If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below. |
|
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
|
#1
|
|||
|
|||
Army ends 20-year helicopter program
Army ends 20-year helicopter program
Canceled Comanche program will cost Army at least $10 billion Monday, February 23, 2004 Posted: 1:50 PM EST (1850 GMT) WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Army has decided to cancel its Comanche helicopter program, a multibillion-dollar project to build a new-generation chopper for armed reconnaissance missions, officials said Monday. The contractors for Comanche are Boeing Co. and Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. With about $8 billion already invested in the program, and the production line not yet started, the cancellation is one of the largest in the history of the Army. It follows the Pentagon's decision in 2002 to cancel the Crusader artillery program -- against the wishes of Army leaders. Pentagon officials said a public announcement was planned for Monday afternoon. Congressional lawmakers and company executives associated with the program were scrambling Monday to figure out the Pentagon's plans. Sikorsky spokesman Matthew Broder would only say that "we are on track and fully funded until we hear otherwise." The Sikorsky plant in Bridgeport, Connecticut, where the Comanche is being built, opened last year and employs about 400 workers. The Comanche has been a target of critics who say it was an expensive mistake. "The Comanche program has been plagued with wildly unrealistic technological expectations and the bugaboo of pay more and get less. Cancellation of this program would free up funds for weapons that work and meet our country's true national security needs," said Eric Miller of the Project on Government Oversight, a private watchdog group. Loren Thompson, who follows aviation and other defense issues for the Lexington Institute think tank said he believes the Army under new chief of staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker favors ending the Comanche program, even though the service had been counting on it to provide a new reconnaissance capability. "The Bush administration has now killed the two biggest Army weapons programs it inherited from the Clinton administration," Thompson said, referring to the Crusader and Comanche. Earlier this year the White House budget office asked the Pentagon to provide independent reviews of the Comanche and another expensive aviation program, the Air Force's F/A-22 Raptor fighter. Although killing the Comanche project would save tens of billion in future costs, the cancellation decision is expected to require the Army to pay at least $2 billion in contract termination fees. The Comanche program was started in 1983 and had survived many reviews. Under a restructuring worked out in 2002, a decision on going ahead with initial low-rate production was to be made in 2007, with the first Comanches delivered to the Army in 2009 and full-rate production to begin in 2010. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. |
#2
|
|||
|
|||
Garrison Hilliard wrote: Army ends 20-year helicopter program Canceled Comanche program will cost Army at least $10 billion Monday, February 23, 2004 Posted: 1:50 PM EST (1850 GMT) Commanche go bye-bye. |
#3
|
|||
|
|||
Garrison Hilliard wrote: Army ends 20-year helicopter program Canceled Comanche program will cost Army at least $10 billion Monday, February 23, 2004 Posted: 1:50 PM EST (1850 GMT) Commanche go bye-bye. |
#4
|
|||
|
|||
I love it when someone tries to be informative about a topic, but
informs us most about themselves. Let's look at what Garrison's done he 1. Illegally posted a copyrighted story. 2. Included the copyright notice, in the illegal redistribution. 3. Posted an ever-so-clever one line commentary 3. Reposted ever-so-clever one line commentary Well thank you Garrison. It's been nice getting to know you. I just wish there was some way I could read more of your wonderful work, as you clearly have so much to share. |
#5
|
|||
|
|||
"Garrison Hilliard" wrote in message ... (Snip) The Comanche program was started in 1983 and had survived many reviews. Under a restructuring worked out in 2002, a decision on going ahead with initial low-rate production was to be made in 2007, with the first Comanches delivered to the Army in 2009 and full-rate production to begin in 2010. Since this Reagan era DOD project survived the Reagan DOD evaluations, and those of Daddy Bush, and those of Bill Clinton, we now have arrived at the present situation, with our present DOD deciding that the project was unworthy of completion and not worth spending any more money on. Why do I have that uneasy feeling that brain surgery is about to be done by our neighborhood podiatrist? Why do I feel that they'd rather spend the money on some other project, like Star Wars, that they'd like rather than this one that the Army has said all along that it needs? George Z. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. |
#6
|
|||
|
|||
On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 16:34:45 -0500, "George Z. Bush"
