#1 piston fighter?

In article ,
"The Enlightenment" writes:

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Yeah. we got hit by a 262 one day. It didn't seem very well flown and did
no
damage and was gone.

Some Me262B (the fighter bomber version as opposed to the pure Me262A)
pilots were converted bomber pilots who didn't think like fighter pilots.

Let's also not overlook that there are a couple of other factors,
here. One is that the 262 had quite a few flight limitations. You
couldn't just horse it around in teh sky, sawing the throttle back &
forth. The engines, and their fuel feed systems were very sensitive
to -G fuel starvation, and required very tender handling even in the
most benign conditions to keep teh engines within their operatin
limits. (The penalty for exceeding those limits, BTW, being not just
a failed engine, but an explosion and fire, or teh turbine wheel
coming apart and throwing shards of itself though the airplane.

The other factor is that transitiong to jets, even if you're an
experienced fighter pilot, requires a big change in perspective. The
airplane doesn't want to speed up (Slow throttle resonce, and low
thrust compared to a propeller at low speeds) and it doesn't want to
slow down. (Pull the throttle back, and that slippery shape keeps
going and going - an idling prop produces a lot of drag). You also
need to develop a different sense of the speeds adn distances
involved. Closure rates are very high, and the turning circles are
big. These adjustments take time to make. And they aren't affected
by skill level. When Frank Gabreski started flying F-86s in Korea, he
had the same problems, despite being one of the all-time greats.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

"Edward French" wrote in message ...
Hello All,

Ok, is there a singular Numero Uno air-to-air ww2 pistoned-fighter?

I figure that "reliable performance with lethality" has gotta be considered
60% of the truth. Ease of manufacture, versatility, easy to pilot,
durability, etc. making up the 40%.

I'm hearing that, in all altitudes, the FW190 did the job best. How about
the HELLCAT?


--hug the day

After their unacceptable failure in protecting bomber squadrons an
angry Goring visited his fighter squadrons in France and spoke to his
Air-general about it.

Herman Goring: "What can I do to help you?"
Adolf Galland: "Get me Spitfires for my wing"

Not quite conclusive, but it is an interesting opinion.

The Spitfire comment from Galland has an interesting context. Galland was
referring to the fact that Spitfires, with their tighter turning circles and
lateral maneuverability, were better suited for the close escort role,
whereas the Bf 109's were more suited to the free chase hunter role. He was
not simply labeling the Spitfire as the better fighter plane, although I
suspect he also enjoyed tweaking Goring with that statement!

Ken


"JonB" wrote in message
om...
"Edward French" wrote in message
...
Hello All,

Ok, is there a singular Numero Uno air-to-air ww2 pistoned-fighter?

I figure that "reliable performance with lethality" has gotta be
considered
60% of the truth. Ease of manufacture, versatility, easy to pilot,
durability, etc. making up the 40%.

I'm hearing that, in all altitudes, the FW190 did the job best. How
about
the HELLCAT?


--hug the day

After their unacceptable failure in protecting bomber squadrons an
angry Goring visited his fighter squadrons in France and spoke to his
Air-general about it.

Herman Goring: "What can I do to help you?"
Adolf Galland: "Get me Spitfires for my wing"

Not quite conclusive, but it is an interesting opinion.

On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 22:53:22 -0400, "Lawrence Dillard"
wrote:


The German system allowed Hartmann, Marseilles, Roedel and company to run up
some admirable individual scores (and more power to them). However, the
efforts of none of these experten was of much use to the Reich.

Now you only have to prove these "experts" were somehow responsible
for Reich's ultimate failure.


The major question, to my mind, when assessing fighter aircraft and "Aces"
is: what contribution did their collective (as opposed to individual)
successes or failures make toward the achievment of their nation's war
aims?

I'd say you fail to asses how much Germany's war aims were realistic
or feasible before proclaiming German "aces" as noworthy.

When it came to crunch time, the Allies (albeit at times barely) almost
always seemed to marshall their fighter forces in such a way as to achieve
their goals, despite not having a Barkhorn or Sakai amongst them, while
frustrating the Axis' aims at practically every turn.

Probably because Allies had a whole lot more of them. Something that
German aces can hardly be blamed for.

