Dover short pilots since vaccine order

http://www.healthsentinel.com/news.p...st_item&id=503

Hiran Ratnayake and Lee Williams, "Dover short pilots since vaccine
order", Delaware News Journal, December 28, 2004,
Link:
http://www.delawareonline.com/newsjo...hortpilot.html

When the military ordered all military personnel bound for Korea and
the Middle East to be inoculated with the anthrax vaccine, pilots
staged a massive walkout at Dover Air Force Base, where the Air Force's
largest cargo aircraft are flown.

That was more than five years ago.

Today, with Dover playing an integral role in the war against terror,
the base is still strapped for qualified pilots, former pilots say. Lt.
Col. Jay Lacklen, in charge of hiring pilots for the 326th Airlift
Squadron in 1999, says his former squadron is still "about 10 short of
full strength." The other reserve squadron, the 709th Airlift Squadron,
suffered an equally debilitating loss. No information was available on
how it has since fared.

After the Clinton administration order to get the vaccine, 55 of 120
pilots at DAFB's two flying reserve squadrons failed to show up for
drills during two weekends in June 1999. That spring, Brig. Gen. Peter
Sullivan, wing commander at the base, ordered C-5 pilots to cease
duties unless they received the vaccine during drills.

Only one of the 55 pilots showed up during the next six months, Lacklen
said. Of the other pilots, some quit the Air Force altogether, others
traded their flying jobs for staff jobs. Only a handful resumed their
C-5 duties. Reserves can leave the unit if they refuse to take the
shot, unlike active-duty pilots in the base's 436th Airlift Wing who
can be punished if they disobey orders.

Current commanders at DAFB would not comment about the walkoff.

The controversy at Dover, and the sudden drop in response readiness,
was little noticed outside the military.

Status of Resources & Training Systems, known as SORTS, informs the
Pentagon on the strength of military units. SORTS has five categories.
Category 1 means a unit is full combat ready. Category 5 is the lowest,
and means a unit is "not prepared to undertake the mission set for
which it is organized or designed," according to a 2003 Air Force SORTS
report, the most recent available.

Reviewed by The News Journal, the report said that because of a lack of
pilots, both reserve flying squadrons of DAFB were downgraded to the
lowest category after the 1999 walkoff. The SORTS report assessed the
326th Airlift Squadron's most current strength as Category 2, or fit
for "most of the wartime mission(s)," but still suffering from a loss
of "flexibility."

Retired Master Sgt. Karen Ploof, a wing manager for SORTS at Westover
Air Reserve Base in Chicopee, Mass., said she heard of other bases that
suffered pilot losses because of the anthrax vaccine issue, but none as
severe as Dover.

"If you lose half your pilots, you've just lost a lot of money," she
said. "You've got a problem."

Based on pilot training cost estimates, the military lost between $49.5
million and $55 million during the walkoff.

The C-5 pilots who did not show up for drills in June were still listed
on unit status reports for six months in case of a national emergency,
in which time they could be re-qualified with two or three training
flights. Sullivan, wing commander at DAFB from 1998 to 2002, says the
walkoff was a disruption but it is being mischaracterized by Lacklen
and other Dover pilots.

"In my recollection, they did not leave in large enough numbers at one
particular time to give us a SORTS rating where it would warrant an
outside investigation," Sullivan said. "It was manageable for me as a
wing commander."

Now a major general and mobilization assistant at the Pentagon,
Sullivan said reserve pilots left their flying duties for a
"combination of events," such as war concerns, family pressures,
retirement eligibility and the anthrax vaccine.

"In a series of events in their lives, the uncertainty of the safety of
the anthrax vaccine was just another reason," he said.

Lacklen, who lives in Dover, said most pilots left primarily because of
anthrax. Retired Dover commander Col. Felix Grieder told The News
Journal earlier this year that he believes his troops were the subjects
of illegal experiments. Grieder temporarily halted the program, a move
he says ended his military career. The military later admitted the
anthrax vaccine administered at Dover contained squalene.

Neither the military nor the Food and Drug Administration test for
squalene, a substance that occurs naturally in the body and has been
used to boost a vaccine's effect. Some experts say even trace amounts
of squalene in vaccines can harm the immune system, causing arthritis,
neurological problems, memory loss and incapacitating migraine
headaches.

"No unit loses 40 percent of its pilots in one month, unexpectedly,
without something being drastically wrong," Lacklen said.