wrote: Since this Reagan era DOD project survived the Reagan DOD evaluations, and those of Daddy Bush, and those of Bill Clinton, we now have arrived at the present situation, with our present DOD deciding that the project was unworthy of completion and not worth spending any more money on. Why do I have that uneasy feeling that brain surgery is about to be done by our neighborhood podiatrist? Why do I feel that they'd rather spend the money on some other project, like Star Wars, that they'd like rather than this one that the Army has said all along that it needs? While I'm no supporter of Star Wars (since it does damn all against a nuke arriving Fed-ex, a rather larger risk), I would point out one thing. ..... It's the Army cancelling the Comanche, at least according to the reports I've seen. My guess is the money saved will go towards more armed UAVs and (hopefully) more armed scouts of the OH-58D variety for the Guard. Of course it *could* be used to go towards making the budget a little more balanced, but that seems unlikely. Peter Kemp |
#7
|
|||
|
|||
George Z. Bush wrote:
"Garrison Hilliard" wrote in message ... (Snip) The Comanche program was started in 1983 and had survived many reviews. Under a restructuring worked out in 2002, a decision on going ahead with initial low-rate production was to be made in 2007, with the first Comanches delivered to the Army in 2009 and full-rate production to begin in 2010. Since this Reagan era DOD project survived the Reagan DOD evaluations, and those of Daddy Bush, and those of Bill Clinton, we now have arrived at the present situation, with our present DOD deciding that the project was unworthy of completion and not worth spending any more money on. Why do I have that uneasy feeling that brain surgery is about to be done by our neighborhood podiatrist? Why do I feel that they'd rather spend the money on some other project, like Star Wars, that they'd like rather than this one that the Army has said all along that it needs? The Army aviaiton community has said so all along. But Army aviation's credibility is not what it once was. It's a little hard to claim, with a stright face anyway, that the Army's next-generation scout helo needs extensive and expensive radar-frequency stealth when Apache units in Afghanistan and Iraq are getting rocked by optically-aimed guns and IR MANPADS. Granted they may not have done as badly as press reports suggest, but these wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable option. And that was what Commanche was designed around. That level of stelath was only needed to penetrate an enemy's sophisitcated battlefield air defenses and strike deep into their rear area, where the radar SAMs would live. It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's only slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting for, or why you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent surveillance radars like Longbow. Commanche may have been the right answer for fighting in the 1990s against a Soviet force with integrated air deffenses even with its mobile armored units (but I won't bet on it). But the mid 1990s, it was obviously the wrong answer. Likely some sort of replacement was needed, but Commanche was way too much helo for the job. -- Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail "If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed) |
#8
|
|||
|
|||
"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message ink.net... George Z. Bush wrote: "Garrison Hilliard" wrote in message ... (Snip) The Comanche program was started in 1983 and had survived many reviews. Under a restructuring worked out in 2002, a decision on going ahead with initial low-rate production was to be made in 2007, with the first Comanches delivered to the Army in 2009 and full-rate production to begin in 2010. Since this Reagan era DOD project survived the Reagan DOD evaluations, and those of Daddy Bush, and those of Bill Clinton, we now have arrived at the present situation, with our present DOD deciding that the project was unworthy of completion and not worth spending any more money on. Why do I have that uneasy feeling that brain surgery is about to be done by our neighborhood podiatrist? Why do I feel that they'd rather spend the money on some other project, like Star Wars, that they'd like rather than this one that the Army has said all along that it needs? The Army aviaiton community has said so all along. But Army aviation's credibility is not what it once was. It's a little hard to claim, with a stright face anyway, that the Army's next-generation scout helo needs extensive and expensive radar-frequency stealth when Apache units in Afghanistan and Iraq are getting rocked by optically-aimed guns and IR MANPADS. Granted they may not have done as badly as press reports suggest, but these wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable option. That is one hell of a leap based upon the results encountered during a single mission where the SEAD support was intentionally withheld. A lot of green suiters (outside the aviation community) thought that the emphasis on the deep attack mission was bit overdone, but to condemn the entire concept as "not viable" based upon one mission? That's a bit much. And that was what Commanche was designed around. That level of stelath was only needed to penetrate an enemy's sophisitcated battlefield air defenses and strike deep into their rear area, where the radar SAMs would live. Well, to be honest, that is not quite completely true. The Soviet (and hence it still remains a viable model since so many potential foes still