Something basic was faulty about the manner in which the Axis fielded their
forces:

Which, of course, has nothing to do with the individual pilot's combat
performance. I guess, an NBA players like Malone or Barkley who never
won the NBA championship were worse than some obscure guys who
happened to share the lockroom with Jordan.

1) The Germans could not gain air superiority over Great Britain, despite
investing considerable resources, including the most modern of fighters.
Hence, no invasion, despite ballyhooed aces.

These same aces handled RAF pretty roughly over France. In order for
Sea Lion to succeed, Luftwaffe needed much more than well trained
fighter pilots. The problem with your argument is that you already
know why Luftwaffe could not create preconditions for successful Sea
Lion and you also know German aces could not win that battle.

2) The Germans could not sustain air superiority over the Soviets despite
investment of considerable resources and the creation of several ballyhooed
aces flying a/c deemed to be "superior" to the opposition.

Luftwaffe sustained air superiority over Soviet Union long enough for
Heer to lose every chance of winning. You also know how Soviets
outproduced Germans, you know the story about the Lend Lease, you know
about the growing Luftwaffe commitments outside Soviet Union, so I ask
why are you deliberately blame combat pilots for unrealistic goals of
German leadership?

3) The Germans could not gain air superiority over the DAF and later over
the Allied air forces over N Africa and the Med, despite investment of
considerable resources and astonishing individual aerial victory claims.
Hence a sad end to operations, with the Tunisian surrender.

Because British deployed more aircraft to the theatre. That's why.

4) The Germans could not hold air superiority over the continent in the face
of escorted daylight raids, despite investment of considerable resources and
the inevitable presence of the vaunted experten. On D-Day, the Germans
managed maybe a couple hundred sorties, while the Allies managed thousands
of sorties from dawn to dusk. The beginning of the end.

See above, but include Americans as well.

One link between all the above is that even as the Reich was producing
prodigies in terms of fighter aces, in not one instance did the successes of
the various aces have a jot to do with abetting the achievment of the
Reich's aims or with frustrating the Allies from achieving their objectives.
In every instance, the Luftwaffe found itself face to face with a task for
which it had neither adequate planning nor adequate means with which to
successfully compete.

Than why did you start this post with a diatribe against combat
pilots? They were not to blame for idiotic politics of their civil and
military leadership. These young men joined Luftwaffe for the same
reason young men are becoming fighter pilots today.


Drax

On Tue, 17 Jun 2003 19:17:24 GMT, (The
Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote:


Sure. But then let's throw in all the other pilots and let's also
include the Italians who provided the majority of Axis aircrew in the
theatre until Torch, not that they figure in the
Luftwaffe-exceptionalist appreciation of the North African air war
which reduces the totality of that conflict to the inanity of the
fighter superheroes *to the exclusion of all else* .

What was the contribution of Regia Aeronautica to the air war over the
Western Desert prior to appearance of Luftwaffe?

By the way, what is generally known about the fighter pilots of French
air force who shot down quite a few Germans (Moelders among them) in
English language works? It's always RAF, RAF, RAF until Pearl Harbor.


Indeed, but his death, along with the loss of other experten at the
same time, was a watershed for that unit.

Well, it got rotated, like German divisions of fighter groups, it was
a different system than Allied.


That's precidely my point. Marseille did not exist in isolation, but
the impact of his death (and the other experten in the same unit lost
in the summer of 1942) was disproportionate.

Had Luftwaffe had the numbers to contest the skies over Egypt, his
death wouldn't have been so important (if it actually was). But
Germans did not have the pilots, nor the aircraft nor the fuel to keep
adequate air force in the air. Whether it was Marseille who shot down
130 aircraft, or four Fritzes with 30 victories each, the outcome
would have been the same.


The British had similar problems of overstretch at that time
(deploying fighter units from the UK, Malta, Middle East across Asia
to India and Burma). They managed an air force in an attritional
conflict more effectively, primarily by recognising the extent of
aircrew training and development demanded by an attritional conflict
in a manner the Luftwaffe didn't.

British could afford to have such air force by having Red Army to
engage German army. If it were one-on-one, I doubt RAF by itself would
have ever won the air supremacy in Europe. Granted, war is not a sport
event, but Luftwaffe should not be blamed for failing to prepare for
war it could never win.