Pilots were already short

The exodus in Dover came as concerns about retaining pilots was rising.

Several months before the 55 pilots left, in March 1999, a government
official with the U.S. Congressional Budget Office testified on Capitol
Hill on pilot retention.

"Both the Air Force and the Navy currently cite shortages of pilots
that are expected to persist for the foreseeable future," said
Christopher Jehn, then the assistant director for the budget office.
"In the Air Force, the shortage will worsen over the next several
years."

Jehn noted in his testimony that the cost of training one new military
pilot exceeds $1 million.

During wars, C-5 Galaxys deliver all types of equipment, from tanks to
toilet paper. Since these planes are unarmed, the pilot-in-command and
the co-pilot controlling them learn defensive tactics to minimize
exposure to enemy fire.

All military pilots, regardless of what airplane they will fly, go
through 52 weeks of basic pilot training to earn their wings. C-5
pilots get an additional three months of specialized training. After
several years of experience, they can enroll in a three-week course to
become a C-5 instructor pilot.

According to 2nd Lt. Ashley Norris, a spokeswoman for Altus Air Force
Base, the cost to train a C-5 pilot is nearly $900,000. The figure
varies, and includes the costs for training devices, aircraft
maintenance, pilot operations and room and board.

During training, retired Air Force Maj. Hans Reigle said he was
constantly reminded that millions of dollars were being spent to train
him and fellow pilots. Reigle, an instructor pilot, had been flying C-5
planes for 20 years. Anticipating Sullivan's order, he left his flying
job for a desk job, where he would not need a shot, before the drills.

"I still have questions on how they could let so many people leave,"
said Reigle, who lives in Wyoming, Del. "Not only were they losing
almost half the reserve wing but they also lost a lot of qualified
people who had flown for thousands of hours. It meant they had to find
new people to train for the next war."

The hemorrhaging of pilots did alarm commanders.

Sullivan, who interviewed pilots on why they did not submit to his
order, wrote Reigle a letter July 12, 1999, urging him to reconsider
his decision to leave his job as instructor pilot. "Your squadron, this
Wing, our Air Force, and the nation need you and the expertise and
experience you possess," Sullivan wrote. "I know we in leadership put a
lot of demands on your precious time and put requirements on your
plate, but you represent a vital part of our nation's defense. So I am
vitally interested in why you are considering this decision."

Reigle continued to be listed as a C-5 pilot on the unit status report.
So did Jim "Zeke" Przygocki, another of the pilots who left.

"I have never technically trained for anything else other than to be a
pilot," said Przygocki, who lives in Dover and works for commercial
airlines. "We were trained for millions of dollars, but all of a sudden
we were copy boys. They'd have us sit in the office and answer
telephones everyday or look for typos in their publications."

Scramble to replace

In the months that followed, the military grew desperate to replace the
pilots who left, Lacklen said. Navy and Coast Guard helicopter pilots
were hired in their stead.

"At first we went looking for C-5 pilots but there weren't any of
those," Lacklen said. "The helicopter guys were very capable but they
didn't have a lot of fixed wing experience. Those were some of the only
guys available. It was a terrible hit because it was some of the most
experienced guys who left."

"To an extent that's true," Sullivan said. "We had fairly new people
and we spent most of our time instructing. But that's not bad, because
you get more work as an instructor. It's just more difficult work."

Half the departed were instructor pilots, Lacklen said. His squadron
fell from 58 qualified C-5 pilots to the low 30s by the end of June
1999. When December 1999 came around, his squadron still had almost 20
pilot positions to fill. Sullivan said the base replaced all the pilots
who left in 2001. While he said the Air Force should have done a better
job of educating its pilots on the vaccine, he does not regret his
order, which was passed down to him by superiors.

"I understood the risk involved," he said. "I badly wanted to retain
the pilots. I had a personal interview with everyone who left and I
listened to them. That was all I could do."

Lacklen said the order to take the shot was the biggest mistake base
commanders made.

"It was a severe hit, it was catastrophic," said Lacklen, who saw
combat during the Vietnam War. "If they lost that many pilots in the
1970s when I was in strategic air command, there would be a four-star
general down here firing everybody. He'd want to know why you'd lost
the pilots and then he'd fire everybody for having lost them. But they
couldn't do that in Dover because the vaccine was the reason they lost
the pilots."

Contact Hiran Ratnayake at 324-2547 or .
Contact Lee Williams at 324-2362 or .