use it) FAAD system did indeed include radar guided systems, both missile and gun type (even the ubiquitous ZSU-23/4 used a radar gun laying system). You could expect to encounter those kinds of systems up pretty close to the FLOT. It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's only slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting for, You think the cavalry scout helos are there only to operate in support of the attack helos? Nope. Cavalry units can be tasked to independently screen and guard at the division level; add the other required assets (i.e., additional tanks and arty support on the ground side and attack helos on the air side) and you can also do a covering force fight (though that would normally be in the corps level cavalry regimet's domain). Scout helos also support indirect fires, and with the RAH-66 it was expected to perform general deep intel collection. Personally I see the latter as stretching things a bit too far, but as to including weapons on scout helos--witness the AH-58D; that weapons capability id there for a reason. or why you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent surveillance radars like Longbow. So the attack helos can concentrate on their mission (killing bad guys), while the cavalry scouts perform their mission (screen, guard, reconnoiter, etc.). Commanche may have been the right answer for fighting in the 1990s against a Soviet force with integrated air deffenses even with its mobile armored units (but I won't bet on it). But the mid 1990s, it was obviously the wrong answer. Likely some sort of replacement was needed, but Commanche was way too much helo for the job. I think Commanche could have been of value against the old Soviet threat in a European battle environment. But I agree with your last two sentences, and it is a shame that the previous leadership (at both DoD and senior Army levels) got sucked into supporting the beast for as long as they did. Brooks -- Tom Schoene |
#9
|
|||
|
|||
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message ink.net... Granted they may not have done as badly as press reports suggest, but these wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable option. That is one hell of a leap based upon the results encountered during a single mission where the SEAD support was intentionally withheld. A lot of green suiters (outside the aviation community) thought that the emphasis on the deep attack mission was bit overdone, but to condemn the entire concept as "not viable" based upon one mission? That's a bit much. As I've said in another post, it's not just one mission. Afghanistan (especially Op ANACONDA) certainly cast some doubt on current attack helo doctrine. But I did sort of misdirect my comments here. I really should have said that these ops suggested that Comanche wasn't going to offer enough improvement in Army aviation's capability to perform these missions. As a fairly large helo (smaller than Apache, but not that much smaller), Comanche wasn't going to be dramatically less vulnerable to the sort of threats that were actually being encountered. But it was going to be a lot more expensive. Its main improvement for the performance of these missions seems to have been in sensors, which surely can be retrofitted to Apache for less money. It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's only slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting for, You think the cavalry scout helos are there only to operate in support of the attack helos? Nope. Cavalry units can be tasked to independently screen and guard at the division level; Granted. But why do they need a unique helo for this? Can't a cavalry aviation formation have attack helos the same way a cavalry ground formation has tanks? or why you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent surveillance radars like Longbow. So the attack helos can concentrate on their mission (killing bad guys), while the cavalry scouts perform their mission (screen, guard, reconnoiter, etc.). In which case, the scouts don't need heavy armament. If you were going to have a heavily armed scout, it seems like the Apache could have done that job, too with the main differences being in crew training and doctrine rather than the airframe. Given the shortcomings of the Kiowa Warrior, I get the impression that Apache units have been pretty much self-scouting in many cases anyway. -- Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail "If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed) |
#10
|
|||
|
|||
"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message news Kevin Brooks wrote: "Thomas Schoene" wrote in message ink.net... Granted they may not have done as badly as press reports suggest, but these wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable option. That is one hell of a leap based upon the results encountered during a single mission where the SEAD support was intentionally withheld. A lot of green suiters (outside the aviation community) thought that the emphasis on the deep attack mission was bit overdone, but to condemn the entire concept as "not viable" based upon one mission? That's a bit much. As I've said in another post, it's not just one mission. Afghanistan (especially Op ANACONDA) certainly cast some doubt on current attack helo doctrine. How did Anaconda do that? There they used the