", usually equipped with FM, UHF, VHF and HF radios. I'd like to hear your comments on this because I've heard (on the Army side) there were all sorts of coordination problems with CAS/FAC ops in SEA, and things weren't quite a "joint' as you indicate. In my experience in the late '70s/early '80s Army ground troops could not communicate directly with any USAF fast movers but they could communicate directly with Army aviation assets, i.e. basically the same set up as in SEA if my understanding is correct. It goes back to the radio frequencies again. Army aviation flies on VHF and talks to ground units on FM. (I'm not sure what the A-10 carries for radios--I think they've got Victor, which would be essential for the old JATT operations. USAF FACs and ALOs have the full range of radios in their equippage, so they can talk to everybody. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
#6
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![]() "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ... On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 12:55:39 -0400, John Hairell wrote: It goes back to the radio frequencies again. Army aviation flies on VHF and talks to ground units on FM. (I'm not sure what the A-10 carries for radios--I think they've got Victor, which would be essential for the old JATT operations. I'm pretty sure that Hogs these days are sporting UHF, VHF, and FM. As the song goes, "He got right on the horn and gave the DASC a call....." This radio issue was a player for F-15Es flying CAS over in Iraq, as we were Uniform only. |
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On Thu, 24 Jun 2004 06:12:25 -0400, "R Haskin"
wrote: "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message .. . On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 12:55:39 -0400, John Hairell wrote: It goes back to the radio frequencies again. Army aviation flies on VHF and talks to ground units on FM. (I'm not sure what the A-10 carries for radios--I think they've got Victor, which would be essential for the old JATT operations. I'm pretty sure that Hogs these days are sporting UHF, VHF, and FM. As the song goes, "He got right on the horn and gave the DASC a call....." This radio issue was a player for F-15Es flying CAS over in Iraq, as we were Uniform only. Well, if it's CAS, it needs to be talking to someone on the ground. That usually means a FAC (even in these days of "no-mo A-FAC"), and that means an ALO or G-FAC who is going to have the necessary comm gear. A lot has changed since I was in that business, so methods of comm, validation of targets, coordination of fires, etc. have evolved considerably. We often over-simplify the picture, with a concept of a laser spot in the hands of every other grunt to provide pinpoint delivery of massive airpower anywhere required. It ain't that simple by a long shot. If nothing else in your Iraq scenario the Mud Hens should have been able to UHF to brigade TOC and talk to the ALO who could be relaying through the S-3 fire coordination element to spot the requirements. Cumbersome, but doable. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
#8
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The Warthogs are playing A-FAC these days. That's why they are OA-10s now.
-- Les Matheson F-4C(WW)/D/E/G(WW), AC-130A, MC-130E WSO/EWO (ret) --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.710 / Virus Database: 466 - Release Date: 6/23/2004 |
#9
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On Thu, 24 Jun 2004 21:12:50 -0500, "matheson31"
wrote: The Warthogs are playing A-FAC these days. That's why they are OA-10s now. Well, yes and no. Last time I heard anything about the program it was more like "not-so-fast-FAC". The employment was as an armed recce spotter (hence the "O" nomenclature) rather than as a traditional, assigned to the support of the ground manuever unit FAC. They "rove the allotted area" calling in BAI strikes. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
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