Thunderstorm - Ron Knott

I received this as a part of an e-mail today and thought I'd pass it
along for what it's worth. Makes an interesting read.

There are a couple of others that I haven't managed to finish yet and
I'll pass them along also--- Greasy


THUNDERSTORM FLIGHT
*
It was a beautiful Florida Saturday morning, in August 1962, when a
flight of seven F-8 Crusaders from Fighter Squadron 62 took off from
Cecil Field, near Jacksonville, heading for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. I
well remember LTJG Tom Malloy laughing and pointing to his new flight
suit as we briefed for the long flight that morning. He had been
issued the flight suit the day before and had not tried it on. It was
about three sizes too big and he looked lost in that tent size
costume. There was no way to exchange it for another one since it was
Saturday and the supply office was closed. Tom had a wonderful sense
of humor and accepted our kidding with a big smile. That is the way I
remember him until this day.
*
As you will recall this time and date was just prior to the ‘Cuban
Missile Crisis’. Our mission was to demonstrate a ‘show of force’ at
the small Naval Base on the southeastern side of Cuba. I had joined
VF-62 just a few weeks earlier and this was my first major deployment
with the squadron. I was a ‘Nugget’ as they call the new pilots fresh
out of flight school. Two Divisions, eight airplanes, were scheduled
to deploy that morning but one of the airplanes had mechanical
problems. LCDR Paul Gillcrist was scheduled to be the second Division
leader but he never got airborne due to a radio problem as I recall.
Therefore, we had a flight of 4 and a flight of
3 F-8’s heading for Cuba.
*
We went "Feet Wet" (over water) just north of Miami. About 150 miles
southeast from Miami, over the Caribbean, we entered an area of very
low visibility at our cruising altitude of 39,000 feet. Our forward
visibility was one mile or less. We had no weather radar. In fact the
radar on board the F-8B had a maximum range of 16 miles and most of
them never worked. The weather briefing we received before the flight
made no mention of severe weather along our route of flight. We were
unaware that huge thunderstorms were hidden in the haze ahead.
Nevertheless these cumulonimbus demons were in our flight path and
were about to inflect major damage to our flight.
*
The Skipper, John Brozo (Diamond Flight) was leading the first
division of 4 airplanes. His flight consisted of LTJG Tom Malloy,
Diamond two, LT Dick Oliver, Diamond three, and LTJG Ben Walker,
Diamond four. In my flight of three airplanes were LT Al Wattay,
Division leader, LT John Nichols (Pirate) right wing and myself flying
left wing position. LT Wattay positioned our flight about 5 miles aft
and two miles abeam Diamond Flight. Although the visibility was low
the ride was fairly smooth as I recall.
*
Everything was going great until I heard the Skipper say in a very
loud and frantic voice, "DIAMOND ONE FLAMED OUT!" And as my heart was
elevating up into my throat I heard his wingman LTJG Tom Malloy saying
with even more fear in his voice, "DIAMOND TWO FLAMED OUT." Before I
could suck up more oxygen I heard the Skipper say, "DIAMOND ONE
EJECTING - STAY WITH ME IF YOU CAN!" Just seconds later I heard LT
Dick Oliver say, "DIAMOND THREE FLAMING OUT." Almost instantaneously
another call came into my headset, "DIAMOND TWO EJECTING." Nothing was
heard from Diamond Four. We thought he went down as well.
*
WOW! This was my first major cross-country with the squadron and the
airplanes were falling out of the sky. I was anxiously waiting for my
engine to quit as well. We were only seconds away from their position.
I was very tense to say the least. My heartbeat was louder than the
jet engine. However our flight of three flew through the same area,
basically at the same time, without any problems. It took many months
and numerous accident investigations to determine how our flight made
it through this area without any problems. I’ll explain why later.
*
The F-8 was a great fighter as long as the engine was running.