attack helos as CAS platforms in a rather demanding environment (helos don't like really high altitude operations that much). They performed their mission and took ground fire; one helo was lost after it had to set down during the transit back home (another Apache took an RPG round and stayed in the fight). So what universal conclusion can you reach based upon Anaconda results? Or for that matter based upon any other attack helo usage in Afghanistan? But I did sort of misdirect my comments here. I really should have said that these ops suggested that Comanche wasn't going to offer enough improvement in Army aviation's capability to perform these missions. As a fairly large helo (smaller than Apache, but not that much smaller), Comanche wasn't going to be dramatically less vulnerable to the sort of threats that were actually being encountered. But it was going to be a lot more expensive. Its main improvement for the performance of these missions seems to have been in sensors, which surely can be retrofitted to Apache for less money. I'd agree with the conclusion that Commanche did not offer enough gain to be worth its increasingly ridiculous cost. As to retrofitting sensors on Apache, another poster has already addressed the concerns that will have to be overcome if that route is followed. That would be sort of a reverse move for the Army, though-- IIRC they just finished pulling the AH-64's from the Cav units a few years ago in favor of the AH-58D. It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's only slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting for, You think the cavalry scout helos are there only to operate in support of the attack helos? Nope. Cavalry units can be tasked to independently screen and guard at the division level; Granted. But why do they need a unique helo for this? Can't a cavalry aviation formation have attack helos the same way a cavalry ground formation has tanks? The AH-58D became the standard Cav scout/light attack aircraft for the DIV Cav squadrons years ago, and the Apaches reside in the attack battalions at both DIV and Corps level, except for the airborne and light divisions, which have AH-58D's in their *attack* units (the 101st AASLT DIV retained the Apache). You are somewhat mixing your unit definitions a bit, too--cavalry units, be they corps or division level, are combined arms teams that already include *both* ground and air components (at DIV level the mix is three ground troops and two air troops, while at the corps level the regiment is made up of three ground squadrons and an air squadron). Yes, you can *augment* the cavalry unit's firepower by attaching some number of Apaches to it (if, for example, you wanted your DIV Cav unit to conduct a cover mission, which is normally beyond its capabilities). The current "unique helo", the AH-58D, is quite capable of performing the normal range of cavalry duties, and can perfrm adequately in the light attack role--why would you want to pull Apaches away from their normal attack duties and try and turn them into cavalry platforms? or why you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent surveillance radars like Longbow. So the attack helos can concentrate on their mission (killing bad guys), while the cavalry scouts perform their mission (screen, guard, reconnoiter, etc.). In which case, the scouts don't need heavy armament. Uhmmm...look up what is involved with both screen and guard missions. Both involve the potential of direct combat (guard moreso than screening). Then there is that pesky fact that we have *only* AH-58D's assigned to the light and airborne divisions... If you were going to have a heavily armed scout, it seems like the Apache could have done that job, too with the main differences being in crew training and doctrine rather than the airframe. Again, you are going to be pulling them away from their primary role of being killing platforms. The 58D is a little smaller (a good thing for the sneak and peek role) and is easier to get into theater via airlift. It apparently performs quite well in the scout role, so why remove attack assets from the force structure to replace them? Given the shortcomings of the Kiowa Warrior, I get the impression that Apache units have been pretty much self-scouting in many cases anyway. Not sure what "shortcomings" you would be referring to in the case of the D model. And you have sort of made a point that goes against your earlier claim that the scouts are there "only" to support the attack helos. In actuality they support the entire force; they *can* and often *do* support the Apaches, but not always, and not exclusively. Brooks -- Tom Schoene |
|
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
Similar Threads | ||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
FA: 3 MASH Model Kits- Medical, Swamp, Helicopter - Ends Tomorrow | Disgo | Aviation Marketplace | 0 | February 21st 04 02:35 PM |
bush rules! | Be Kind | Military Aviation | 53 | February 14th 04 04:26 PM |
Army fears skilled helicopter pilots will fly away | Otis Willie | Military Aviation | 0 | January 11th 04 11:48 PM |
Warszaw Pact War Plans ( The Effects of a Global Thermonuclear War ...) | Matt Wiser | Military Aviation | 0 | December 7th 03 08:20 PM |
French block airlift of British troops to Basra | Michael Petukhov | Military Aviation | 202 | October 24th 03 06:48 PM |