Drax

On Sat, 14 Jun 2003 06:28:26 -0400, Cub Driver
wrote:


You are being overly generous here, in my opinion

It is not a matter of whether to subtract 2 or 5 or 10 kills from a
given score, but which figure to use as a divisor.

But since this mustbe valid for every air force composed of human
beings, Erich Hartmann still remains the world's highest scoring ace
in the history. Whether it was 350, 250 or 150, it's really less
rellevant.

The real question is whether the such reduced number of claims (by two
thirds) actually matches the number of aircraft lost to air combat.

By your method of counting, on the day Marseille claimed 17 aircraft,
he really shot down no more than 6, right?


Drax

Hartmann, Marseilles, Roedel and company to run up
some admirable individual scores (and more power to them).

Roedel? Whoinheckizat? Do you mean Rudel, the Stuka pilot?

However, the
efforts of none of these experten was of much use to the Reich.

Rudel destroyed over 500 Soviet tanks. How "much use" is one soldier supposed
to be to his country? Hartmann and Marseille destroyed the equivelent of an
enemy fighter wing between them. That's "some use" at least.

The major question, to my mind, when assessing fighter aircraft and "Aces"
is: what contribution did their collective (as opposed to individual)
successes or failures make toward the achievment of their nation's war
aims?

All fighter pilots are tactical assets and by nature will have few
opportunities to turn the course of the war by themselves.

despite not having a Barkhorn or Sakai amongst them, while
frustrating the Axis' aims at practically every turn.

You're for forgetting Basil Embry and Col Don Blakeslee, among MANY others,
that at least matched or exceeded the combat /leadership abilities of the two
fine aviators that you mention.

v.r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

By the way, what is generally known about the fighter pilots of French
air force who shot down quite a few Germans (Moelders among them) in
English language works? It's always RAF, RAF, RAF until Pearl Harbor.

That's how it works. In French works, you get a predominance of French heroes;
in Russian-language books, its nearly always leaned toward the Great Patriotic
Struggle, "and the Americans did some bombing as well, after the Soviets
crushed all German resistance." Historical writing, in general, is weighted
toward the heroes that spoke the same language as the author and the intended
readers. Go into an American bookstore and you'll find rows of books on US and
British aircraft and airmen and a lower percentage of titles about other teams.
Its nature, not a slight against the heroic, brief stand of the French Air
Force.

v/r
Gordon

On 6 Jul 2003 10:51:40 -0700, JonB wrote:

After their unacceptable failure in protecting bomber squadrons an
angry Goring visited his fighter squadrons in France and spoke to his
Air-general about it.

Herman Goring: "What can I do to help you?"
Adolf Galland: "Get me Spitfires for my wing"

I wonder how good the He 112 or He 100 would have been against the
Spitfire?

--
Phil
"If only sarcasm could overturn bureaucracies"
-- NTK, commenting on www.cabalamat.org/weblog/art_29.html

On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 19:04:27 GMT,
(Drazen Kramaric) wrote:

Sure. But then let's throw in all the other pilots and let's also
include the Italians who provided the majority of Axis aircrew in the
theatre until Torch, not that they figure in the
Luftwaffe-exceptionalist appreciation of the North African air war
which reduces the totality of that conflict to the inanity of the
fighter superheroes *to the exclusion of all else* .

What was the contribution of Regia Aeronautica to the air war over the
Western Desert prior to appearance of Luftwaffe?

The RA *was* the air war over the Western Desert prior to the arrival
of the Luftwaffe and remained the major contributor into 1942. If the
British performance against the Axis in the air is going to be judged,
it needs to be done against the whole context involved, not just
against one component of the Axis air effort in isolation, no matter
what qualitative qualifications might be required between the
different national efforts. Marseille and his colleagues shot down a
lot of fighters while they were attacking Axis bombers or other Axis
fighters: removing the Italians from the equation simply distorts the
reality in favour of Luftwaffe performance, just like various posters
who like to exclude German bomber losses from the BoB loss figures to
inflate Bf109 success. Why is this kind of distortion required in the
first place?