However, an engine flameout causes instant electrical and hydraulic
power loss. In addition, at the higher altitudes, the canopy fogs over
almost immediately. We were at 39,000 feet and the pilots who lost
engine power experienced all of the above instantaneously. This makes
the great fighter not too ‘user-friendly’ to say the least. All flight
instruments go ape, the airspeed decreases rapidly and the flight
controls freeze since there is no hydraulic power. In a situation like
this the pilot is just along for the ride, but he is frantically
trying to regain control of that hunk of metal falling through space
by instant recall of his emergency procedures. All the while he is
being slammed around in the cockpit like a sock in a washing machine.
The Navy had a term called ‘Over Learning.’ All pilots had to go over
and over emergency procedures time and time again until they could
respond automatically, in any situation, without thinking. This rote
memory of learning saved a lot of pilots and planes.
*
One of the undesirable characteristics of the F-8 is that when the
indicated airspeed reduces below 170 KIAS it will automatically enter
into a spin with just a little aileron or spoiler input. Due to the
conditions of this flight, listed above, these flamed- out Crusaders
automatically entered into a spin. It was very tough to recover the
F-8 from a spin in day VFR conditions. Add a big bad thunderstorm to
the equation, with the engine flamed out, the flight controls frozen,
the airplane spinning, and the canopy iced over makes recovery nothing
short of a miracle.
*
The F-8 was equipped with an emergency air driven generator that also
provided emergency hydraulics for primary flight controls. This Ram
Air Turbine (RAT), when extended into the air stream, was designed to
recover part of the electrical power and part of the hydraulic power
as well. The emergency generator switch had to be turned on after
dropping the RAT, or no electrical power would be supplied to the
aircraft. This procedure was easy to omit. The RAT restored hydraulic
power necessary for spin recovery and electrical power for a re-light
of the engine in this big bad cumulonimbus cloud.
*
It takes a few seconds for the RAT to come up to speed after
deployment. Sometimes, like in this case, those few seconds can feel
like an eternity. As I recall LT Oliver said in the accident report,
"The airplane was spinning before the RAT became effective." This is
kind of like the parachute riggers jokingly saying, "If it don’t work
bring it back and we will give you another one!"
*
Yet, with all this adversity Diamond Three, LT Dick Oliver, did
recover from the spin, and got his engine running again. This was by
no means an easy task. He first had to extend the RAT to regain flight
control and then he had to recover from the spin. A spinning F-8 may
go from 10 degrees nose up to 190 degrees nose down, while pulling
from plus 4 to minus 3 G’s, all the while rotating rapidly like a west
Texas twister. This short paragraph does not do justice for the superb
airmanship that Lt Oliver demonstrated that dreadful day.
*
Spin recovery procedures in the F-8 were very different and extremely
difficult. While experiencing the violent maneuvers noted above the
pilot had to move both hands to the left console and unlock the
pneumatic switch for emergency extending the leading edge landing
droop. This extended droop changed the aerodynamics of the wing and
served to get the stalled wing producing lift again. In addition, full
aft stick, and full aileron into the rotation of the spin was
required. At the same time full opposite rudder into the spin was
essential. This condition was held until the rotation stopped and only
then could the nose be brought up to pull out of the dive. If the
airplane was in un-controlled flight at 10,000 AGL the pilot was
required to eject. After recovering from a spin the leading edge
landing droop could not be retracted in the air. This placed speed and
‘G’ restrictions on the airplane. In addition the maximum range was
reduced consequentially as well. Needless to say that spins were to be
avoided and when one developed it left you with a crippled airplane.
*
The emergency engine air start procedure was a lengthy process. A lot
of altitude was lost during the re-start procedure. During this time
you were falling out of the sky like a rock. The pilot had to insure
that the RAT had been deployed and the emergency generator switch was
ON in order to supply electrical power to the igniters, which was
required to start the jet engine. If I remember correctly you tried to
establish airspeed around 200 KIAS, plus or minus 30 KIAS. This speed
supplied enough ram air through the engine intake to windmill the
engine from 17% to 30% RPM. Once these parameters were met the
throttle and ignition could be selected. If you got fuel flow of at
least 750 Pounds Per Hour the engine should relight. If not repeat the
procedures again, if you had enough altitude. Last choice was to make
a nylon descent via the ejection system.
*
When my flight leader, LT Al Wattay, heard the radio transmissions
from Diamond flight he advanced power by selecting the afterburner,
accelerated to MACH ONE and we climbed to 50,000 feet. LT Nichols
(Pirate) and I were hanging on his wing as best we could. Little did
we know at the time that the extra speed and altitude is what saved
our flight and possibly our lives. It was brought out in the accident
report that the Skipper of Diamond flight had let his formation slow
to below Mach .70, which is very slow at that altitude. They also
determined that it was a good possibility that vertical wind shears
could cause a flame out during such conditions due to reduced air
through the intake to the engine. In addition the older models F-8’s
were not equipped with engine anti-ice. This was also a factor in the
accident. Due to the fact that LT Wattay accelerated our flight to a
much higher airspeed the wind shear had no effect on our engines. In
addition climbing to a higher altitude removed us out of the icing
area. Thanks LT Wattay for great airmanship that day.
*
We proceeded on to Guantanamo after making "MAYDAY" calls and
reporting the crash site position on guard to the search and rescue
Air Force squadron in Miami. There was no way for us to locate the
downed pilots since the weather was clogged in all the way to the
deck. And besides that we just barely had enough fuel to fly to
Guantanamo. There were no Texaco Tankers available that day.
*
After landing in Cuba we assumed that three aircraft had been lost. We
still had no word from Diamond Four. All of sudden we heard an F-8
coming into the area at the speed of heat. We were very thrilled to
see Diamond Four, Lt Ben Walker, overhead. Later he told us that he
had lost his generator in the midst of all the excitement, dropped his
RAT for electrical power, but never regained his radio. All that he
knew was that his flight had disappeared in the clag.
*
Diamond One, the Skipper, was found two days after the accident by an
Air Force rescue crew, flying an amphibious aircraft. They landed in
very rough seas and retrieved CDR Brozo from his one-man life raft. He
had suffered a broken back due to the ejection. The F-8 had an
explosive cartridge in the ejection system that hit you in the butt
with mega ‘Gs’ when ejecting. A spin produces a lot of negative ‘Gs’.
The Skipper said that he was in a negative ‘G’ flight when he ejected.
This could explain his broken back due to the extra hit in the rear by
the ejection seat. He was later relieved of his command for taking his
flight through a thunderstorm. Yet, he had no way of knowing that
severe weather was in his flight path.
*
Diamond Two, Tom Malloy, was never found. About three years later his
helmet washed ashore on one of the small islands in the Caribbean. He
was reported missing until that time. We never really knew what happen
to him after he called "Ejecting." The Skipper said that his ejection
was very rough. After landing in the water he almost drowned by his
parachute pulling him under. The wind on the surface was very strong.
Under those conditions a parachute in the water can be deadly. If Tom
was injured during ejection, as the Skipper was, his survival would
have been in jeopardy.
*
The following is what a pilot may experience when ejecting from a fast
flying airplane at high altitude. As you can imagine it is a hazardous
experience to say the least. As stated above the explosive charge in
the ejection seat can give you quite a kick in the butt. This big kick
is necessary to insure that the pilot clears the vertical tail of the
airplane during an ejection. The first sequence in an ejection is for
the canopy to separate from the airplane. If it does not separate the
pilot is shot through the canopy. If the pilot ejects at 40,000 feet
he is quick to feel the cold rushing wind hitting his body at the
speed at which he ejected; let’s say 400 KTS for example. It may be 60
degrees below zero at that altitude and with very little oxygen to
breathe. This is not too good for the boys in summer flying suits. The
pilot cannot survive in that environment very long because he would
freeze to death and or die from hypoxia (lack of oxygen). The ejection
system is designed so that a small drogue parachute, about the size of
an umbrella, extends immediately after ejecting. This small chute
prevents the pilot from tumbling during descent, but he is still
falling like a brick. The ejection seat is equipped with an emergency
oxygen bottle that will last about 10 minutes for just such high
dives. This system can be used under water as well. That is if your
mask has not been ripped from your face during the high-speed exit of
the airplane.