By the way, what is generally known about the fighter pilots of French
air force who shot down quite a few Germans (Moelders among them) in
English language works? It's always RAF, RAF, RAF until Pearl Harbor.

There is very little in English (and not a lot in French until
recently, I gather) about the French in 1940. Nevertheless, the
French - no matter how good they were - were not in a position to
directly contribute to the air war against Germany after June 1940
(except those exiles who fought in the RAF, ironically), whereas the
RAF was. When it comes to it, the Dutch destroyed and damaged a lot
of Luftwaffe aircraft in 1940 and don't get much credit, while
disproportionate focus on RAF operations is more than matched by the
successively disproportionate focus on USAAF operations after Pearl
Harbor in English language works. So I don't think the RAF is
benefitting from this kind of approach in isolation. The Soviets have
a real grievance here, as well, in terms of having their contribution
recognised in English sources.

Indeed, but his death, along with the loss of other experten at the
same time, was a watershed for that unit.

Well, it got rotated, like German divisions of fighter groups, it was
a different system than Allied.

It wasn't rotated until it had its most effective members gutted.
This certainly happened to allied units on occasion, but the minority
"stars" didn't seem to account for the same critical proportion of
their unit combat effectiveness, although this is just a personal
opinion on my part.

That's precidely my point. Marseille did not exist in isolation, but
the impact of his death (and the other experten in the same unit lost
in the summer of 1942) was disproportionate.

Had Luftwaffe had the numbers to contest the skies over Egypt, his
death wouldn't have been so important (if it actually was). But
Germans did not have the pilots, nor the aircraft nor the fuel to keep
adequate air force in the air.

Their own fault, I'm afraid. The British, and then Americans, and
even the Soviets, faced and overcame the problems of logistical
overstretch over large geographical areas and swingeing operational
attrition while generally improving the size and quality of their air
force. The Luftwaffe did not.

Whether it was Marseille who shot down
130 aircraft, or four Fritzes with 30 victories each, the outcome
would have been the same.

The Germans and Italians still had to be beaten: a pile of aircraft
sitting around in factory depots doesn't defeat the enemy by itself.
Any material superiority (and this wasn't by any margin decisively in
the British favour in 1941-42 in North Africa) has to be translated
into operational success, and that requires the efforts of the aircrew
and air force organisation involved.

The British had similar problems of overstretch at that time
(deploying fighter units from the UK, Malta, Middle East across Asia
to India and Burma). They managed an air force in an attritional
conflict more effectively, primarily by recognising the extent of
aircrew training and development demanded by an attritional conflict
in a manner the Luftwaffe didn't.

British could afford to have such air force by having Red Army to
engage German army.

The British had their own problems of overstretch in the air, quite
seperate from any ground operations against the mass of the German
army. You might not agree, but I know for a fact from relevant
planning documents in 1941-42 than aircraft and aircrew availability
against their various commitments were a critical issue for them at
the time. The British aircraft production effort was predicated by
the need to fight and win the next Batlle of Britain, and had little
to do with facing the German army direct. These dynamics can be seen
long before Barbarossa.

If it were one-on-one, I doubt RAF by itself would
have ever won the air supremacy in Europe.

And I can say the same about every national air force, but this
doesn't do much other than conclude an argument oriented around
nationalistic posturing.

Granted, war is not a sport
event, but Luftwaffe should not be blamed for failing to prepare for
war it could never win.

The potential enemies were well-known, and the war was launched on a
German timetable, as Adolf certainly wasn't responding to external
agression. Meanwhile the British, Americans and Soviets had war
imposed on them, including the attrition endured in several major
defeats (especially in the Russian case) yet still managed to beat the
people who set the agenda. While I'm sure the individual Luftwaffe
pilots, groundstaff and aircrew did everything that could reasonably
expected, the higher direction and staff work of the Luftwaffe was
observably inferior to that achieved by their enemies. I agree with
Mr Dillard amout this issue, I'm afraid. They controlled the
development of hostilities in every case, and they lost in the end.

The heroic Siegfried myth of the Wagnerian hero facing insurmountable
hordes of untermenschen in inferior machines doesn't account for their
failure, while that failure clearly exists and needs to be accounted
for.

Gavin Bailey


--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003