*
The pilot, still strapped in the ejection seat, will free-fall, in
this case 30,000 feet, before the main chute opens. He is traveling at
the ‘speed of heat’ straight down. This sequence is supposed to open
the main parachute automatically by a barometric release, which is
normally set for operating at 10,000 feet above ground level. When
that altitude is reached a bladder in the seat inflates pushing the
pilot out of the seat and then the main parachute deploys. If the
automatic system does not work then the pilot can manually push the
ejection seat aside and pull the ‘D-Ring’ for the chute to open. How
does the pilot know when he reaches 10,000 feet? He can only estimate
his altitude by visual references. In a thunderstorm that is
impossible. In a storm such as this there would be limited visibility,
which would make it impossible to estimate your altitude. In addition
the pilot is in heavy rain, or hail, severe turbulence, and possible
heavy lightning.
*
Presume that the pilot gets a good parachute opening at 10,000 feet
and floats gracefully down to the waiting ocean. He still has a lot of
emergency procedures to accomplish to insure his survival. First, and
most importantly, he must unhook from the life saving parachute, which
becomes a death trap once it hits the water. When a parachute is
filled with water it will sink like a rock taking the pilot down as
well. If the pilot’s hands or arms are injured it may be impossible to
release the parachute. This quickly turns into a very serious
condition. In addition, once the parachute is released from the
pilot’s harness shroud lines from the chute may entangle the pilot.
These lines may snare him and take him under. For that reason all Navy
pilots carried an open knife, with a hook blade, attached to their
harness to cut the shroud lines if necessary.
*
If all of the above was accomplished without incident, the pilot still
had a lot of work to do. He must inflate his life vest to keep him
afloat since he is burdened with about 50 pounds of flight gear. At
this time he needs to deploy and inflate his one-man life raft that is
stored in a packet, which is attached to his harness. In this parcel
are such items as shark chaser, dye marker, signal mirror, fishing
hooks, a small salt-water distillery to convert seawater to fresh
drinking water, and a host of other small things.
*
Boarding the one-man life raft is no easy task in a swimming pool and
it becomes even more difficult in rough seas or if he is injured. Once
on board the little rubber raft a big wave can dump you back in the
water very quickly and totally mess up your command at sea. You must
re-board the little ‘private yacht’ or the sharks may eat you for
dessert. This could go on for days. These are the conditions that
Diamond One and Diamond Two were faced with that dreadful day.
*
The news media in our city broadcasted that all planes in our flight
were lost at sea. Of course that placed undue and unnecessary stress
on our families and friends. Communications back then were very
antiquated. It took hours for the facts, as we knew them, to get back
to our home base.
*
Thereafter this story was told many times in pilot training. The
point was made loud and clear to never fly into a thunderstorm.
*
I record this account in tribute to my fallen comrades. CDR John
(Diamond) Brozo, deceased; LT Dick (Smooooth One) Oliver, deceased
killed with the Blue Angels; LTJG Tom Malloy, killed on this flight;
LT Ben (Bugger) Walker (deceased); LT John (Pirate) Nichols, deceased.
As far as I know LT Al Wattay is still living. Note: The rank
indicated is the rank these officers held at the time of this
accident.
*
In this narrative I was amazed at how many emergency procedures I
could recall after 40 years. This information is 100% from my memory
and not from documents or other sources. This again proves the point
that the military drilled unto all pilots the ‘Over Learning’ process.
Most pilots could do the same. God bless.
*
Ron Knott 5/2005